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Abstract 
This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the design of profit sharing contracts 
which maximise the surplus a principal extracts from an agency relationship, whereby a 
pay floor limits the liability of an agent in low profit states, and information is either 
unilaterally or bi-laterally asymmetric. 
In the first of three problems examined by the thesis, we explore the impact of imposing a 
floor to agent pay in a bi-lateral mformation asymmetry game, in which the agent is pnor 
mformed about the marginal productivity of capital. The principal (investor) privately 
observes the realisation of an ex ante uncertain opportunity cost of capital, and the ex 
post allocation of the agent is a fixed share of revenue net of some proportion of capital 
cost The principal separates agents through a contract menu parametismg by agent type, 
a capital stock decision and associated proportional division of capital cost. We find that 
only the information private to the agent creates an inefficiency in the optimal level of 
investment, and that the welfare costs of th1s private information are mitigated by hm1ting 
the agent's liability. 
In the second information problem with limited agent liability, we consider moral hazard 
due to unobservable effort. We advance the theory of incentives by analysing a 
contingent share ratiO contract m which the ratio of agent to principal pay is a constant 
whose value depends on the attainment of a pre-specified profit target. We reveal an 
efficiency loss in comparison to lump-sum bonus schemes and show the significance to 
the principal of precise information concerning agent risk aversion. We then derive 
(sufficient) conditions for Pareto improvements from capital substirutwn by the agent and 
the availability of additional signals used to infer effort. 
Finally, we examine optimal contract design by an investor for a combined problem of 
moral hazard and adverse selectiOn, in which an agent whose pay carmot be less than 
zero, supplies unobservable effort, and is prior informed about the marginal productivity 
of effort and capital 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Information and agency 
Since the pioneering work ofMirrlees (1971,1974) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
study of the economics of information has evolved to understand how economic agents 
attempt to deal with their ignorance concerning information which affects them. The 
decisions that these agents take are intended to either acquire new information or to avoid 
some cost attributed to the1r ignorance. When this information is distributed 
asymmetrically among agents, then these decisions are to determine the design of 
contracts which attempt to mitigate the cost of ignorance, and/or induce the revelation of 
relevant private information. 
One strand of the literature on contract theory (see review by Hart and Holmstrom 
( 1985)) which has focused on the internal organisatiOn of the firm, uses agency theory as 
the representative contract paradigm. An agency is essentially an economic arrangement 
in which two or more ind1v1duals share an outcome (say profit or revenue) which depends 
on the ex post realisation of an ex ante uncertain economic envuonmental variable 
(referred to as the state of nature) and a productive input (say effort) supplied by at least 
one of the agents 
An agency may be viewed as a game. As a way of solving the game, the agency is 
embedded in a market that determines the expected utility of all the players except one, 
who extracts all the rent from the game. Tius latter player (referred to as the principal) 
offers a contract to the other players on a take-it or leave-1t basis. Thus all bargaining 
power res1des With the principal, in contrast to games in which bargaining power is 
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distributed amongst players who determine the ex post allocation of the expected surplus 
according to their relative bargaining strengths (Binrnore et a! (1986)). 
An agency may commonly arise because the principal requires an agent(s) to undertake a 
task which is either too complicated or too costly for the principal to do himself. Some 
examples of principal-agent relationships include (amongst many others) that of insurer 
and insured, lawyer and client, and government and regulated industry. 
There are many ways to structure the distribution of mformation in an agency. This 
structure greatly affects the nature of the game. A moral hazard problem arises when an 
informatwnal asymmetry arises after the contract has been signed An adverse selection 
problem exists when the agent has relevant private information before the contract is 
signed Lastly, a signallzng game arises when the informed party is able to reveal private 
information via individual behaviour prior to formalising the contract. 
1.2 Limited liability share contracts 
In this thesis, we consider problems of moral hazard and adverse selection We examine a 
principal-agent relationship in which we impose a hmited liability fee schedule that 
awards the agent a piecewise-linear share, that is one for which the allocation to the agent 
over each domain of possible outcomes is some fixed (domain dependent) proportion of 
the outcome, but for which his monetary reward carmot be less than some threshold 
amount (which can be zero). The motivatiOn for examining limited liability contracts 
derives from the frequency with which these conditions are present in everyday life. This 
fact is illustrated by the relatively low criminal penalties applied in the case of 
bankruptcy In the case of employment contracts, many legal restrictions implicitly or 
explicitly limit the worker's liability. Such restrictions include laws which impose a 
minimum wage, and laws which exonerate workers from liability for damages caused 
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during the execution of a contrad. Additionally, limited liability is studied in the context 
of (piecewise) linear (profit/revenue) sharmg contracts The main reasons for this (apart 
from their simplicity and the abundance of linear schemes witnessed m practice) are two-
fold. 
Firstly, it has been clrumed that linear (cash) sharing contracts give rise to advantages 
over their fixed wage counterparts at both a microeconom1c and macroeconomic level. At 
a microeconomic level, profit sharing contracts have been cited as productivity 
enhancing. Jones and SveJnar (1985) point to the positive effects of profit shanng on 
improving the awareness and sense of responsibility that workers feel, which gives nse to 
greater labour tenure and a resultant increase in firm specific human capital that increases 
productivity. Cable and F1tzroy (1980) identify productivity affects that emanate from a 
greater identification between workers and management. The most notable criticism of 
productivity enhancement from profit sharing IS due to a "free-rider" problem (Jensen and 
Meckling (1979)), in which shirking may arise in large organisations where group 
mcentive schemes (viz-a-viz individual incentive schemes) give each worker only a small 
fraction of the mcremental profit derived from their additional effort. 
At a macroeconomic level, Weitzman (1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987) has cited the 
potential of these contracts to cure stagflation (the coexistence of high inflation and 
unemployment) if adopted as the economy-wide method for worker remuneratiOn. 
According to Weitzman, stagflation is caused by the relative inflexibility of money wages 
in the face of product-demand shocks, with a monopolistically competitive market 
structure underlying a wage-push inflationary spiral. According to Weitzman, by driving 
a wedge between the marginal and average cost of labour, economy-wide profit sharing 
creates a persistent excess demand for labour which ensures that the economy stays at full 
employment. Since unemployment is then cured, monetary policy can successfully be 
1 Limited hablllly piecew1se hnear profit sharmg contract forms are also Witnessed m lslam1c venture 
capital fmancmg, whereby a (zero capital partiCipatmg) entrepreneur shares profits but not losses (Vogel 
and Hayes (1998)) 
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used to target inflation alone. Weitzman's theory is certainly not Without its critics (see 
amongst others, Eaton (1985), Levine (1987), Nuti (1987), Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1988), Wadhwani (1987), Estrin and Wadhwani (1990)). For example, Nuti (1987) and 
Estrin and Wadhwani (1990) cite the failure to link increased risk bearing without some 
measure of worker participation in the decisions of the firm as a major flaw in the 
argument, since incumbent workers are in reality likely to restrict employment expansion 
given its affect on their share ratio. Some critics (for example, Nuti (1987)) instead 
constder the marginal cost of a worker to be the sum of base wage and profit share and 
not just the base wage, thereby inferring no such comparative employment advantage of 
the type proffered by Weitzman. Others (for example, Wadhwani (1987)) suggest a 
failing in the theory since Weitzman does not supplement his theory with a description of 
how wage parameters are determined, instead being content to specifY that they are fixed 
exogenously The employment creating potential offered by profit sharing imphcitly 
assumes that profit sharing firms could lower total compensation to workers in the short 
run. However, since all firms (both share and wage) must offer the same total 
remuneration to workers m the long run, a weakness arises since no link between the 
short and long run is provided. 
Notwithstandmg fervent criticism, Weitzman's claims have been so influential that the 
British government decided to subsidise profit related pay schemes in the 1987 Finance 
Act. That fixed wages are so widely adopted as the standard remuneration paradigm may 
be more as a result of inertia than economic rationale. Throughout this thesis, the 
piecewise-linear share scheme is adopted as the basic contract form. 
The second motivation for imposing a (ptecewise) linear form of fee schedule, is that 
linear share contracts appear to be robust. As will become apparent in the following 
chapter, when effort carmot be verified, and carmot therefore be contracted upon, 
mcentive contracts must be designed to give the agent a self-mterested reason to supply a 
greater effort. These contracts ensure that the agent's remuneration is affected in a 
positive way by the effort that he supplies. A fixed wage contract carmot posstbly realise 
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this effect. Further, Holmstrom and Milgrom (I 987) have shown that linear schemes as 
incentive contracts ensure that the agent's behaviour and the payoffs to both principal and 
agent change only very slightly when small changes are made m the specifications of an 
agency game. In contrast, "models that derive optimal rules in which small differences m 
outcomes lead to large differences in compensatiOn are invariably based on the 
assumption that the agent finds it impossible, or very expensive, to cause small changes 
in individual outcomes. The optimal rule in such cases is usually inordmately sensitive to 
the distnbutional assumptions of the model" (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) pp 325-
326) Thus, given this consideration, there is a case to bring for examining problems in 
which a linear form of share contract is Imposed ex ante. 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
In this section we will outline the scope and contribution of the thesis As a whole, the 
thes1s makes a theoretical contribution to the understanding of the way in which limiting 
the liability of an agent in the context of mformational asymmetry affects the design of 
contracts by a principal with whom the agent transacts a profit sharing agreement. 
Chapter 2 qualitatively presents some of the more relevant theory from received literature 
concerning the economics of information. We explain the ideas of moral hazard and 
adverse selection, providing illustration With the use of frequently cited examples Game 
theoretic concepts used in the thesis are explained m detml. We then provide a formal 
literature review of limited liability in the context of information asymmetnes, thereby 
identifYing the contributions of this thesis in relation to existing literature. 
Chapter 3 examines a problem m which an investor entirely funds the project of an agent 
who is privately informed as to the marginal productivity of capital. In contrast to the 
approach taken in a majority of the profit sharing literature, we emphasise the importance 
of the way in wh1ch the surplus generated for apportionment between principal (mvestor) 
and agent (entrepreneur) is defined with respect to the deductibility of capital costs. A 
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bilateral information asymmetry model is developed, in which both the agent and the 
princ1pal are separately endowed With private information wh1ch determines the utility of 
the other party to the contract. The principal pnvately observes the realisation of an ex 
ante uncertain unit cap1tal cost and smce some proportion of this cost is shared with the 
agent, the agent requires a floor to his ex post allocation in order to participate. It is found 
that only the information private to the agent creates an inefficiency in the optimal level 
of investment for the princ1pal. The welfare costs of private agent informatiOn upon 
investment are mitigated when the liab11ity of the agent is hmited. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine a moral hazard problem in which an agent with limited liability 
supplies unobservable effort. In the absence of the restriction of non-negative pay (see 
2 2.1.1 ), a risk averse agent can be induced to supply the socially optimal (first-best) 
effort by the use of the threat ofunhmited punishment for low outcomes (profit/revenue) 
(Holmstrom (1979), Gjesdal (1976), Mmlees (1974)). It is also well known (Harris and 
Rav!V (1979), Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979)) that the first-best effort is supplied by a 
nsk neutral agent who is made sole res1dual claimant through the use of a franchise 
contract However, in the presence of a hability constraint, both of these solutwns are 
unenforceable. Dichotomous incentive contracts, in which the order of the realised 
outcome in re la!! on to a pre-specified performance target precipitates one of two mutually 
exclusive fee schedules, may provide sufficient incentive pressure to elicit the first-best 
effort. 
In Chapter 4 we examine contingent profit sharing ratio contracts, in which the ratio of 
agent to principal pay is a constant whose value depends on the achievement, or 
otherwise, of a performance target. In contrast to lump-sum bonus contracts, in which 
inducement to greater effort can be achieved by offering the agent a fixed performance 
bonus, analogous inducement in contmgent share ratio contracts is ach1eved by the threat 
of a lower share ratio. However, the effect of tlus threat is in general ambiguous, since 
conflicting incentive pressure is generated though a lower share of all outcomes below the 
performance target, but a greater jump in the lump-sum element of pay otherwise 
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Under conditions in which risk neutrality precludes the use of contingent share ratio 
schemes in eliciting greater effort from the agent, we examine the impact of agent risk 
aversion. We find that the prec1se degree of risk aversiOn of the agent is crucial, and that 
there exists a range of risk aversion for which the threat of a lower share ratio must be 
sufficiently severe as to not render such schemes counterproductive to the objectives of 
the pnnci pal. 
In Chapter 5 we then extend the analysis of Chapter 4 to consider ways in which the 
incentive pressure created by dichotomous contracts can be supplemented by margmal 
substitutiOn of capital by the agent, and derive sufficient conditions for a Pareto 
improvement. We also explore the interaction of a monitoring technology on the use of 
dichotomous incentive schemes, whereby the benefit to dichotomous schemes of an 
informative but noisy signal is illustrated 
Chapter 6 synthesises the information asymmetries examined in isolation by the 
preceding chapters to consider a problem of adverse selection w1th moral hazard m wh1ch 
an agent who supplies unobservable effort is pnor mformed as to the marginal 
productivity of a venture with respect to (hereafter w.r.t.) effort and capital. We derive 
conditions for which a contmgent share ratio scheme parametised on a message vanable 
signalled by the self-selection of a contract by the agent, can implement the optimal pure 
adverse selection outcome 
Chapter 7 draws together the conclusions of the thesis and outlines some areas for future 
research 
In the followmg chapter we provide a brief discussion of some of the key concepts in the 
study of the economics of information. This is intended to explain some of the 
background theory to the approaches taken in subsequent chapters, and to illustrate how 
problems of information asymmetry vary according to the information structure 
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(specifically "who has what information and when ?"). We also formally provide a 
review of the literature on limited liability in the context of information asymmetries. 
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CHAPTER2 
THEORY AND REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is two fold. The first objective is to collect in one place an 
explication of essential game theoretic concepts which are applied repeatedly in the 
thesis. hi providing a review of received literature essential to solution methodologies 
applied to situations of moral hazard (see Essential concept: The trade-off between 
insurance and incentives 2.2.1.1) and adverse selection (see Essential concept: The 
revelation principle 2.2.2.1 ), we will intuitively explain the conflicts which exist between 
informed and uninformed economic agents for each of these informational problems. We 
also discuss the equilibrium concept applied to both the moral hazard and adverse 
selection games which we will examme (see Essential concept: subgame perfect 
eqmlibrium 2 2 I 2). 
Further, in order to place the contributions made by this thesis beyond a statement of the 
relevance with respect only to the existing literature which discusses information 
asymmetries in the context of limited liability (see 2.3), we will also discuss alternative 
model formulations, thereby providing a game theoretic modelling backdrop in which to 
embed the particular features of problems tackled by the thesis. Since the information 
problems we consider specifically examine a monopolistic non-repeated relationship 
between a single agent and a single principal, the discussion of alternative informational 
settmgs for moral hazard extends to multi-period (2 2.1.3) and (separately) multi-agent 
(2 2.1.4) frameworks, and for adverse selection, the discussion includes competition 
between principals (2.2.2.2) and (separately) multi-period (2 2 2.3) relationships. 
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Figure 2 I clarifies where the modelling features of the problems tackled by the thesis fit 
mto alternative and sometimes Wider informatiOnal settings. 
penod 
Figure 2.1 
Smgle 
period 
Smgle 
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Multi-
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Shown in the uppermost part of the ovoids m Ftgure 2.1 are the subsection numbers 
discussing alternative models for problems of adverse selection (A/S). The corresponding 
lowermost part of the ovoids relate to subsectiOns whiCh discuss moral hazard (M/H). 
The second objective of this chapter is to survey the literature which posits within the 
overlap of information asymmetry and limited liability studies (see 2.3). We provide an 
original classification for this literature which essentially divides the non-continuation 1 
studtes between incentives and non-incentives, wherein effort is a choice variable2 for the 
1 By non-contmuation we mean that once a mechanism tnggenng bankruptcy has occurred, such as the 
default on a loan note, the game ends, with no possibility of a ball out or subsequent firm activity. 
2 By this we mean that effort is not contracted because It is not observable It IS important to note that as 
long as effort is chosen by the agent (to maximise h1s own ut1hty), the problem IS classified as one of 
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agent in the former case but not the latter. In the context of this classification we will 
further discuss the contributions made by the thesis. 
2.2 The Economics oflnformation 
The information asymmetries that we examine in this thesis are those that give rise to a 
problem of either moral hazard, adverse selection, or both moral hazard and adverse 
selection. A moral hazard problem arises when an asymmetry arises after the contract has 
been signed, whereas an adverse selection problem arises before the contract has been 
signed. It is important to note that we are only interested in information asymmetries that 
give rise to conflicts of interest between principal and agent. If this were not the case, 
then all relevant information would be automatically revealed, rendering any information 
asymmetry irrelevant. 
2.2.1 Moral Hazard 
A familiar situation in which a conflict of interest exists in a principal-agent framework is 
that of investor and entrepreneur. This conflict arises because an agent (entrepreneur) 
supplies costly effort in return for an allocation of the outcome (profit/revenue), whereas 
the principal (investor) enjoys the outcome net of this allocation Without supplying effort. 
If the effort of the agent were verifiable3 by the principal, then th1s effort could be 
contractually specified, and would be enforceable given the existence of suitable 
institutions (for example, a court of law). However, where effort is not verifiable 
(provable), the principal must achieve an internalising of incentives to supply effort by 
suitable contract design. Incentive contracts therefore exist in order to hmit the cost to the 
mcenttves even 1f 1t contams elements of adverse select1on, i e precontractual mformation which is private 
to the agent 
3 A d1stmction is made between venfiable and observable The pnnc1pal may be able to observe the effort 
of the agent However, w1thout bemg able to venty (prove) h1s observatiOn, the effort cannot be a contract 
vanable smce 1t is unenforceable. 
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princtpal of his ignorance concerning the effort supplied by an agent after contract 
acceptance. 
2.2.1.1 Essential Concept: The trade-off between insurance and incentives 
An agent is said to be risk averse with repect to (hereafter w.r.t.) money when the loss in 
utility that he attributes to a given decrease in his wealth, exceeds the gain in utility that 
he attributes to an equal mcrease m wealth. Such an agent is not indifferent to a fair bet. 
That is, if for example he stood an equal chance of gaining or losing a fixed amount of 
money, an outcome contingent on the realisatiOn of an ex ante uncertain random event 
(say the flip of a coin), his expected utihty (read welfare) would be less than zero. In 
order to accept the offer of a fair bet, he would in addition require a side payment equal to 
the premium that he attaches to the risk involved. The greater his degree of risk aversion, 
the greater would be the premium required to just leave him indifferent between 
accepting or rejecting the bet. In contrast, a risk neutral agent requires no such premium. 
His expected utility from the fair bet is zero, equal to the expected (mean) reward. 
Consider a risk averse agent who is to supply an unverifiable effort prior to the realisation 
of an ex ante uncertain state of nature, where productive output is increasing m both the 
effort supplied and the realised state. The effort carmot be inferred by the principal from 
(perfectly) observed output smce the principal is unable to observe the realised state of 
nature4• Faced with this situation, how is the principal best (for himself) able to design a 
fee schedule (contract) which the agent is willing to accept? The prmcipal would like to 
give as much incentive to the agent as possible to supply greater effort. If higher 
outcomes are indicative of higher effort by the agent, then the way to achieve this would 
4 The agent should therefore not be given a fixed wage contract smce he has no mcentive to provide effort, 
given that his effort IS not observable, and can always declare (possibly falsely) that the realised state was 
unfavourable upon observation of the outcome by the pnncipal 
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be to allocate the agent a greater reward for higher outcomes5• However, when the agent 
is risk averse, there is a problem. By g1ving the agent greater incentives through greater 
risk sharing, the principal shares less of the risk. This is unfortunate, since the principal 
(being risk neutral) IS willing to accept nsk without requiring a premium to do so. The 
same, however, is not true of the agent. Therefore, if the agent is to be given greater 
incentives, he must also be given a greater risk prem1um for bearing risk. This risk 
compensatiOn is costly to the pnncipal smce the outcome is allocated entirely between the 
principal-agent pair, and what the principal rewards the agent by way of risk premium, he 
must forego himself. 
This trade-off between incentives and insurance for the agent is a key issue in the 
incentives literature. The need to g1ve the risk averse agent an incentive to provide greater 
effort by bearing greater risk results in suboptimal risk sharing. The welfare loss of the 
pnncipal due to the need to pay the agent a risk premium is a cost of asymmetric 
infonnation6when the agent is risk averse. 
It is worth noting that in contrast to the risk averse case, if the agent were risk neutral, he 
could be given maximum incentives to supply effort by becoming the sole residual 
claimant7 (i.e. sole claimant to the ex ante uncertain outcome). The agent would require 
no risk premium for bearing this risk, and the principal could extract the entire rent that 
the agent expects by imposing a fee that leaves the agent with exactly h1s reservation 
utility (the utility that the agent could aclueve 1f he had not accepted the incentive 
' An unsatisfying feature of optimal fee schedules IS that the allocation to the agent may not necessarily be 
mcreasmg over the entire range of outcomes In fact, It IS even posSible that the fee schedule may be 
decreasmg over some (non-empty) mterval of outcomes A condi!Ion which IS suffictent to guarantee 
monotonicity of the fee schedule is the monotone likelihood rat1o property (P. Milgrom (198I)) ThiS 
condition Imphes that, for any given outcome, mcreased effort leads to relattvely greater probability weight 
on all higher profit levels (thereby llllplymg first order stochastic dommance) 
6 The Lagrange multiplier, or shadow pnce, of the constraint which depicts the agent as choosmg an effort 
level which ts individually optimal (the moral hazard constramt) IS greater than zero. 
7 A franchise contract 
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contract offered by the princtpal). Since nsk aversion of the agent forces the principal to 
bear some of this risk by sharmg the outcome, the agent's compensation becomes less 
sensitive to his performance compared to the franchise contract. The reduced effort of the 
agent when risk averse therefore results in losses for the principal relative to the franchise 
case. 
2.2.1.2 Essential Concept: Subgame perfect equilibrium 
The formalisation of the single-period moral hazard problem8 is to derive the conditions 
that the optimal fee schedule must satisfY as a result of a constrained optimisation 
problem. Specifically, the problem is to maximise the expected utility of the principal 
subject to participation, and effort choice by the agent which is individually maxima19• 
8 For details of a formal model along these hnes, see for example St1ghtz (1974, 1975), Harris and Rav1v 
(1979), Holmstrom (1979), or Shaven (1979). Also, see Grossman and Hart (1983) and Laffont and T!role 
(1986). 
9 The optimisatwn IS a double maximisatiOn problem The principal must maximise his expected ullhty 
subject to the moral hazard constramt An approach which IS commonly taken IS to replace the moral hazard 
constramt with the first-order necessary condition for a maximum Smce this condition IS only a locally true 
necessary condition for a stationary point (local mmuna, saddle pomt, or local but not global maxima), and 
IS not equivalent to the actual moral hazard constramt, we may find that we mclude too many efforts that 
locate other statiOnary pomts In order to Isolate the effort which is globally maximal, It IS sufficient to 
assume the followmg condi!Ions m order to ehmmate this problem (Rogerson (1985a)) 
(I) The diStributiOn functiOn of outcomes IS convex m effort This mdicates a stochast1cally d1mm1shmg 
margmal productiVIty of effort, and guarantees uniqueness of the agent's effort choice by ensunng that the 
expected ut1hty of the agent IS concave m effort 
(2) The d1stnbution functiOn exhibits the monotone hkehhood ratiO property 
Another approach (Grossman and Hart (1983)) to solve the double maxim1satwn problem uses a two-stage 
method m which one analyses the charactenst1cs of the optimal fee schedule mdependently of whether or 
not we Identity the optimal effort This approach breaks the pnnc1pal's problem up mto a computation of 
the costs and benefits of the different actiOns that can be taken by the agent Under the assumptiOn that the 
agent's preferences over income lottenes are mdependent of the actiOn that he takes (ut1hty is add1t1ve1y 
separable in money and effort), the cost minimisatiOn problem becomes a fairly straightforward convex 
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There is an underlying sequence to the decisions of the players (the principal-agent pair) 
in this non-cooperative extensive form game. Given this sequentiality, the solution 
concept that is bemg applied is that of subgame perfect equzlzbnumi0 'This solution 
concept requires that at each point in time, each player chooses an optimal strategy, given 
the situation that has been reached, and assuming that the other player will do likewise' 
(Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castnllo ( 1997) p8). 
We will illustrate the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium for the (single period) 
moral hazard (hidden effort) gameii. The first to act is the pnncipal, who, knowing the 
future behaviour of the agent for each possible contract that he can offer (given that the 
principal is assumed to know the utility function of the agent), offers that contract which 
maximises his own expected utility. The future behaviour of the agent is depicted by two 
decisions Firstly the agent decides whether to accept or reject the contract proposed by 
the principal, whilst anticipating his future choice of effort were he to accept the contract. 
The agent accepts if he IS able to extract from the relationship no less than the utility he 
can achieve in the best alternative relationship (the reservation utility). The second 
deciSIOn is a choice of effort. The agent is assumed to always choose an effort which 
maximises his own (expected) utility. 
programmmg problem A deficiency m this approach, however, IS that It does not generalise to allow the 
principal to be nsk averse 
10 For eqmiibnum concepts, see E1chberger, J {1993) 
11 The special features of the canomcal moral hazard settmg are (Sappmgton {1991))· 
(I) Symmetry ofprecontractual behefs If for example the prmc1pal and agent d1d not share the same beliefs 
about the d1stnbut10n of ex post outcomes given effort, then such a neat separation between incentive and 
msurance issues might not be possible Implicit m the strong assumptiOn of symmetric beliefs IS that both 
parties are able to anticipate fully all possibilities that might anse dunng their relationship 
(2) The agent can be costlessly bound to the terms of any contract he agrees to. Even though the agent may 
earn a return below his reservation utility when the state IS realised, he is unable to abrogate or renegotiate 
the contract he has Signed. His commitment, in this sense, is therefore perfect 
(3) The outcome IS perfectly, and publicly observable 
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The subgame perfect equilibrium solutwn concept is applied throughout the game 
theoretic modelling of the asymmetric information problems considered in this thesis. In 
the following section we briefly consider multi-period (2.2.1.3) and monitoring/multi-
agent (2.2.1.4) extensions to the moral hazard setting so far considered 
2.2.1.3 Alternatives: Multi-period contracts 
If the principal-agent relationship is repeated, then the insurance-incentive trade-off, 
which prohibits a first-best outcome for the principal in a single period setting, may be 
avoided in a dynamic setting. 
Suppose, for example, that both the principal and agent value future rewards 12 as much as 
they value current rewards (no dtscountmg case), and that their relatwnslup IS mdefimtely 
repeated 13• If the agency is repeated a sufficiently large number of times, then by 
compensating the agent on the basis of an average of outcomes over time, the agent can 
be induced to supply the effort which is most preferred by the principal. The reason for 
this is that randomness in the agent reward becomes negligible, and the agent 
consequently faces very little risk (income uncertainty). Therefore, incentives can be 
provided for the risk averse agent without the welfare reducing need to pay a nsk 
premium. The agent receives his reservatiOn utility contingent on an average outcome 
sufficiently close to a pre-specified target14• The importance of not discounting is that the 
agent is dissuaded from supplying less than the requisite amount of effort by the threat of 
12 Which are ex post allocatiOns in each penod of the ex ante uncertam outcome (profits/revenue) for that 
penod 
13 The first studies of dynamic mteractions are those of Rubinstein (I 979), Radner (I 981,1985), and 
Rubmstem and Yaar1 (1983). 
14 Intuitively we would expected that frequent repetitiOn allows us to converge to the efficient (first-best) 
solutiOn In this framework, mcent1ves are not detennmed by the fee schedule, but rather on average effort, 
and this infonnatiOn becomes very precise when the number of penods IS large 
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punishment in future periods. Were the payoff from future periods to be discounted, the 
significance of this threat would become diluted in any current period15. 
When future payoffs are discounted and/or the duration of the agency relationship is more 
limited, the conflict between risk sharing and incentives re-emerges However, gains 
(Pareto-improvements16) generally arise when agent compensation in each period is based 
on past outcomes17 as well as the current outcome This is the so-called "memory result", 
which suggests a rationale for long-term contracts. A criticism of this result is that it 
critically relies on assuming that the agent's reward IS needed for immediate 
consumption 18• When the agent has access to credit markets on the same terms as the 
principal, the advantage afforded by long-term contracts in improving upon a series of 
short-term contracts by providing consumption-smoothing opportunities, can be 
removed19. In this settmg, a long-term contract will be no better than a series of repeated 
short-term contracts20• Access to credit markets is also important when considering 
whether or not the optimal long-term contract can be tmplemented21 by a sequence of 
optimal short-term contracts. The conditions in which such implementation obtain are 
that the agent must be able to access credit markets (in order to smooth consumption in 
15 Not d1scountmg future payoffs allows mcentlves to be better diStributed over time 
16 The Pareto-effic1ency concept IS used to Judge soc1al welfare outcomes Wben there IS moral hazard, 
Pareto-efficiency is used to Imply the second-best outcome The first-best obtams when moral hazard IS 
absent. 
17 See Lambert (1983), Rogerson (l985b), and St1ghtz and We1ss (1983). 
18 Th1s pomt IS raised by Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Malcomson and Spmnewyn 
(1988) 
19 This is because m long-term contracts, the pnnc1pal serves as a "bank", lendmg to the agent m bad 
periods and drawmg repayment from the agent m good penods This role ofthe prmcipalis redundant when 
the agent has access to credit markets 
2° Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) 
21 ImplementatiOn m this sense means that the subgarne perfect eqmhbnum of the short-term contracts leads 
to efforts and consumptwns that coincide w1th those obtamed under the long-term contract 
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the way that the mternalisation of this process is achieved by a long-term contract), and 
that the long-term contract is re-negotiation proof2• 
2.2.1.4 Alternatives: Monitoring and many agents 
Incentive contracts, which base a risk averse agent's reward on ex post realised outcome, 
compensate the agent according to observed productive output. An alternative approach is 
to base the agent's reward on an imperfect, and publicly observable signal of productive 
input (effort). For example, the signal may be a true observation of the effort with 
additive nmse23 (say a standard normal distribution). However, given that the signal is 
noisy, a question arises as to whether the principal would prefer to 1gnore the signal and 
compensate the agent according to an incentive contract depending only on observed 
output, or reward the agent according to both the observed output and the imperfect signal 
as to productive input The answe~4 is that whenever the signal together with observed 
output provides more information as to agent effort than output alone, then it is optimal 
for the principal to reward the agent according to the signal and the observed output. The 
extra incentives created by basing the agent's compensation on both pieces of information 
outwe1gh the mcreased risk exposure of the agent caused by use of the imperfect monitor. 
When a principal contracts with more than one agent, it may be possible to achieve 
momtoring of agents by exploiting the information available from their relative 
performances25• If there is a common environmental parameter, which is outside the 
control of agents whose productivity is equally affected, then basing rewards on the 
22 A contract IS renegotiation-proof If at the begmnmg of any mtennediate penod, no new contract or 
renegotiatiOn is possible that would be preferred by the prmc1pal and agent. See Dewatr1pont (1989) and 
Chiappon, Macho-Stadler, Rey and Salame (1994) 
23 i e. observed effort IS the true effort plus a random variable whose value IS known only to the agent 
Observed effort carmot therefore be used by the prmc1pal to perfectly infer actual effort since any Signal of 
the latter IS 'garbled' by the additive random variable (nmse) 
24 See Holmstrom (1979), Harns and Raviv (1979), and Shavell (1979) 
25 For details of this work see Green and Stokey (1983), Lazear and Rosen (1981), and Nalebuffand Stightz 
(1983a,b) 
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relative performance of identical tasks provides motivation Without imposing excessive 
risks26• Rank order tournaments, which compensate agents according to the ordinal 
ranking of theu output, provide such incentives. For example, the agent with the greatest 
output might be awarded a fixed compensation, which is greater than the equal reward 
which all other agents receive. Note that the ideal incentive scheme will generally be a 
combination of individualised and relative performance schemes27• These schemes 
supplement the ordinal natlire of a tournament with a cardinal dimension. 
2.2.2 Adverse Selection 
The definitive feature of incentive contracts is that they exist to limit the cost of the 
pnncipal's ignorance from an information asymmetry that arises in the process of contract 
executiOn. At the time of contract acceptance, both principal and agent share common 
beliefs about all aspects of the agency. In contrast, an adverse selection problem exists 
when, prior to contract acceptance, the agent is informed as to some relevant aspect of the 
agency about which the principal is ignorant. For example, an investor may be less 
informed than an entrepreneur about the marginal productivity of capital to be invested; a 
regulator may be less informed than a regulated firm about the market m which it 
operates; or a client may be less informed than his lawyer as to the chances of winning a 
case should he decide to employ the lawyer's services. 
In the course of executing the contract, the information about which the principal was 
previously ignorant may be revealed. However, for a single repetition of the agency, this 
Will be of no use to the principal. The principal must therefore attempt to limit the cost of 
his ignorance by making a strategic decision at the point in time at which a contract (or 
contracts) is offered. Critical to the analysis of adverse selection problems that we 
26 Incentive premiums due to nsk aversion are reduced because the tournament provides msurance agamst 
random events, which are beyond the control ofthe agent's, and which affect them equally 
27 Nalebuffand Stightz (I 983b) 
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consider in this thesis is the revelation prmctple (established by G1bbard (1973), Green 
and Laffont (1977), and Myerson (1979)). 
2.2.2.1 Essential concept: The revelation principle 
This principle asserts that any equilibrium outcome which is the result of a potential 
contract under any non-truth-telling mechanism can be replicated by the equilibrium 
outcome of some truth-telling mechanism. 
In order to understand the intuition behind this principle, consider a lawyer/defendant 
relationship. Suppose that the defendant completely trusts the integrity of the lawyer, and 
that the lawyer needs certain mformation from the defendant in order to be able to best 
defend him in court. The defendant has nothing to gain from misrepresenting the truth to 
his lawyer, since then the lawyer may play the wrong strategy on his behalf, thus 
threatening his case. It is therefore possible to replicate the equilibrium of a non-truth 
telling mechanism where the defendant represents himself (assuming he is able to defend 
himself as well with representation as he IS alone), with a truth-telling mechanism m 
which the defendant is represented by the lawyer. For the same reason, a firm will reveal 
its accounts truthfully to an accountant in order that the accountant can effect the best 
strategy to limit taxation liability. 
More formally ' ... for any response-plan equilibnum of any choice mechanism, there IS an 
equivalent incentive-compatible mechanism g1vmg all types of all players the same 
expected payoffs' (Myerson (1979) p66). Thus, without any loss in generality, a principal 
may be restricted to policies/contracts/mechanisms which require the agent to truthfully 
reveal private information, and which give the agent no incentive to lie (incentive-
compatible) In a regulator/firm setting28, where production cost information is private to 
the firm and the regulator determines a price and transfer (tax or subsidy) policy, the 
28 Baron and Myerson (1982) 
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regulator could declare a policy which does not mduce a truthful response from the firm 
as to its actual cost structure. The firm will report a cost structure that maximises its own 
expected utility against the declared policy. An alternative policy, which induces truthful 
cost reportmg by the firm is the following: the regulator asks the firm to divulge its cost 
structure; the regulator then calculates the cost report that would maximise the firm's 
expected profits against the original policy given the true cost structure; the regulator then 
enforces the regulations which would have been enforced in the original policy in 
response to this (calculated) cost report29• 
Since the revelation principle permits a principal to restrict attention to those mechanisms 
(contracts) which induce truthful (type) revelation by an agent, determining which 
contract is optimal for the principal reduces to identifying from amongst the set of truth-
telling contracts, which contract gives the principal the greatest expected utility. The 
reason is that any equilibnum of a non-truth-telling mechanism can be replicated by the 
equilibrium of a truth-telling mechanism. Therefore, no non-truth-telling mechanism can 
yield a better outcome for the principal than the best amongst the set of truth-telling 
mechanisms. 
The analytical simplification that the revelation pnnc1ple affords essentially derives from 
the consequent mitigation of the need for the principal to interpret the lies of an agent(s). 
A feature of adverse selectiOn problems is that it is sometimes optimal for a principal to 
offer a set of contracts (contract menu) in which the selection of a contract by an agent 
uniquely identifies the agent's type. Tlus is an example of a d1rect revelation mechanism, 
where agents truthfully reveal their type by disclosing their preference between contracts. 
For example, an insurance company can exploit the fact that low risk agents are more 
willing to buy partial coverage than their high risk counterparts. For higher risk types, the 
29 Another example IS the use of taxatiOn bands. Tax payers have an mcent1ve to understate mcome If 
mstead tax codes set the same tax across bands, then there IS no mcenllve to misrepresent mcome, and the 
same amount of tax IS collected m the truth reveahng eqmhbnum 
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benefit of a lower insurance premium is outweighed by the anticipated cost of only partial 
coverage. 
However, it is not necessarily the case that a principal's utility is maximised by separating 
out each type of agent. Instead, subsets of types may, in general, be pooled30 (Hirschleifer 
and Riley (1992) pp319-325). Whether it is optimal for the principal to offer as many or 
fewer contracts than there are types will in general depend on the prior assessment of the 
principal as to the probability that the agent is of a particular type, and the indifference 
curves of the agent types, as expressed by their utility functions (Rasmusen ( 1989) chp 7). 
In the next two subsectiOns we briefly mention two adverse selection settmgs which 
highlight the issues which arise from an alternative modelling of the adverse selection 
problems which we consider in this thesis. The first concerns how competitiOn between 
pnncipals (2.2.2.2), which is the polar case w.r.t. the monopolistic framework assumed in 
Chapters 3 and 6, affects the outcome of a single period adverse selection problem. The 
second concerns the extension of a single period relationship with adverse selection to 
one which is multi-period (2.2.2.3)31 • 
30 When each type of agent chooses the same strategy, the eqmhbrmm which results is said to be pooling, 
otherwise 11 IS separatmg An eqmhbnum IS fully revealing 1fthe agent's choice of contract always conveys 
h1s pnvate infonnatwn to the pnnc1pal Between poohng and fully revealing eqmhbna are Imperfectly 
separatmg eqmhbna, also called semi-separatmg, partially separatmg, partially reveahng, and partially 
poohng Note, however, that the d!stmcl!on between poohng and separatmg has nothmg to do with the 
eqmhbnum concept A model might have multiple Nash eqmhbna, some poohng and some separatmg 
Moreover, a single eqmhbrium, even a poohng one, can mclude several contracts, but if It is poolmg the 
agent always chooses the same strategy, regardless of type If the agent's eqmhbnum strategy IS mixed, the 
eqmhbnum IS poolmg 1fthe agent always p1cks the same mixed strategy (Rasmusen (1989) chp 7). 
31 See schematic m Figure 2.1 for an overview of these alternatives m relatiOn to the modelling context of 
problems tackled by th1s thesis. 
2.14 
CHAPTER 2 THEORY AND REVIEW 
2.2.2.2 Alternatives: Competition between principals 
The adverse selection problems that we consider in this thesis depict a single principal 
contracting wrth a smgle agent whose type is privately known (see Chapters 3 and 6). The 
principal is a monopohst who attempts to extract the maximum rent from the relationship 
with the agent. In this subsection we briefly discuss how the concluswns reached for this 
type of adverse selection problem may be different if we instead consider a situation in 
which several principals compete in order to attract agents, whereupon each pnnc1pal is 
constramed to earn no more than zero expected profits in equilibrium. 
By way of example, consider the purchase of insurance by agents who wish to alter their 
pattern of income across states of nature (accident and no-accident), and who are either 
high or low risk types. In the absence of competition, insurance policies which maximise 
the utility of a principal offer full insurance to the high risk agent and extract the entire 
surplus of the low risk agent who receives partial coverage32(Hirschleifer and Riley 
(1992) chp 11 ). With only two agent types, it IS always optimal for the principal to 
separate the two risk types. 
However, in the presence of the additional constraint that principals earn zero expected 
profits, the separating equilibrium may become dominated by a pooling equilibrium if the 
probability of the agent being low risk is sufficiently high. The reason is that offering a 
pooling contract, whose price IS an average of the full information contract prices, is 
attractive to high risk types because It is cheap, due to the greater weight in averaging 
given to the lower insurance pnce. The pooling contract is also attractive to low risk types 
since It affords them greater coverage, albeit at a slightly higher price. 
32 The greater the probability that the agent IS high nsk, the lower IS the coverage of the low nsk agent 
When the probability of high nsk IS sufficiently large, there IS no insurance coverage for the low nsk agent. 
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However, since principals will earn positive expected profits from pooling agents who are 
mostly low risk, a pooling contract will not be robust to competition. It is possible that a 
competing principal can offer a contract which maintains the price per unit of coverage 
but offers lower coverage. The competing pnncipal would thereby attract only low risk 
agents33 Willing to accept lower coverage, givmg themselves a positive expected profit, 
and leaving the original pooling contract msuring only high risks witl! negative profits34• 
In summary, competition amongst principals precludes the existence of stable pooling 
(Nash) eqmlibria. Therefore, if tl!e best separating equilibrimn contracts are dominated by 
a pooling contract m competition, only an equihbnum which supports a mixed strategy is 
possible (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)), in contrast to the 
case of a monopolist principal in which a pure strategy (Nash) equilibrimn will always 
exisf5• 
2.2.2.3 Alternatives: Dynamic adverse selection 
Given an adverse selection problem, the principal's objective is to extract private 
mformatwn from tl!e agent via the contract, introducmg tl!e least amount of mefficiency 
and cost possible. At issue when the relatiOnship is repeated IS whetl!er repetition can 
help tl!e principal in his search for information. In problems with hidden actions, 
repetition mitigates moral hazard since it allows incentives to be better distributed over 
33 This IS referred to as "cream skimming" 
34 This conclusion obtams when the eqmhbnum concept IS Nash. However, a W1lson eqmhbrium concept 
(W1Ison (1980)), which reqmres that no new contract could be offered that makes positive profits even after 
all contracts that would make negative profits as a result of Its entry are withdrawn, legitimises the pure 
strategy pooling eqmiibnum This ts because If pnnc1pals realise that the newly introduced competmg 
contract IS rendered unprofitable when the old pooling contract IS Withdrawn, It will not be introduced 
"R1ley (1985) denves sufficient conditiOns for the existence of a Nash eqmhbrmm Crucially, the rate at 
which the margmal cost of s1gnallmg activity declines wtth improvement m "quality" (lower nsk) must be 
sufficiently large. 
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time. However, mitigation of adverse selection problems through repetition does not 
necessanly follow, since if contracts in each period were to be conditioned on previously 
revealed information, the agent would have an even greater incentive to misrepresent his 
type compared to the static case (the "ratchet effect"). 
CritiCal to the design of optimal contracts in a repeated relatiOnship is whether the 
principal commits36 to not usmg information that IS revealed through time m revismg the 
contracts in each period Also crucial is the correlation of agent types in each period. 
Baron and Besanko (1984) consider a two-period model in which the agent knows his 
type in each period just prior to the start of that period, and the principal commits to not 
using information which is revealed over time37 With no correlation between types, the 
period one contract is the optimal static contract, and the second penod contract is the 
optimal symmetric information contract because both agent and principal have the same 
information about period two type at the time the contract is signed (start of period one). 
If types across periods are perfectly correlated, the multi-period contract is the repetition 
of the optimal static contract. Since in this case the principal commits to not use his 
knowledge of the period two agent type m the second period contract, the multi-penod 
contract is not sequentially rational and Pareto Improvements are possible through 
renegotiation. With imperfect correlation, the period one contract is the optimal static 
contract and the period two contract is intermediate between the optimal static 
asymmetric and full information contracts. 
When mstead the pnnci pal makes no commitment to Ignore information that IS revealed 
over time, the ratchet effect becomes admissible. When the agent in each of two penods 
36 Note that the notion of cmmmtment also exiSts m the static case, where the prmc1pal comrmts to not 
renegot1atmg the smgle-penod contract between himself and the agent once the agent reveals mformatwn 
37 Note that commitment IS (weakly) des!Table smce the prmc1pal can comm1t to the strategy that he would 
choose m the absence of comm1tment Th1s mduces the agent to take the same dec1s10ns as m the 
noncomm1tment case 
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is either low or high productivity, there is perfect correlation between types in each 
penod, and where transfers to the agent are linear in output38, Freixas, Guesnerie and 
Tiro le ( 1985) apply backward induction to derive the optimal contract in each period. The 
period two contract is the optimal static contract given the (Bayesian) updated beliefs 
from the period one announcement made by the agent (which may or may not be truthful). 
Low productivity agents, who have no incentive to pass themselves off as high 
productivity types in either period, achieve no rents in each penod. However, high 
productivity types trade off the discounted information rents possible in period two by 
pooling with low productivity types in period one, with the possible gains from separation 
in penod one (whereupon the period two mformation rent is zero). Thus the optimal 
period one contract may induce separating39, pooling or semi-separating equihbria, where 
in the latter equilibrium the high productivity agent plays a mixed strategy in which he 
sometimes reveals his true productivity. There is also a sense in which the search for 
information leads the principal to be more generous in the first period, in that the 
allocation to the agent is greater than the optimal static contract, recognising the greater 
tendency of the agent to misrepresent his type when the principal may revise future 
contracts to mcorporate previously revealed information. 
In the next section, we formally rev1ew the literature on information asymmetries in the 
context of limited liability. 
38 With non-lmear schemes, since high transfers reqmred to mduce high productivity firms to separate are 
appeahng to low productiVIty firms, low productivity firms may pass themselves off as high productivity 
firms m the first penod and then qmt to achieve the reservation amount m penod two ("take the money and 
run"). 
39 With contmuous types, no mechamsm which mduces type revelatiOn IS feasible, let alone des1111ble 
(Laffont and T1role (1988)) 
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2.3 Literature survey: Asymmetric information and limited liability 
We now formally review the literature which posits within the overlap of hmited liability 
and information asymmetry studies. An original40 classification of this literature IS 
provided below, after which each category is discussed in turn. 
2.3.1 Classification 
The literature on asymmetric information and limited liability broadly decomposes into 
continuation and non-continuation studies (see Figure 2.2). Continuation issues motivate 
the bankruptcy debate, which has focused on the design of bankruptcy laws intended to 
avoid the inefficient liquidation of distressed firms and the promotion of economically 
viable firms as ongoing concerns, when typically, debt holders cannot observe the 
efficiency of a firm. 
Contmuatwn 
Employment 
Asymmetric 
mformat1on 
and hm1ted 
hab1hty 
Non-
mcentives 
Non-Con! 
Figure 2.2 
Investment 
Chp3 
Managenal 
Chps 4,5,6 
Incenllves 
Prod /Envrron 
40 The only aspect of th1s classificatiOn wh1ch 1s not ongmal 1s the dehneatton of mvestment literature 
between ex ante and ex post mformatwn asymmetrtes (see 2 3 4), wh1ch is taken from !noes (1993b) 
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Non-continuation studies are static in the sense that there is no possibility of continuation 
following a trigger mechanism such as the default on a loan note. 
Non-continuation studies further polarise mto mcentives and non-mcentives literature. 
The incentives literature examines how limiting the liability of an economic agent affects 
the motivation of the agent to supply effort which is only privately observable. This 
literature is divided between managerial, and products & environmental studies 
Managerial studies consider a principal-agent setting in which a principal offers an agent 
a contract to supply an unobservable effort, and for which the principal provides a safety 
net limiting the share of ex post loss allocated to the agent. The principal-agent 
relationship is one of employer-employee. 
However, products & environmental studies consider the incentives that contracts for the 
productiOn of goods, or the provision of services, give to firms which can take costly 
preventative measures to reduce the risk of causing injury to third parties, be they 
consumers of a product or the general public, when the liability for loss that the injurer 
may cause is limited. In these studies, the principal-agent relationship is one of regulator 
and firm. 
The non-incentives literature is divided between investment and employment studies, in 
which actions are publicly observable but some aspect(s) of information affecting the 
welfare of contracting parties is asymmetrically distributed between them 
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Investment studies41 consider the allocation of capital to an entrepreneur whose project 
quality is not publicly observable, and who is either allocated no share of loss outcomes 
or may only share ex post outcomes above some threshold amount. 
Employment studies consider the effects on employment of enabling firms not to commit 
to paying employee wages in low profit states, when only the firms can observe the 
realisation of an exogenous random productivity parameter. 
We now review each subcategory, giving only a brief review of some of the aspects of the 
bankruptcy debate, since continuatiOn issues form no part of the contribution made by 
this thesis. 
2.3.2 Managerial 
When a risk neutral agent supplies unobservable effort prior to observing an uncertain 
productivity state, a franchise contract is optimal42 (Harris and Raviv (1979)), whereby 
the agent is sole residual claimant, and the principal extracts the entire surplus through a 
fixed fee (see 2 2.1.1 ). The agent participates given that his expected utility is no less than 
his reservation amount. 
However, when the agent is constrained to earn no less than some mirumum pay, the 
principal is no longer able to award the agent a franchise contract (Innes (1990, 1993a), 
Park (1995), Kim (1997)) This is because if the agent pays the principal a franchise fee 
which extracts the entire rent, then for some low states, the outcome net of this fee may 
41 This literature considers the debt contract to be the basic contract paradigm smce the entrepreneur 
undertakes to pay the mvestor a fixed return from ex post profits, a guarantee which IS compromised by 
hab1hty limitatiOnS, 
42 For a nsk neutral agent, the franchise contract is optimal mdependent of the order of state observation 
and the supply of effort What matters IS that the contract IS negotiated pnor to the observatiOn of the 
productiVIty state 
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be less than the minimum (floor) amount. Since a franchise contract clearly delivers too 
great a share of the realised surplus to the agent, the principal must resort to a sharing 
contract in which the agent supplies less effort because his reward is less sensitive to the 
effort that he supplies43• 
An important difference between franchise contracts44 and share agreements in the 
context of liability limitations concerns the discretion exercised by agents when deciding 
between mvestrnent projects of differing risk When agents supply observable effort, 
Basu (1992) suggests that a pure rental agreement permits an agent to maximise the value 
of the insurance afforded by a liability constraint, by choosing (at cost to the investor) a 
project which does not maximise the expected Qoint) surplus45• In contrast, a pure share 
agreement will always induce the agent to choose a project which maximises the expected 
Qoint) surplus. However, in a richer framework in which effort is instead unobservable, 
Sengupta ( 1997)46 has shown that the relative dominance of share contracts over pure 
rental agreements is sensitive to the actual value of the expected Goint) surplus, and that 
liability limitations alone are not sufficient to guarantee the dommance of share tenancy 
contracts over pure rental agreements. 
43 In the same way that nsk aversiOn of the agent was costly to the pnnc1pal, hm1ted liability IS smularly 
costly Note however that although bankruptcy constramts may function much as does nsk aversiOn m 
models where the prmc1pal contracts with a single agent, notable distmctiOns concernmg the (subgame) 
dommance oftruth-telhng by agents who also possess pnvate mformat10n about the productivity state, may 
anse when the possibility of multiple agents working m correlated environments is admitted (Demsk1 et al 
(1988)) 
44 also referred to as pure rental agreements in the sharecroppmg literature. 
45 expected revenue net of effort and all other costs 
46 Sengupta (1997) generalised the earher work ofBasu (1992), m which effort is observable and the agent 
chooses from amongst proJeCts which differ m nsk 
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A qualification to the approach taken by Sengupta, in which he assumes a widely held 
view that agents whose liability is limited will take excessive risks, is illustrated by Suen 
(1995). Suen argues that even in the absence of direct bankruptcy costs, risk neutral 
agents will have an incentive to avoid bankruptcy in a multi-period setting, because 
bankruptcy means ending the game and foregoing a valuable option when the expected 
value of future income flows are positive47• 
Another variant of the sharecropping framework considered by Sengupta, is the link 
between the credibility of the commilment that tenant farmers (agents) may make to pay 
the fixed rent of a franchise contract, and their personal wealth (Shetty (1988)) When 
landlords (principals) can completely and costlessly appropriate the assets of tenant 
farmers, the efficient choice of effort is only made with fixed rent contracts for those 
tenants with sufficient wealth to guarantee the landlord full rental payment for all output 
realisations. For tenants with lower wealth levels, a disincentive to supply effort arises for 
the same reason that contracts which award an agent less than his marginal product may 
reduce effort. The effort of a tenant farmer will increase with his wealth when default is a 
possibility since the landlord may confiscate the tenant's assets if the rent is not paid in 
full. 
However, the optimaf8 design of an incentive contract when the liability of the agent is 
limited centres on the possibility of motivating the agent to supply greater effort by the 
use of incentive targets. Holmstrom (1979) following on from the work ofGjesdal (1976) 
had noted that the first best was possible (for a risk averse or risk neutral agent) when 
47 An ImplicatiOn of hm1ted liability m a multi-penod settmg is also that the resultant effort sh1rkmg from 
the use of a share contract viz-a-viz fixed rent contract IS mitigated by the threat of the loss of a valuable 
contmuatiOn optiOn 
48 An mcent1ve contract is optimal when It m1mmises the incentive costs of contracting 
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sufficiently large penaltJes49 for outcomes below some threshold can be imposed. But 
when limited agent liability precludes the principal motivating the agent by penalties, he 
must instead motivate the agent by discontinuously increasing agent pay for outcomes 
above some threshold50• 
That lump-sum bonuses or penalties of any size may improve incentive contracts was 
formally proved by Lewis (1980) for a strictly risk averse agent. Additionally, lump-sum 
bonuses or penalties may also motivate risk neutral agents, as shown by Innes (1990), 
whereupon the importance of the monotonicity of the pay of the principal over the range 
of profit outcomes was agam5i established to be a key feature in whether agents can be 
motivated to supply greater effort when penalties of unrestncted size cannot be enforced 
If the pay schedule of the principal is constrained to be monotone non-decreasing, as is 
the case for debt contracts in which the principal receives the lesser of the entire surplus 
or the promised amount, then the agent will strictly share the benefits of his marginal 
effort over some (non-empty) range of possible outcomes, thus ensuring that the conflict 
of interests caused by sharing profits but none of the effort costs of generatmg those 
profits will remam52• However, the first best (efficient) outcome was shown in Innes 
49 Mehta (1993) discusses the 1mpact of 1mposmg bounds on rewards or punishments upon attainmg 
effic1ent (first-best) mcentive contracts If efficiency ts to be possible, then the mference about effort from 
the realised outcome must be stronger when rewards or pumshments are constramed m magmtude. 
50 In essence, bonuses are a mtrror 1mage of penalties, except that when an agent ts nsk averse, the mcenttve 
pressure exerted by a pumshment and a reward of equal measure are different Rtsk averse agents rece1ve a 
greater fall m ut1hty from a penalty than they do an mcrease in ut1hty from a bonus of equal stze Wben 
hab1hty zs hmtted, nsk averston therefore causes bonus schemes to become an "expensive" device for 
mottvatmg greater effort from the agent 
" Wben the pay of the agent discontmuously increases at some threshold outcome, the pay of the prmcipal 
dtscontinuously decreases Therefore, even though agent pay may be monotone non-decreasmg, the pay of 
the principal Will be not be monotomc, as 1t w1ll be both mcreasmg and decreasmg over the range of 
posstble outcomes 
52 In !noes (1990), the debt contract IS optimal (assummg a monotomc hkehhood ratio property and a 
monotone contract constramt) when the output prtce IS fixed and only the output is uncertam However, 
decomposmg revenue uncertamty mto prtce and output uncettamty, wh1ch permits a much w1der set of 
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(1990) to be possible If the agent is instead awarded a contract in which he is allocated 
the entire profit, and therefore loses none of the marginal benefits of his effort, when high 
profit states (above some threshold) are reahsed53• For this latter contract, the payoff 
profile54 of the principal is non-monotonic. 
Thus, the emphasis in Innes (1990) was to show with a monotonic likelihood ratio 
property (hereafter MLRP) that the debt contract was not optimal, and that when contracts 
are allowed to be non-monotonic, that superior contract forms exist The fixed bonus 
element to incentive contracts discussed in Lewis (1980) and Innes (1990) has been 
further considered by Kim (1997) and Park (1995). These authors stress that the most 
efficient form of mcentive contract when the liability of the agent is hmited is a pure step 
contract, in which the agent receives nothing if the outcome is less than the target 
performance level, and receives a fixed amount if the target is achieved. Therefore, if it IS 
not possible that this contract form implements the first best allocation, then under the 
same conditions, no mcentive contract exists which can achieve this objective. 
Klm and Park also consider a fixed ratio profit sharing contract in which they derive a 
necessary condition to ensure that a lump-sum bonus can motivate a nsk neutral agent to 
supply the first best effort level whilst leaving the agent in expectation of no more than 
his reservation utility. In Chapters 4 to 6, we consider an alternative form of dichotomous 
incentive contract which has not been discussed by the incentives literature, in which the 
fee schedule of an agent with limited liability is a (piecewise-linear) profit sharing 
contract in which the share ratio, which divides the ex post profit between the agent and 
the principal, depends on the realised outcome. Specifically, we allow a proportional 
increase in profit sharing ratio upon the achievement of a performance target mstead of a 
possible contract fonns, lnnes ( 1993a) shows that the pure debt contract is almost never optimal Instead, 
the optimal contract fonn Will be a combmation of pure debt, commodity futures contracts, and a multiple 
of commodity call optiOn contracts. 
53 Innes refers to thts as a "hve-or-dte" contract. 
54 being a mappmg of all possible outcomes to the ex post pay of the prmcipal 
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lump-sum bonus of arbitrary measure. The crucial feature of this contract type that 
differentiates it from lump-sum bonus contracts in Kim (1997) and Park (1995), is that 
the lump-sum increase in pay derives from the threat of a lower share ratio for outcomes 
less than the performance target. As a result, conflicting incentive pressure is created 
since the agent's share of the value of his (costly) marginal effort is reduced for outcomes 
less than the target, whilst a greater jump in the lump-sum element of pay acts to increase 
incentive pressure. 
In Chapter 4 we analyse this contract form for both a risk neutral and risk averse agent, 
showing that the effective use of contmgent share ratio contracts as a means to elicit 
greater effort relies crucially on technology considerations. We also show the importance 
of the availability to the principal of precise information concerning the degree of risk 
aversion of the agent. 
In Chapter 5, we then separately consider how two factors which affect incentive pressure 
can be incorporated into dichotomous contracts. In the first we examine capital 
contribution by the agent, and derive sufficient conditions for a (Pareto) improvement 
from the use of contingent share contracts through substitutiOn of the pnncipal's capital 
with that of the agent. In the second we examine additional signals and illustrate an 
improvement to dichotomous schemes which is provided by the use an imperfect 
monitoring technology. 
In Chapter 6, we then extend the pure moral hazard setting of Chapters 4 and 5 by 
combining the information asymmetries examined in isolation by the preceding chapters 
(including Chapter 3, see 2.3.4) to consider a problem of adverse selection with moral 
hazard in which an agent who supplies unobservable effort is prior informed as to the 
marginal productivity of a venture w.r.t. effort and capital. We derive conditions for 
which a contingent share ratio scheme parametised on a message vanable signalled by the 
self-selection of a contract by the agent, can implement the optimal pure adverse selection 
outcome. 
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Contracts which prov1de incentive effects, such as promotiOns and bonuses, are likely in 
practice to be only privately enforceable in the sense that they contain terms wh1ch may 
preclude the allocation of market traded instruments, such as financial derivatives, as a 
means to replicate the contract payoff profile of the agent. However, an important link 
between financial derivative contracts and mcentive contracts has been established by 
Selender and Zou (1994), who showed the results oflnnes (1990) to be a special case of 
their analysis, whereby the (strong) assumption of MLRP could be relaxed in favour of 
assuming first order stochastic dominance 55• Selender and Zou showed that under limited 
liability, there exists a necessary and suffic1ent condition for standard share-derivative 
contracts to resolve the moral hazard problem In addition to having large enough 
expected profits, the manager must be able to hold combinations of call and put options 
in excess of the underlymg assets56• This means that the slope of the contract (i.e. the 
relative changes of contractual value with changes in firm value) is greater than one over 
some domain of end-of-period firm value. This result therefore shows how incentive 
contracts that induce first best allocations may be achieved using real-world arrangements 
as opposed to abstract theoretical constructs 57• 
In all of the above studies, the agent supplies effort prior to the realisation of uncertainty. 
However, limited liability constraints not only preclude the use of franchise contracts 
when a risk neutral agent supplies effort before observing the realised state of nature, but 
also render franchise contracts redundant when the agent sees the realised state of nature 
prior to supplying effort (Sappington (1983a)). If the liab1lity of the agent is hmited, then 
the agent is essentially free to d1ssociate himself from the principal once he has 
(privately) observed the realised state of nature, where by so doing he will be able to 
"of the probability distnbutiOn of outcomes induced by effort given exogenous uncertamty. 
56 However, Selender and Zou also discuss the existence of mstitullonal constraints which may not permit 
mdividuals to hold combmatiOns of call and put options which allocate them more underlymg shares, when 
the options expire, than are actually traded m the market place In this case, cash viz-a-viz physical 
settlement may cucumvent such problems. 
57 such as the "hve-or-die" contract oflnnes (1990). 
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secure his reservation amount. The type of incentive contract that the principal must 
design is agam sigmficantly affected. In particular, the agent will never earn less than his 
reservation utility, and will receive rents in some states (Pitchford (1998)). 
To illustrate this idea, consider an example58of a risk neutral agent who can supply one of 
two poss1ble efforts. The agent IS awarded some fixed amount depending on whether the 
outcome is a success or a failure. Suppose that in order to induce the agent to supply the 
greater effort, the principal must allocate h1m a reward for a success which is greater than 
his reward for a failure by some fixed amount. Absent some specified floor to agent pay 
for both outcomes, the principal can mduce the greater effort and extract all of the rent by 
imposing a franchise fee (as discussed previously), thereby leaving the agent in 
expectation of his reservation utility. However, when there exists a floor which becomes 
binding in the event of a failure 59, differentiation of payments between the outcomes by 
the necessary amount intended to induce the greater effort can only be achieved at the 
expense of awarding the agent a rent. The first-best (franchise) outcome 1s therefore agam 
precluded. 
In Sappington (1983a}, the agent supplies hidden effort after observmg the realisation of a 
productivity state which IS unobservable to the principal. As a consequence, the agent has 
an expanded strategy set in comparison to the case in which he supplies effort prior to 
seemg the productivity state. It is shown that in all states except the one in which the 
agent is most productive, and perhaps in certain very unproductive states, that the contract 
which is optimal for the principal will induce outcomes that are ex post Pareto inefficient. 
Output is ex post Pareto efficient when the agent's marginal disutility from generatmg an 
additional unit of output coincides with the principal's valuation of such output60• 
"Th1s example was taken from Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castnllo (1997) pp64-66. 
"That 1s, when the reward m the event of a fatlure for the unhm1ted case 1s below the spectfied floor 
60 Thts 1s m contrast to the result ofHarns and Ravtv (1979) (wh1ch has an eqmvalent mformal!on structure) 
whereby enforceab1hty of contracts m all states facthtates ex post Pareto efficiency by the use of 
2.28 
CHAPTER2 THEORY AND REVIEW 
The reason for preclusion of Pareto efficiency m Sappington (1983a), is that if the 
principal des1gns the contract such that the agent is compensated for producing an 
inefficiently small output in the lower states of nature, then he reduces the magnitude of 
the payment to the agent needed to induce a lugher level of output in the more productive 
states The trade-off between inducing inefficiency m lower states and reducing the size 
of the payment to the agent in higher states is sensitive to the probability of occurrence of 
the lower states. If lower states are more probable then the trade off is less beneficial to 
the principal since an inefficient production level is a more likely reahsatwn, whereas if 
higher states are more probable, the benefit of reducing the magnitude of the payment to 
the agent in higher states IS hkely to outweigh the detriment of an inefficient outcome for 
lower states. It is also the case that because the benefits associated with inducing an 
inefficient outcome in any state are realised only when higher states of nature occur, there 
are no incentives for the principal to induce an inefficient outcome in the highest state of 
nature. To see the importance of the liability constraint in this context, note that in 
contrast, absent any floor on the payoff that the agent can receive, the principal could 
restore efficiency and expand output for the lower states, extracting any surplus thereby 
allocated to the agent by use of a franchise contract. 
Finally, a minority of the literature on the combination of limited liability with 
unobservable effort in a principal-agent model, examines 1ssues whose scope extends 
beyond the optimal design of incentive contracts. Baneljee and Timothy (1990) ask 
whether it is optimal to increase taxes when introducing a limitation in the liability for 
losses of an owner-manager who finances investment using a debt contract with creditors 
who compete with one another By allocating a government subsidy to creditors for a 
reduction in the rate of interest, the owner-manager is given an incentive to increase effort 
whilst a rise m taxes maintains his wealth following lower borrowing costs. Since higher 
effort means a lower chance of bankruptcy, creditors are able to further reduce the risk 
dichotomous contracts (dual and mutually exclus1ve contmgent fee schedule rules) and the add!!lonal use of 
an imperfect momtormg technology for effort 
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premium 61 and therefore the interest charge, thus effecting an overall welfare 
improvement when the subsidy is financed through the increase in taxation. 
Brander and Spencer (1989) present a theory of the firm which examines the relatiOnship 
between the financial structure of the firm and the effort and output decisions of the 
owner-manager. Substitution of borrowed funds for equity mvestment by the owner-
manager induces lower levels of effort, since the number of states of nature in which the 
owner-manager receives a return from his effort is reduced. As a consequence, firm 
output is lower and the probability of bankruptcy is higher. Also, for any given financial 
structure, the effort supplied by a monopolist is less than that of a competitive owner. 
Lastly, Lawaree and Audenrode (1992) establish the restrictions that limited liability 
imposes on the use of punishment threats following an audit of an agent employed to 
reduce costs, and who attempts to shirk by always passing off a privately observable firm 
specific cost parameter (which is either high or low) as being of a high cost type. If 
auditing is imperfect and liability is unlimited, then even though a high cost agent IS 
erroneously punished with positive probability, the principal can compensate the high 
cost agent in expected value for possible mistakes. However, when liability is limited, 
compensation for punishment errors must be in full, and therefore since the principal 
cannot distinguish a truthful high cost agent from a cheating low cost agent, it is never 
profitable for the pnncipal to perform the audit62• In Lawaree and Audenrode (1996), 
these authors also demonstrate that both agent types will receive a positive rent, and that 
even63 the most efficient agent (with low cost parameter) will not produce at his first best 
effort level. 
61 If hab1hty IS unlimited, then loans are always repatd in full and a compeiiiive loan market guarantees that 
the owner-manager effort and the rate of mterest are mdependent 
62 1 e "tf you cannot convtct an Innocent, do not audtt". 
63 This IS m contrast to "non-distortiOn at the top", m which the contract for the most efficient agent, 1 e the 
agent for whom no other type would pass themselves off as, ts efficient 
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2.3.3 Products and Environmental 
In the managerial model considered in section 2.3.2, the most important impact of limited 
liability on incentive contracts was to render a franchise contract, which is optimal when 
liability is unlimited, potentially unenforceable and therefore suboptimal. 
An analogous first best rule exists in the law of tort to apportion the costs of remedial 
measures following an accident which causes hann to third parties, where the liability of 
the injurer is unlimited Shavell (1987) and Landes and Posner (1987) showed that a rule 
of strict liability with contributory negligence generates incentives for efficient accident 
prevention for both firms and consumers. 
However, when firms can inflict hann which exceeds their net worth, then a rule of strict 
liability becomes unenforceable. Mandatory purchase of insurance by firms, specifYing 
the care level, may mitigate this problem by inducing firms to supply socially efficient 
preventative care, whereupon the msurer creates additional mcentives by conducting 
random and imperfect costly monitoring (Jost (1996)). 
In the absence of the motivation to supply socially efficient preventative care, such as is 
the case with the mandatory purchase of insurance (Jost (1996)), a firm will only be 
motivated to take (privately observable) actions which reduce expected hann by the 
amount of damages for which they can be held liable. Endres and Ludeke (1998) identifY 
three important ranges of liability for the allocation of the remedial costs following an 
accident. For low and high levels of liability, the firm will either choose no prevention 
care or the optimal care level chosen in an equihbnum characterised by the first best rule 
when liability is unlimited. However, for intermediate levels of liability only an 
equilibrium in mixed strategies, which can be motivated for example by lack of 
information about payoffs of firms and potential claimants, is possible, for which care 
levels are inefficient. 
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In the same way that limited agent liability motivates the use of performance bonuses in 
managerial models (see section 2.3.2) when punishments cannot be enforced, Strand 
(1994) illustrates that the first best care level of a firm can be implemented by a 
government subsidy which rewards the firm when accidents do not occur, and confiscates 
the entire assets of the firm in accident states. However, implementation of the first best 
is sensitive to the preference of the government to the distribution of income between 
itself and the firm64• When firm profits are less important to the government than its own 
revenues, only the second best is possible, with lower subsidies and less than the first best 
care level exercised by the firm 
Government subsidies in Strand (1994) are mirrored in Leonard and Van Audenrode 
(1996) and Shaven (1997) by wage premiums paid to employees who cannot be held 
responsible for mistakes which cause harm to third parties, and who therefore receive 
wage premiums (wages above spot market rates) in order to motivate greater 
(unobservable) care Leonard and Van Audenrode empiricany establish that limited 
(employee) liability results in fewer quits and firings through its affect on wage 
premiums, whilst Shaven explores the social welfare implications of a rule where the 
firm pays damages equal to harm in the event of an accident and employees receive 
supernormal wages because their liability is limited. Shaven cha11enges conventional 
wisdom that damages equal to harm induces the socia11y efficient outcome, a rule based 
on the rationale that as a result, product prices reflect the fu11 social cost of production, 
thereby inducing customers to make socially correct purchase decisions. However, since 
supernormal wages create additional firm expense, whereas for society they are a costless 
transfer payment from firm to employee, damages greater than harm may be necessary to 
induce firms to pay high enough wage premiums. In contrast, since supernormal wages 
induce a social welfare loss by firms passing these costs onto consumers, thereby 
charging prices which exceed social cost, a rule of damages less than harm may be 
socia11y preferable in order to reduce prices by reducing wage premiums. The social 
64 t e the firm's profits and governments revenues have equal wetght m the soctal welfare functton 
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efficiency of a rule of damages equal to hann when employee liability IS limited is 
therefore ambiguous. 
Costly accident prevention care may in reality be one of several factors under firm control 
which affects the expected hann of an accident. The risk of an environmental accident is 
also determined by the activity level of the firm. Posey (1993) explams the affect that 
limited liability has on both preventative care and firm activity levels. The expected cost 
of care and the expected marginal benefit of activity are reduced when liability is limited. 
This is because costs and benefits are weighted by the probability that an accident does 
not occur, whereas for unlimited liability, expected costs and benefits equal their realised 
values. Consequently, because limited liability also reduces the marginal benefit of 
prevention costs and the marginal cost of risky activity, the affect of limited liability may 
be to either decrease or increase care and activity levels. 
Finally, other interesting variants of accident prevention care and limited liability include 
the possibility that lenders can bear responsibility for the cost of accidents caused by 
firms which they finance. Pitchford (1995) establishes that partial lender liability, where 
the lender65 compensates the victim for less than the total hann, together with a minimum 
equity requirement of the firm delivers the highest level of efficiency (compared to the 
social optimum when prevention care is contractable) Extensions of the economic 
analysis of tort to multi-party accidents with unobservable accidents are considered by 
Feess and Hege (1998). If punitive damages were possible, as is the case of unlimited 
liability, then the efficient liability rule is that each party pays the total damage in the 
event of an accident. However, when this is not possible, a fundamental dilemma anses 
because each party only pays a fraction of the total hann, ensuring inefficiently low levels 
of care. It is shown that asymmetry between parties in their Impact on the stochastic 
damage function can be exploited to improve ex ante incentives to prevent an accident. 
The power of incentives can be mcreased and the hability rule may be efficient if each 
" The loan contract specifies the repayment m an accident state and a no accident state 
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injurer has to pay a disproportionate share of those outcomes which are more likely their 
fault than the fault of others, in the sense that if the defendant in question was less careful 
than they should have been, then the probability of an accident outcome had risen more 
than it would have If another inJurer had been less careful. This implies departures from 
the proportional rule (or constant splitting rule), based on the statistical information 
contained in the circumstances of the accident. By applying this idea in an optimal way, 
Feess and Hege find that efficient liability rules exist as long as the asymmetry across 
injurers is sufficiently large. 
In the next section we discuss the non-incentives literature, for which effort is observable, 
whilst agent liability is limited and information is asymmetric. 
2.3.4 Investment 
In the absence of symmetnc mformation about project quality, or a means by which 
project quality can be signalled prior to the commitment of capital, the fmancing of 
entrepreneurial projects by investors will take place subject to informational constraints. 
In this case, information asymmetry is ex ante, the entrepreneur being privately informed 
about the probability distribution of(costlessly observable) ex post profits. In contrast, an 
ex post information asymmetry occurs when the only asymmetry which arises concerns 
the observability of ex post profits. In this case, the entrepreneur is able to freely observe 
ex post profits, whereas observability by the mvestor is costly. 
The literature which exammes both ex ante and ex post information asymmetries when 
the entrepreneur and possibly the investor are constrained to earn no less than some 
minimum amount, studies a principal-agent model in which investment is governed by a 
debt contract. Even with identical risk preferences, the use of a debt contract leads to a 
conflict of goals between the entrepreneur and the investor. When the liability of the 
entrepreneur is limited, the entrepreneur has an incentive to commit investor capital to 
higher risk projects (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Asymmetric information about project 
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quality then creates a need for the investor to attempt to minimise the costs of this 
ignorance. 
In contrast, if the liab1lity of the entrepreneur is unlimited, then the ignorance of the 
investor has no associated cost since the return promised by the debt contract66 is 
guaranteed. Additionally the impact of investor ignorance and the confl1ct of goals that 
arises with debt contracts and limited entrepreneurial liability, is not evident when an 
investor is instead allotted eqmty shares67• This is because equity shares make no promise 
of a fixed return, a promise whiCh IS compromised when the liability of the entrepreneur 
is hm1ted. Also, the clmms to the residual surplus per share are equal, whereas the claims 
of debt holders subjugate those of equity investors68• 
When information asymmetry is ex post, whereupon investors can only observe ex post 
profits at a cost, the debt contract is an optimal financial arrangement (Townsend (1979), 
Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1987)). Th1s is because a debt contract is the least 
costly arrangement inducing the entrepreneur to truthful revelation of ex post profits, in 
which observation occurs only for a lower interval of (default) states, in which the 
promised amount exceeds the realised surplus. This type of information asymmetry also 
leads to suboptimal lending arrangements, in which entrepreneurs are (equally) unable to 
borrow the entire capital that they would like to given the quoted interest rate (Gale and 
66 The fixed return bemg determined for example by the competitive market rate of mterest for loans 
67 Notwithstandmg the possibility of different risk preferences and insider-outsider conflicts (Meade (1986), 
Myers and MaJiuf (1984)) In Myers and MaJiuf (1984) for example, asymmetric mformatwn about real 
mvesnnent proJects and assets-m-place causes a conflict of mterest between existmg secunty holders and 
new equity financiers, causmg firms to forego valuable mvesttnent opportumlles 
68 The pnonty of claimants m bankruptcy also provides a hnk between financial structure and consumer 
markets (Appelbaum (1992)) In bankruptcy, debt holders have a higher prionty than consumers, whereas 
equity holders have a lower pnonty Obligations to debt holders therefore affects the nsk facmg consumers 
even when the firm provides product warranties. As a result, the firm will be fully equity financed if 
consumers are nsk averse and secunty holders are nsk neutral, thereby optimally shifting nsk away from 
consumers 
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Hellwig (I 985)), or in which some would-be borrowers receive loans whilst others do not 
(Williamson (1987)). 
The availability of credit also motivates much of the discussion of ex ante information 
asymmetries69, whereby the entrepreneur is endowed with private information about the 
probability distnbutwn of ex post profits, prior to the commitment of capital by investors. 
Important to this literature is whether loan amounts are the same for each entrepreneur 
(Stlghtz and Weiss (1981), DeMeza and Webb (I 987)), or whether the loan size itself is a 
contract variable (Innes (1993b), Milde and Riley (1988), Jaffee and Russell (1976)). 
When loan sizes are fixed, it is not possible for investors to differentiate the risk of 
investment opportunities between entrepreneurs. As a result, since investors charge an 
interest premium in respect of the possibility of default, entrepreneurs with lower risk 
proJects are driven from the market for loans (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). As a 
consequence, and in order to prevent the saturation of the loans market with poor quality 
(high risk) investment opportunities, investors must ration the supply of credit instead of 
reducing excess demand by increasing the rate of interest. 
In contrast, DeMeza and Webb (1987) derive an over-investment result. This result is 
however consistent with that of Stiglitz and Weiss because DeMeza and Webb permit 
69 An Important body of literature also attempts to provide an explanatiOn other than tax sh1eldmg for the 
use of debt contracts when ex ante mformation asymmetry obtams Jensen and Meckhng ( 1976) argue that 
there are agency costs with both eqmty and debt financmg with an opllmum mixture mmilmsing the total 
agency cost Ross (1977) suggests that the manager of a firm whose wage depends on current and future 
firm value uses debt to signal firm value to the market The dependence of his wage on current firm value 
gives him the mcenllve to Signal, while a penalty in the case of bankruptcy prevents him from overstatmg 
the value. Le land and Pyle (1977) suggest that an owner-manager uses the proportiOn of equity that he holds 
as a Signal of firm quahty Lastly, Narayanan (1988) identifies an advantage to risky debt not possible with 
eqmty finance, whereby Its use by profitable firms keeps mfenor firms out of the market even when the 
market IS unable to perfectly d1stmgmsh between firms of different quahty This reduces financing costs 
when firms are pooled by lenders 
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entrepreneurial projects to differ according to expected return. This means that the 
marginal project financed in DeMeza and Webb has the lowest probability of success, 
whereas the reverse is true of Stiglitz and Weiss. 
Innes (1993b), in generalising the analysis ofDeMeza and Webb, went on to illustrate the 
importance of assuming only monotone payoff profiles for the investor. For a non-
monotone contract, in which investors receive the entire profit if it IS below some 
threshold, and nothing otherwise, Innes was able to show that entrepreneurs of higher 
quality in the sense of MLRP can signal their type by preferring the non-monotonic 
contract over the debt contract, even when investment amounts are fixed. Further, if 
investment is not fixed, a separating equilibrium is possible, m wluch high quality 
entrepreneurs will signal their type by underinvesting in their projects. The cost of 
underinvesting IS m1mm1sed, however, if entrepreneurs of high quality projects may also 
choose to finance their projects with investment contracts which are non-monotonic. 
The intUition that the amount of loan risk 'purchased' by uninformed investors depends 
on the size of loans to entrepreneurs, was first highlighted by Jaffee and Russell (1976). 
M!lde and Riley (1988), in extending the scope of the analysis of Jaffee and Russell, also 
demonstrated that the way m which exogenous uncertainty affects productivity 
determines how entrepreneurs signal their types to investors when the loan size is a 
contract variable. Since larger loans attract greater interest charges per unit of capital, 
entrepreneurs are able to signal their quahty types by their willingness to accept greater 
lending costs for larger loans. For multiplicative uncertainty, higher quality entrepreneurs 
accept larger loans than they would otherwise, in order to distinguish themselves from 
poorer quahty loan applicants. For additive uncertamty, higher quality entrepreneurs 
accept smaller loans. Therefore, technology considerations alone may determine whether 
over or under investment obtains when signalling phenomena are admiss1ble. 
It is evident from the literature reviewed above, which characterises optimal financial 
arrangements between asymmetrically informed investors and entrepreneurs, that as far as 
2.37 
CHAPTER2 THEORY AND REVIEW 
we are aware, no contributiOns exist which attempt to examine the ramifications of 
limited entrepreneurial liability when a profit sharing agreement governs the allocation of 
ex post profits between investor and entrepreneur. In Chapter 3 we examine the 
implications of imposing a floor to entrepreneurial pay when both the investor and the 
entrepreneur are privately endowed with information wh1ch determines the optimal 
cap1tal investment The entrepreneur is privately informed about the marginal 
productivity of capital, whilst the mvestor becomes privately informed about the unit cost 
of capital which is shared with the entrepreneur. 
We find for this bi-lateral information asymmetry problem, whereupon the investor must 
design a contract menu which induces him to truthfully reveal the cost of capital when 
realised, that the only inefficiency in the optimal investment schedule is due to the 
productivity information privately endowed to the entrepreneur prior to contract 
acceptance. The private observation of the realised cost of capital to the investor only 
serves to reduce welfare by restricting the space of feasible70 mechanisms Additionally, 
imposmg a pay floor for the entrepreneur is overall welfare enhancing smce it reduces the 
extent of the mformation rents which the investor must award the entrepreneur m order to 
elicit truthful reporting of the entrepreneur's actual productivity type. This welfare 
enhancmg feature of limited liability in profit sharing agreements has received no 
mention in the literature. However, whilst our contnbution is a significant departure from 
the existing literature which examines investment arrangements between asymmetrically 
informed entrepreneurs and lenders in the context of a debt contract, a comparison is 
poss1ble with some of the conclusions reached therein. 
70 By feastb!e mechamsms we mean contract menus whtch are mcenttve compattb!e and mduce the 
borrower to participate 
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2.3.5 Employment 
It IS well known that incentive compatible contracts, in which risk averse firms privately 
observe an ex post realised productivity state, lead to underemployment (Hart (1983)). 
The reason is that risk averse firms prefer employee contracts in which wages are lower in 
relatively less productive states. However, since firms have an incentive to understate the 
realised productivity state, incentive compat1ble contracts can only be conditioned on 
total wages by way of employment. As a consequence, employment is inefficiently low in 
less productive states. 
When risk neutral firms have lim1ted liability, a claim of bankruptcy limits the payment a 
firm must make to workers. Because workers will therefore prefer to accept contracts 
which preclude firms from ever entering into bankruptcy, contracts appear to represent 
firms as having extreme disutility from negative returns (Kahn and Scheinkman (1985)). 
As a result, an artificial concavity is introduced into the utility function of limited liability 
risk neutral firms71 , ensunng that they behave as if they were risk averse72• 
Kahn and Scheinkman show that the consequence of this artificial concavity in the utility 
function of a nsk neutral firm, when leisure is a normal good, is the existence of some 
productivity state, whereby higher state realisations yield overemployment, and lower 
state realisations yield underemployment73• If leisure is an mferior good, then ex post 
underemployment obtains for all states. 
71 Th1s is in contrast to nsk lovmg behaviour induced by hm1ted hab1hty for nsk neutral firms when there IS 
no mcent1ve compat1b1hty constramt 
72 Another way to v1ew th1s IS that the firm must be concerned about the allocatiOn of profit across states, 
smce the profit m low states must be adequate w r t the firm's hqutdatton value 
73 For the full mformat1on case, employment 1s efficient, but workers may not be fully msured, smce the 
firm bankruptcy constramt ensures that workers cannot be pa1d more than the firm produces 
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The explanation of an underemployment result is also offered by Farmer (1984,1985), in 
which the return to the factors of production is extended to include the cost of debt 
finance. A contract in which a risk neutral firm with supenor information is given the 
entire residual risk is rendered unfeasible in low states when the firm has limited liability. 
This means that since a constant utility level for factors of production cannot be 
guaranteed in every state, with a possible loss in low states, the factors of production must 
receive a bonus in favourable states. However, this bonus payment interferes with the 
firm's ex post employment decision by raising the marginal cost of employing an 
additional unit of labour above the disutility of employment. The profit maximising firm 
makes its ex post employment decision by equating the marginal cost of employment to 
the marginal product, but since the marginal cost schedule is steeper in an inefficient 
contract than in the first best contract, the firm will hire less labour in states for which the 
bankruptcy constraint is binding. 
Additionally, Farmer also showed that smce the degree of (artificial) concavity of the 
firm's utility function varies as the bankruptcy constraint becomes more or less binding, 
then its employment contracts will be less efficient when the value of outside 
opportunities for workers increases, whereupon the firm becomes less able to guarantee 
factor payments. In the same way, variations in interest rates may manifest themselves as 
variations in the incidence of layoffs, because With rising interest rates the firm is forced 
to pay a higher expected return to its factors of production, being the sum of the 
reservation utilities of workers and investors. 
Farmer (1985) had established a hnk between credit and labour markets, in which it is 
asserted, in common with Kahn and Scheinkman, that worker underinsurance is a result 
of the limitation placed on firms by bankruptcy constraints to make payments m low 
states. This assertiOn has been challenged by Tsoulouhas (1996). Typically, firms are 
assumed to be risk neutral since they have access to credit markets, and can therefore 
offer complete insurance to risk averse workers. Access to credit markets therefore means 
that for workers who commit to ex post employment with the firm, the firm can offer full 
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insurance by shifting the variability in payments to creditors, even though limited liability 
restricts the aggregate (workers plus creditors) payments a firm can make in low states. 
However, for workers who do not commit to ex post employment with the firm, the 
distribution of pay across states must adjust to the ex post arbitrage opportunities 
available. Since the pay of workers in high states who can quit ex post must increase to 
stop a quit, given that the firm would not pay a rent ex ante to workers, pay in low 
productivity states decreases. As a result, the existence of outside sources of credit, which 
are important in shiftmg risk away from immobile workers has no effect when workers 
are mobile. It is therefore asserted instead, that it is worker mobility which leads to 
underinsurance of workers when firms have access to credit markets. 
2.3.6 Bankruptcy74 
The legislative intent of bankruptcy laws, such as Chapter 11, is to avoid the liqmdation 
of financially distressed but efficient firms, and to liquidate distressed inefficient firms 
(Mooradian (1994)). This is an issue of efficient resource allocation and the debate about 
the effect of Chapter 11, which specifically allows for a renegotiation between equity and 
debt holders over the allocation of claims for a firm, throws up two competing views. The 
first view is that bankruptcy laws exacerbate overinvestrnent, where in the extreme, 
managers may reorganise when liquidation is efficient. The second view is that Chapter 
11 enhances efficiency by inhibiting the inefficient liquidation of firms in default. 
Mooradian (1994) introduced asymmetric information, where creditors carmot observe 
firm efficiency, into a model of public debt restructuring. Mooradian showed that without 
a collective reorganisation mechanism like Chapter 11, inefficient firms pool with 
efficient firms, where both are equally likely to continue or liquidate. It is further shown 
that Chapter 11 imposes a cost on pooling that efficient firms do not incur, which induces 
74 In th1s subsection we present only a bnef review detailing some of the ISsues of the bankruptcy debate, 
smce contmuat1on ISsues form no part ofthe contribution made by this theSis 
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voluntary filing for bankruptcy by inefficient firms and consequently enables efficient 
firms to contmue when they would otherwise be liquidated. 
An alternative dissemmation of the information structure is provided by Berkovitch and 
Israel (1999), where m addition to fundamental information such as intrinsic firm 
efficiency, importance is given to strategic managerial information, which allows the 
manager to determine the chance with which an investigation by creditors will 
successfully identify firm efficiency. Optimal bankruptcy laws can then be derived, each 
depending in a different way upon the quality of both fundamental and strategic 
information endowed to managers, in which creditors' information IS utilised and the use 
by managers of strategic information is minimised. 
Since a manager chooses his effort level whilst anticipating both the possibility of the 
firm entering financial distress and the resolution of distress as governed by the existing 
bankruptcy law, Berkovitch et a! (1998) extend the definition of optimal bankruptcy laws 
to include optimal ex ante incentives of managers to supply effort, whilst also achieving 
an ex post efficient allocation of resources. Berkov1tch et al. (1998) identify that directly 
affecting the structure of the bargaining process between owner-managers and investors 
in directmg the assets of the firm to their highest value use in bankruptcy, for example by 
mandating a first move advantage to the owner-manager and enforcing some minimum 
delay before counter offers may be considered, can effect implementation of the optimal 
resolution of financial distress whilst achieving the first-best incentives for effort75 
The significance of not giving debt holders absolute priority in renegotiation, but instead 
giving the owner some bargaining power in default, is also illustrated by Heinkel and 
Zechner (1993). These authors also permit owner-managers to make effort choices which 
" Legros and M1tchell (1995) suggest that there IS a trade-off between efficient resource allocatiOn and 
mcen!Ive effects, since a hqmdatwn policy has a disciplinary effect m which a manager with any g1ven 
productivity venture Will exert more effort when faced with the threat of hqmdat10n than when assured of a 
bailout 
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are individually utility maximising, but consider how new information about future cash 
flows is obtained over time. A conflict of goals may arise between owner-managers and 
creditors m which intermediate cash flows revealing an expectation of final default on 
debt payments, may give managers an incentive to conceal poor prospects in order to pay 
themselves a div1dend. This can also lead to false declarations of expected default in 
order to achieve debt forgiveness, thereby rendering less binding the restnctions on the 
ability of managers to pay themselves dividends. When cash flows are positively serially 
correlated, this problem is mitigated by the issue of debt with a risky intermediate debt 
payment, which acts as a signal of future default. When flows are less highly correlated, 
owner-managers can be induced to truthful revelation by being g1ven sufficient 
bargaining power m default, such that the value of the owner's pos1tion after 
renegotiation exceeds the benefits of concealing expected future default with mefficient 
continuation. 
Finally, that bankruptcy rules which are identical across firms automatically embody the 
risk that firms that should be liquidated are bailed out and vice versa, as discussed in the 
literature above, is well known. However, these inefficiencies may even exist when 
regulators can tailor bankruptcy rules to each specific firm, given particular firm specific 
beliefs about efficiency (Legros and Mitchell (1995)). 
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CHAPTER3 
INVESTMENT, HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY AND LIMITED 
LIABILITY PROFIT SHARING CONTRACTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The charactensation of optimal financial arrangements between asymmetrically informed 
borrowers and lenders has been studied for two polar cases, ex ante and ex post 
informational asymmetry Ex ante information asymmetry arises when the borrower is 
pnvately informed ex ante about the probability distribution of ex post profits which can 
be costlessly observed by the lender An ex post informational asymmetry implies that 
mvestors can only observe ex post profits (or realised state) with a cost. Prior to 
contracting, the borrower and lender are symmetrically informed about the probability 
distribution of ex post profits. 
The literature on the effect of information asymmetries upon mvestment (see section 3 .2) 
has examined the impact of both types of information asymmetry, ex ante and ex post, in 
the context of debt contracts. Debt contracts, in which the lender is sole res1dual claimant 
when project returns are less than the promised payment, are limited liability contracts. 
This is because, the borrower is liable to pay the fixed amount only when project returns 
are sufficient to meet this requirement. Upon default, when project returns are less than 
the promised amount, the borrower is not liable for the shortfall. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the impact of providing a floor to the pay that an 
informed borrower receives when it is a profit sharing contract rather than a debt contract 
which IS used to reward cap1tal. The borrower, who contributes no capital himself, is 
informed about the margmal productivity of capital prior to formalisation of the profit 
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shanng agreement that he commits to with the lender. Concerned about the opportunity 
that the borrower may have to overinvest capital, the investor designs the profit shanng 
contract to allocate a proportion of the realised cost of capital to the borrower. However, 
neither the borrower nor the investor know the actual unit cost of capital supplied by the 
investor at the lime of contract acceptance. Therefore, in order to placate concerns of the 
borrower that the realised cost of capital may turn out to be very high, the investor 
provides a floor to the pay that the borrower is allocated from ex post profits. 
This problem is one of bilateral information asymmetry, since both the investor and the 
borrower are required to make declarations about private information which is separately 
endowed to each of them. The information asymmetry of the borrower is also ex ante, in 
the sense that his pnvate information about the marginal productivity of capital induces a 
probability distribution over ex post profits, where uncertainty is about the future 
realisation of the unit cost of capital. 
The chapter is set out as follows. In section 3.2 we provide a detailed review of the 
literature on optimal lending arrangements between asymmetrically informed borrowers 
and lenders with limited liability constraints. From the review it will become apparent 
that the literature concentrates on the discussiOn of the use of debt contracts in 
determming the significance of information asymmetries between borrower and lender, 
and that no such analogous contributions exist to examine the use of profit sharing 
contracts with a pay floor for at least one of the participants. In sectiOn 3.3 we introduce 
the model. In sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 we present and discuss the analysis. In section 3.7 
we collect concluding remarks. 
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3.2 Asymmetric information and investment: A detailed review 
Studies of ex post informational asymmetries, in which lenders can only observe ex post 
profits (or realised state) with a cost, but for which no information asymmetry exists ex 
ante, can be traced back to Townsend (1979), who explained the existence of debt 
contracts as a result of costly state verification procedures. If a contract is contingent on 
an event (the realised state), then it must be known whether or not that event has occured. 
The range of possible contingent contracts is limited to those states which are easily 
verified by both parties to the contract. By characterising a contract to specify for which 
states an asymmetrically informed borrower must provide state verification (at cost to 
himself) to the lender, and the amount to be transferred to the lender for each state, 
Townsend was able to show that the optimal incentive compatible contract, in which the 
borrower truthfully declares the realised state when called to do so, is one for which the 
verification states are a lower interval of possible state realisations. Such verification 
obtains for debt contracts upon default, where the lender must verify the realised state in 
order to precisely extract the residual surplus, which is necessarily less than the promised 
fixed payment. Verification is absent for all higher states for which no default occurs and 
the promised fixed payment can be made. 
Gale and HeiiWig (1985) also derive a debt contract as the optimal contract form by 
endogenising a binary observation decision for each state However, they concentrate 
their study of ex post asymmetry on how the cost of observation and the asymmetry in 
information gives rise to an inefficiency. This mefficiency causes a market failure for the 
provision of credit. It is shown that given a fixed opportunity cost of investment, 
diminishing returns to investment ensure that as the level of investment increases beyond 
some point, the distnbution of profits shifts to the left. Due to both dimimshing returns 
and the structure of bankruptcy costs, the point at which this shift starts to occur is less 
than the first-best level of investment which obtains when the lender has the same 
information ex ante as the borrower. Thus it is optimal to reduce investment some way 
3.3 
CHAPTER3 INVESTMENT AND HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY 
below the first-best level in order to reduce the probability of bankruptcy and 
consequently its associated cost. 
In Gale and Hellwig (1985), credit is rationed in the sense that borrowers cannot borrow 
all of the capital that they would like to given the quoted interest rate. This is in contrast 
to the credit rationing result of Williamson (1987), in which all would-be borrowers are 
identical, ex ante, but some receive loans while others do not. WJlliamson's model relies 
on monitoring costs to produce this result, as it contains none of the features that produce 
rationing m the other models so far discussed. Williamson was able to characterise two 
eqUilibnum types, a rationing equilibrium and a no rationing equilibrium. By assuming 
that borrower utility (all parties are risk neutral) is concave in the interest rate, when 
demand for credit is greater than the available supply, the equilibrium interest rate (which 
maximises the lender expected utility) ensures that some entrepreneurs (borrowers) are 
denied credit. Those entrepreneurs who do not receive loans can offer no contract that 
will bid loans away from those who receive them or that draw more lenders into the 
credit market This IS the case since the equilibrium interest rate maximises the expected 
utility of the lenders. Offering to pay a higher interest rate implies a higher probability of 
default, with larger expected morutoring costs for the lender. This increase in monitonng 
costs exceeds the mcrease in expected payments to the lender which result from the 
higher interest rate. 
The issue of credit rationing (when demand for credit exceeds supply) also motivates 
much of the discussion of the effects of ex ante infonnation asymmetry upon investment 
These studies attempt to ascertain the conditions which support the existence of either an 
under or over m vestment problem, where the degree of investment IS made with reference 
to the first-best level. For these studies, characterisation of the ex ante probability 
distnbution of ex post profits invokes either differing risk for the same expected return 
(as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) or differing expected returns (as in DeMeza and Webb 
(1987)). 
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Without the possibility that high quality loan applicants can signal their characteristics to 
potential lenders, Stiglitz and We1ss (1981) consider a pooling equilibrium in which 
borrowers seek to fund projects of different risk but equal expected return, where lenders 
are unable to distinguish between loan applicants because loan amounts are equal for all 
potential borrowers. The truncation of borrower payoffs for low states afforded by debt 
contracts ensures that for projects which vary according to a mean preserving spread in 
risk considered by St!glitz and Weiss, the expected return for higher risk loan applicants 
who debt finance their projects will be greater. Raising the interest rate to reduce excess 
demand in a non-cleared loan market will then tend to force the preferred loan applicant 
with a lower risk project out of the pool. Instead of raising the interest rate to reduce the 
demand that it meets, lenders must therefore ration credit. 
The intuition for the result in Stiglitz and Weiss comes from the way in which loan 
contracts can induce a conflict of goals between borrower and lender. Consider instead a 
borrower who can choose his character to be from a range of possible risk types. The 
borrower has an incentive to shift to high risk projects in order to maximise the value of 
insurance provided by the limited liability of a debt contract. Anticipating this, lenders 
may demand a higher interest rate to offset the higher risk (Pang1 (1992) shows that this 
moral hazard is mitigated in a multi-period setting when lenders offer a performance 
related interest rate, which conditions the current period interest rate on the realised 
project return of the previous period). This type of asymmetric information problem is 
analogous to that considered by Akerlof (1970) for the second hand car market. When an 
uninformed buyer cannot distinguish high quality from low quality products, the discount 
that the buyer requires given his uncertainty forces the sellers of high quality products 
from the market In order to prevent the disappearance of low risk loan applicants from 
the market for loans by an increase in interest rates (analogous to the demand for 
discounts by buyers m Akerlofs problem), credit must instead become ratiOned as shown 
by Stiglitz and Weiss. 
The cnteria that differentiate high from low quality projects, whether it be risk or mean 
retl!m, also define what a lender considers to be the marginal project. The importance of 
3.5 
CHAPTER3 INVESTMENT AND HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY 
this definition has been exposed by DeMeza and Webb (1987). The latter study again 
considers a pooling equilibrium but instead derives an over-investment result m contrast 
to the under-investment result of Stiglitz and Weiss. For both studies the equilibrium, in 
wh1ch the terms of all loan contracts are homogeneous, involves entrepreneurs with high 
success probability projects subsidismg their low success probability counterparts. 
However, in DeMeza and Webb the marginal project financed has the lowest success 
probability whereas in Stiglitz and Weiss the marginal project financed has the highest 
success probability. For both cases it may be stated that the presence of an ex ante 
information asymmetry between borrower and lender introduces an inefficiency in the 
market for loans, the quantitative result of which depends upon how borrowers in the 
pool are different. 
For the studies of the effects of the use of debt contracts in establishing results 
concerning the supply of credit so far mentioned, the importance of an implicit 
assumption made therein has been highlighted by lnnes (1993b) Innes exposed an 
underlying assumption of monotonicity. A debt contract awards the lender a payoff 
which is monotone non-decreasing. This "monotonic contract" constraint can be 
motivated either by a reqmrement that investors never have an incentive to sabotage the 
firm or by an ability of entrepreneurs to costlessly revise their profit reports upwards 
(with hidden borrowmg, for example). Assuming limited liability for both the borrower' 
and the lender, and that projects differ in quality in the sense of the mono tonic likelihood 
ratio property3, Innes showed that a pooling eqmlibrium would again result with or 
without a monotonicity constramt on the contract form when investor capital was fixed 
across quality types. With the constraint, borrowers pool and those with proJect quality 
1 The borrower cannot allocate more than the realised profit to mvestors 
2 Investors have hm1ted habihty m that their loss ts hm1ted to the1r initial mvestment 
3 The monotonic hkehhood ratio property 1mphes that, for any given profit level, h1gher quahty 1mphes 
relatively greater probabihty weight on all h1gher profit levels Under MLRP, If higher quahty leads to 
greater weight on some profit levels below X, 11 must also mduce a proportionally greater increase m 
probabihty we1ght on all h1gher profit levels 
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less than some threshold do not invest in their projects. Without the constraint, a new 
type of contract form is possible in which lenders receive the entire profit if it IS below a 
certain level and nothing othel'Wlse. This non-monotonic contract4 form minimises the 
incentives of low quality borrowers to pool with high quality types, and all high quality 
types who would previously have accepted a debt contract, defect to the new contract 
form. Further, if investment capital can vary across quality types, then any variable 
investment equilibnum contains either a debt contract (if constrained monotone) or the 
new non-monotonic contract, but both a pooling and a separating equilibrium are 
possible. If a separating equilibrium obtains, high quality borrowers can use their 
investment choice to signal their type, but at a cost (which manifests as either over or 
under investment, see Milde and R.Iley (1988) below). However, high quality types can 
reduce these investment signalling costs by choosing the payoff function which 
minimises the incentive of low quality types to masquerade. The payoff function chosen 
in the separating equilibrium is the new non-monotonic contract form if the monotonicity 
constraint IS relaxed. 
The Importance oflnnes' (1993b) paper was to characterise a contract form other than a 
debt contract in the presence oflimited liability constraints that would minimise the costs 
of high quality loan applicants m signalling their type, and therefore best mitigate the 
adverse selection problem faced by investors. Permitting the amount of borrowings to 
vary between borrower types was crucial to the signalling process. MI!de and R.Iley 
(1988) had earlier examined a variable investment equilibrium characterising a separating 
equilibrium Without ratiomng. Generalising previous work by Jaffee and Russell (1976)5, 
Milde and Riley ( 1988) demonstrated that lenders will screen loan applicants by offering 
4 lnnes refers to thts contract as a "hve-or-dte" contract since 1f the lender receives a return, he receJVes the 
entire surplus and the borrower rece1ves nothmg (and v1ce versa). 
5 The key ms1gbt m Jaffee and Russell ( 1976) IS that the amount of risk "purchased" by the unmforrned 
lender IS dependent on the s1ze of the loan. Therefore, even a perfectly compet1t1ve lender wtll not be 
mdifferent as to loan s1ze Jaffee and Russell then show that there may be no "compet1t1ve" Nash 
eqmhbnum m such a world 
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them a schedule of loan amounts and corresponding interest rates6• The symmetric 
information benchmark in Milde and Riley shows that, given a standard debt contract and 
project risk which vanes according to investment amount, the Pareto optimal loan 
contract awards projects with less than the loan capital which is individually optimal. 
This is because the marginal increase m interest rate that a lender requires for a marginal 
increase in loan amount reaches a point, below the loan amount which is individually 
optimal for the borrower, where it starts to mcrease faster than the marginal increase in 
interest rate that the borrower is Willing to pay for a marginal increase in loan amount. 
This no rationing equilibrium (in which loan demand equals loan supply) also obtains 
when information is asymmetric. Thus in the competitive equilibrium considered, the 
emphasis is on the way in which higher quality loan applicants (lower risk) will signal 
their type when information is asymmetric and the way in which this mechanism is 
determined by how the ex ante uncertain state of nature affects productivity. The 
production function is taken to be either multiplicative or additive m uncertainty. For 
multiplicative uncertainty, the marginal increase in interest rate that a loan applicant is 
willing to accept in order to receive a larger loan is greater for higher quality projects 
(those with lower risk). In the case of additive uncertainty, the reverse is true. Therefore 
higher quality applicants can signal their type in either case by their greater or lesser 
willingness respectively to pay a larger interest rate for a larger loan, leading to a stable 
multiple contract separating equilibrium without ratiomng. 
From the review above, it is apparent that the debt contract proliferates the literature 
which characterises optimal financial arrangements between asymmetrically mformed 
borrowers and lenders with liability constraints. Whilst it is true that this contract form IS 
shown to be optimal for ex post asymmetries m very general settings for which state 
observation is costly to the lender (Townsend (I 979), Gale and Hell wig (I 985), and 
Wdliamson (1987)), it is not apparent from ex ante asymmetry studies that there is 
6 M1lde and Rdey assumed that no profitable (from the lenders v1ewpomt) poolmg contract Pareto 
dommates the Pareto efficient set of separatmg contracts 
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sufficient (if any) reason to impose this contract form7• Instead of imposing a debt 
contract to reward investor capital, which necessarily limits the liability of the borrower, 
we could equally impose a profit sharing contract providing the borrower with a pay 
floor, and address simtlar issues, such as whether an ex ante information asymmetry 
causes over or under investment In the next section we present a model which we will 
use to examine the implications of providing a pay floor when a profit sharing rule 
allocates the ex post return from investment instead of a debt contract. 
3.3 The Model 
We present the model in two stages. In the first stage we present the production 
technology and the profit sharing contract, whereupon we briefly discuss the form of the 
profit sharing contract between investor and borrower, since it contains features which 
are important to this analysis as well as to some other economic issues (see 3 3.1 below). 
In the second stage we mtroduce the game played by the investor and the borrower. 
3.3.1 Production technology and Contract form 
Let 9e[~,B] be a multiplicative productivity parameter, such that for capital mvestment 
K(r,9), which also depends on unit capital cost re[r,r ], there exists a production 
technology H(K(r,9)) which generates revenue 9H(K(r,9)) in productivity state 9. 
H(K(r,9)) is increasing in K(r,9) at a decreasing rate, i.e. H'(K(r,9)) > 0 and H"(K(r,9)) < 
0. For per unit cost of capital r, and productivity state 9, the profit from the venture is 
9H(K(r,9))- rK(r,9). 
7 The notable exceptiOn to this bemg Innes (1993b), whereby specifically assuming a monotomcity 
constramt and that quality types differ accordmg to MLRP, establishes the debt contract as an optimal 
contract fonn that mmimises the cost of adverse selectiOn when ex ante mfonnatlon asymmetry obtams 
3.9 
CHAPTER3 INVESTMENT AND HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY 
In allocating realised profit between the investor and the borrower, let a(r,9)e[0,1] 
denote the deductibility of capital costs for unit capttal cost r and productivity state 9. 
Then we can define the share base, S(r,9), being the realised revenue net of deductible 
capttal costs, as 
S(r,B) "'BH(K(r,B)) -a(r,B)rK(r,B) (1) 
If7te(0,1) is the proportion of the realised share base which is allocated to the borrower, 
then the ex post allocation of the borrower, rp(r,B), is given by 
rp(r,B) "';rr(BH(K(r,B))- a(r,B)rK(r,B)) (2) 
and the agent receives zero base wage. 
The ex post allocation of the investor, p(r,B), is therefore given by 
p(r,B)"' (1-;rr)BH(K(r,B))- (1-a(r,B);rr)rK(r,B) (3) 
A profit sharing contract for unit cost of capital r and productivity state 9 is defined to be 
a pair (a(r,B),K(r,B)) 8, where we assume that the share ratio 1t is exogenously 
determined. A contract menu M is then a set {a(r,B),K(r,B)} for all Be [~,8] and for 
all re [r,r]. 
From (1) it is immedtate that a(r,9) = 0 would mean that the surplus generated from 
investment is allocated according to a pure revenue sharing contract, whilst a(r,9) = 1 
8 We include K(r,8) as an element of the profit shanng contract for productiVIty state e and umt capital cost 
r, smce m additton to the rule (a(r,8),11) allocatmg ex post profit, where 11 IS exogenous and therefore 
excluded from the defimtion of the profit sharmg contract, the mvestment capital determmes the borrower 
pay 
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would divide the realised surplus according to a pure profit shanng contract. Thus the 
borrower may share none, some or all of the capital costs, depending upon the 
deductibility of this cost from the share base. 
The motivation for modelling the profit sharing contract to explicitly include the 
deductJbility of capital costs from the share base is that the pay of the borrower is directly 
affected by the actual cost of capital9• Therefore, by an appropriate choice of a(r,9), the 
investor, who supplies the entire investment capttal, may bring the incentives of the 
borrower more in line with his own objectives 
We have also deduced that the deductibtlity of capital costs from the share base impacts 
at least two more economic problems (see Appendix I for proofs). Drawing from the 
work of Ross (I 973), the first of these examples concerns linear profit sharing contracts 
and the possibthty of achieving Pareto effictency when investment decisions are made 
under conditions of uncertainty. It is found when capital costs are not deductible from the 
share base, that the attainment of Pareto efficiency and the stmultaneous utility 
maximisation of a risk averse principal and risk averse agent by the use of linear share 
contracts is precluded. In contrast the exact opposite is true when these costs are fully 
deductible. The second example concerns the effect of the deductibility of capital costs 
on investment when the investment decision is an unvenfiable action delegated entirely 
to the agent. It is shown that complete deductibility generates a problem of under-
investment whereas non-deductibility creates a problem of over-investment10• 
9The pay of the borrower is also mdirectly affected by the unit capital cost via the dependence of 
mvestment capital K(r,9) on r It IS also important to observe that the only requirement of r is that there 
exists a cost rK(r,9) whtch is to be apportioned between the investor and the borrower Thts cost need not 
therefore be an opportumty cost of capital but IS any cost m direct proportion to the capital stock (e g 
operatmg costs such as uttlltles m direct proportiOn to the scale of plant and machmery) 
10 Note that remote mvestment, where an mvestor IS unable to mspect capital eqmpment, IS an example of a 
delegated mvestment deciSIOn which cannot be observed However, the capital stock decision IS m reahty 
more hkely to be observable. 
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Some mention of the deduct1b1hty of capital costs from the share base is made in the 
literature on profit/revenue sharing. Most notably, and with symmetrically distributed 
information, Michaelis (1997) uses a bargaining model to derive conditions under winch 
profit and revenue sharing are equivalent. In his model a firm and union bargain the pay 
parameters (which are a base wage and share ratio) and in anticipation of this the firm 
unilaterally determines the investment in capital stock. Michaehs' contnbution came 
about in order to show for the assumptions common to the literature on the effects of 
profit sharing on employment in a unionised labour economy (see for example PohJola 
(1987,1990), Jackman (1988), Hoe! and Moene (1988), Palokangas (1992)), that revenue 
and profit sharing are equivalent, thus making arb1trary the definition of the share base 
with respect to the deductib1lity of cap1tal costs. However, for our purposes the 
deductibility of capital costs is an essential element of the contract menu. 
3.3.2 The Game 
The essence of the mvestor' s problem lies in the information structure of the 
envuonment. There are two key elements First, the realised unit cost of capital (r) is 
never observed by any party other than the investor. Second, the borrower has private 
information concerning the productivity state (9) which IS known to the borrower pnor to 
the formalisatiOn of the agreement with the investor. Let us first describe the timing of 
the game and specifically the revelation of information by reference to the following 
time-line: 
I offers M Nature selects r Payoffs 
and (only) I sees 
(a(r, O), K(r, O)) 
B sees 8 B accepts/ B reports B I reports r IS implemented 
(pnvately) rejects 
3.12 
CHAPTER3 INVESTMENT AND HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY 
where M = { a(r, B), K (r, B) } for all B e [~, B] and for all r e [r,;] is a contract menu 
(to be derived), and I, B respectively denote the investor and borrower. 
The timing of the game is therefore as follows 11 : 
Fust, the borrower acquires private information about the productivity state 9. Second, 
the investor announces the terms of the contract menu. At this stage both borrower and 
investor have the same beliefs concerning the possible costs of capital. Third, the 
borrower then either accepts or rejects the contract menu. Fourth the borrower reports 
productivity state B. F1fth, nature (randomly) selects the unit cost of capital. Sixth, the 
investor reports realised cost of capital r. Then the contract ( a(r, B), K(r, B)) is 
implemented given the reported productivity state and unit cost of capital, after which the 
investor and the borrower each receive their respective payoffs. 
A real world example of when the dynamics of information revelation in our model 
descnbes how an investor comes to commit his funds, is where capital investment is 
deferred to some future date, before which data captured by r is not yet available The 
delay between contract menu offer/acceptance and the revelation of the true cost of 
capital to the mvestor, is reflected by the fact that both investor and borrower have 
identical knowledge at the outset as to the ex ante probability d1stnbution of ex post unit 
cost of capital. At the time of revelation of the true unit cost of capital, the returns of 
alternative investment opportunities forecast at the time of contract menu 
offer/acceptance which would possibly present themselves as alternatives at the time of 
actually committing funds, will be known by the investor. It is then that the investor has 
an incentive to misrepresent such opportunities to the borrower. 
11 Btiateral mformat10n asymmetry is dtscussed m Maskm and Ttroie (I990,I992) In thetr analysts, the 
pnnctpal ts mformed at the ttme that he offers a contract to the agent However, as seen from the game 
studted here, the agent (borrower) not the pnnctpal (1 e the parttctpant who destgns and offers the contract) 
ts m formed at the !lme that the prmcipai (investor) offers the contract menu This pomt ts taken up m 3.6 
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It is also worth noting that given the borrower was either not willing to commit his own 
capital, or had insufficient capital to provide the investment capital advanced by the 
investor, the opportunities available to the investor may in real life be very different to 
those available to the borrower. To this extent, that knowledge of the true opportunity 
cost of capital becomes privately endowed only to the investor is consistent with the 
establishment of the need for the borrower to ra1se capital in the first mstance. 
To describe the mforrnation structure formally, let R(ri9) be the cumulative conditional 
probability distribution of r g1ven productivity state B e [ft, B]. Then R1(ri9) represents 
the partial derivative of R(rl9) w r.t. its first argument r. R,(ri9) is the associated 
conditional density function, and has strictly positive support on r e [!:, ~]. To associate 
h1gh productivity states 9 with low costs of capital we would require R2(ri9) ~ 0 i e. 
higher 9 would mean higher R(ri9) at any given r, and thus make low r values more 
probable. However, for the present analysis we will assume that the productivity state 9 
and the unit cost of capital r are zndependent and note that correlating 9 and r allows 
possible extension to the current analysis Additionally, let F(9) be the (unconditional) 
distribution function of Be [ft,B] and let F,(9) be the associated density. 
In the next section we derive the optimal contract menu when the investor provides no 
floor to the pay of the borrower. This will provide a benchmark solution for a subsequent 
analysis of the effects of the provision of a pay floor for the borrower. 
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3.4 Optimal contract menu: No pay floor 
Before we proceed to derive the optimal contract menu when there is no pay floor for the 
borrower, a few points are worthy of a brief mention. 
Firstly we will mvoke the revelation principle in its nested form. That is, in designing the 
optimal contract menu, we will invoke the revelation principle once at the time that the 
investor reports realised cost of capital r (r) =rafter the productivity state is reported by 
the borrower, and again for the earlier report by the borrower of the realised productivity 
state 8 ce) = e 
Secondly, Implicit in the revelation of information by the investor is that once the 
borrower has (truthfully) revealed the actual productivity state, the investor will truthfully 
report the realised unit cost of capital. If the investor were not to commit to the contract 
menu that he offered the borrower, then in anticipation of this the borrower might not 
truthfully reveal e earher on in the game, and our analysis would be mappropriate 
Thirdly, we denve the optimal contract menus with and without a pay floor using 
incentive compatibility (i.e. truth-telling) constraints which are locally true. However, 
since we apply these constraints in a global sense, it is necessary to provide justification 
for th1s approach. In order to elucidate the methodology of the derivation of the optimal 
contract menus, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for globally applying 
locally true incentive compatibility constraints in Appendix Il. We will again discuss this 
point when we have arrived at the optimal contract menus. 
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3.4.1 Derivation of the optimal contract menu 
We will construct the investor's problem in stages F1rstly consider the incentive 
compatibility constraint for the investor. Let p(r, r; B) denote the payoff for the investor 
when the true cost of capital and productivity state are r and 9 respectively, and the 
reported values are r and B respectively (which then means that it is the contract 
(a(r,B),K(r,B)) which defines actual investment and the allocation rule dividing ex 
post profits). Then, recalling (3), 
p(r,P;B) = (J-:r)BH(K(r,B))- (1- a(r,B):r)rK(r,B) (4) 
We use a technique applied in the derivation of the envelope theorem12 to derive the 
investor's local incentive compatibility constraint. For fixed (J and B, by the chain rule 
d ( • B.) op(r. P; B) d" op(r. P; B) d P rr = r+ r 
" or ar 
(5) 
Evaluating (5) at r = r we see that the first term of (5) must be zero since r(r) = r 
locates the local maximum of p(r, P; B) w.r.t. r for incentive compatible contracts. 
Wnting p(r, r; B) as p(r, B) we see that 
op(r, B) = op(r, P, B) I· 
or or r=r 
(6) 
"
2 See for example D1x1t (1990) 
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ap(r,O) = -(1- a(r,0)1r)K(r,O) 
ar 
(7) 
Integrating (7) and using ( 4) again we see that 
' p(r,O) = p(r_,O)- f0-a(s,0)7r)K(s,O)ds 
! 
= (l-1r)BH(K(r,O))- (I-a(r,O)Jr)rK(r,O) (8) 
Any contract menu satisfying the first equality of (8) will then (locally) assure the 
borrower that once the investor has learned r he will implement the contract 
corresponding to that realisation of the unit cost of capital. 
The second equality of (8) then gives the deductibility of capital costs from the share base 
a(r, 0) as a function of the optimal mvested capital K(r, 0) for reported productivity 
state B. Thus we can turn our attention to the optimal investment schedule K (r, B) alone 
in order to know the optimal contract menu M. 
We w1ll now derive the incentive compatibility constraint for the borrower. Consider the 
payoff that the borrower receives At the time that the borrower reports the productivity 
state, neither the mvestor nor the borrower knows the unit cost of capital as it has not yet 
been realised. Both investor and borrower are however assumed to both have common 
knowledge of the cumulative distribution of r given by R(r). Therefore at the t1me the 
borrower comes to report the realised productivity state, the borrower is motivated by his 
expected utility where the expectation IS taken w.r.t. the distribution of r. We are 
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assumingi 3 that the investor can commit to eventually report the unit cost of capital 
truthfully when it becomes realised and therefore only need consider the distribution of r 
smce r = f(r) = r i e. the futurer and r are assumed to coincide so that the only 
uncertainty we need concern ourselves with is about r . 
Let cp(r,B) be the borrower utility when unit cost of capital is reported truthfully, and the 
borrower reports productivity state B when the true productivity state is B. Then 
cp(r, B) = tr(BH(K(r, B))- a(r, B)rK(r, B)) (9) 
Let U"(B,B) 14 be the expected utility of the borrower when the reported productivity 
state is B and true productivity is B. Then U" (B,B) is given by 
' u• (B}) = fcp(r,B)R1 (r)dr (10) 
~ 
By the chain rule 
dU" (B B)= ou· (B,B) dB+ ou" (B,B) dB (11) 
' oB oB 
13 W1thout loss of generality (the revela!Jon prmc1ple) 
14 In th1s analys1s we assume that effort is observable, the costs of wh1ch are written into the reservatiOn 
u!Jhty. We also assume implicitly that the production function ts separable m effort and cap1tal, the 
margmal producttvtty of effort therefore bemg mdependent of a, wtth equal effort supplied by all borrower 
types If thts were not the case, the startmg pomt in extendmg the current analysis to mcorporate htdden 
a • • 
actwns would be U (8, 8,e) = tp(8,8, e)- Q(e) where the last term is effort dtsutthty Applymg the cham 
rule stJII g1ves (I I) because effort ts maxtmal for the borrower See Chapter 6 for an analysts of adverse 
selectwn wtth moral hazard due to unobservable effort 
3.18 
CHAPTER3 INVESTMENT AND HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY 
Evaluating (11) at 8 = e we see that for incentive compatible contracts the first term of 
(11) must be zero since 0(8) = e locates the local maximum of U"(B,O) Therefore 
writing U"(B,B) as U"(B), 
dU"(B) 
dB 
8U" (8,0) 
ae 
From (9), (10) and (12) we see that 
dU"(B) ' 
____c_,-:"-'- = f7rH(K(r,B))R 1 (r)dr de ! 
Integrating (13) gives 
0; 
(12) 
(13) 
U"(B)=U"(fD+ ff1rH(K(r,s))R1(r)drds (14) 
~!. 
where the limits of integration are re [r,r] and se [(t,B]. From (14), since the second 
term is non-negative, the participation constraint of the borrower can be wntten 
U" (fD;:: 0 (15) 
provided K(r, 8) is non-decreasing in 9 15. Explicit inclusion of the participation 
constraint in the investor's max1misation problem can therefore be omitted smce U" @) 
is a constant. 
We now turn to the investor's maximisation problem. The expected utility of the investor 
is given by 
" We check that this 1s true by reference to the opt1mal contract menu (to be derived) wh1ch giVes the 
dependence of K(r,8) on 8 
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0 ; 
f fp(r,B)F;(B)R 1(r)drdB (16) 
€ r. 
In Appendix III we show that the investor's expected utility can equivalently be written 
as 
(} r 9 
f f<BH(K(r,B))- rK(r,B))F; (B)R1 (r)drdB- fu• (B)F;(B)dB (17) 
fr ~ 
and that 
Therefore the investor's expected utility (ignoring the constant u• (B)) is 
8
' F(B) f f<BH(K(r,B))- rK(r,B) + :r-- H(K(r,B)))F; (B)R1 (r)drdB (19) ~' F;(B) 
Pointwise optimisation16 of (19) w.r.t. K(r,B) gives the first order condition for the 
optimal investment schedule17 K(r,B) as 
[ B + :r F(B) ]H'(K(r, B))- r = 0 VB e [!2,8] ,V re [1:,r](20) F;(B) 
16 PomtWJse optlrniSatton of the mtegral m (19) means that 1fK(r,8) maximises the mtegrand in (19) over 
each mfimteSJmal umt of area drde in the (r,S) plane, then the mtegral, bemg the summation of each 
maximiSed integrand over the (r,9) plane, Will also be maximiSed The first order cond1t1on (20) IS formally 
-
established (as (A65) w1th r = r) usmg an op!lmal control approach m Append1x IV 
c 
17 Note that the results in thiS chapter are robust (at least) to an addltlve uncertamty w1th zero mean, i e 
where profit IS mstead 9H(K(r,9)) - rK(r,9) + e, where the expectatiOn of e is zero, smce all agents are 
assumed nsk neutral 
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Remark I: In deriving the first order conditiOn for K (r, B) in (20), we have globally 
applied incentive compatibility constraints (7) and (13), which are locally 
true conditions In Appendix II we show that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions which justify this approach are that K (r, B) is non-decreasing 
in 9 andg(r,B)is non-increasing in r, where g(s,B) =(I- a(s,B)n')K(s,B). 
We confirm the integrity of our analysis, in which these constraints were 
not included, by ensunng that these conditions are satisfied by the 
solution, as given by (8) and (20). 
Differentiating (8) w.r t r yieldsg,(r,B)r =(I- tr)BH'(K(r,B))K, (r,B). 
However, differentiating (20) wrt. r gives K,(r,B)<O. Therefore, 
g, (r,B) < 0, and g(r,B) is non-increasing in r. 
Differentiating (20) w.r.t. 9 yields K 0 (r,B) =- z:g dlni/J(B) " 
Therefore, providing ,...!!._ F(B) ;;:: -I 19, the necessary and sufficient 
dB F;(B) 
condition that K (r, B) is non-decreasing in 9 is also satisfied. 
19 A sufficient condition for this to be true is that the nsk ratio F(9)/F1(9) IS non-decreasmg Thts condition 
IS sal!sfied for many practically relevant distnbutions such as the umform, normal and exponential This 
requtres that the denstty functiOn not mcrease "too qmckly" with mcreasing 9 
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3.4.2 Discussion 
From (20), we may draw some mteresting ins1ghts into the effects of the information 
which was privately, and separately revealed to the investor and the borrower. 
The first order condition (20) tells us that if the true cost of capital is privately revealed to 
the investor, then provided the investor can commit (see below) to the terms of the 
contract menu after the borrower has revealed the true productivity state, it is only the 
information which is private (at least irntially) to the borrower which introduces a 
distortion into the optimal investment schedule20. We may deduce this fact by reference 
to the first best solution, for which all private information is instead public. 
The first best mvestment schedule satisfies the following first-order condition 
()H'(K(r,()))- r = 0 "'Be[~,()],"' re [r,r] (21) 
where, knowing the true productivity state 921 , without havmg to rely on a truthful 
revelation of this parameter by the borrower, the investor chooses K(r,9) to simply 
maximise profit 9H(K(r,9))- rK(r,9). 
The distortion22 in the optimal investment schedule causes an overinvestment for all 
productivity states except for the lowest ~, due to the extra term nF(9)/F 1 (9) in the 
coefficient ofH'(K(r,9)) in (20), recalling that H"(K(r,9)) < 0 and F(~) = 0. 
20 By mvestment schedule we mean a map from the reported productivity state and umt cost of capttal, to 
the capttal stock decision, 1 e capttal to be mvested 
21 The umt cost of capttal would also be publicly observable 
22 By dtstortwn we mean an mvestment schedule whtch ts not ftrst best and does not therefore maxtmtse 
profits 
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The distortion in optimal investment when the investor cannot observe 9 may be viewed 
as an accommodation of the fact that the borrower would have an incentive to attempt to 
secure greater pay by understating productivity if he was offered the full information 
solution when in fact the productivity state was private23. Thus, in order to overcome th1s 
problem, the investor does not award the borrower the profit maximismg contract, but 
one instead for which the pay of the borrower is increased through the award of an 
mformation rent. Th1s information rent recognises the "temptation" in the asymmetric 
information case to pass off the true productivity state as some other lower state, and 
awards Guse4) sufficient pay to the borrower to truthfully reveal the actual productivity 
state25• 
The reason that there is no distortion for the lowest productivity state f}_, is that for this 
state there are no other lower states which the borrower may use to his advantage when 
called to report the actual state. However, the borrower does receive an information rent26 
for all productivity states other than the lowest The information rent is greater for higher 
productivity states because the potential gam from reporting the true state as one lower 
than itself increases as the number of states lower than the true state increases 
23 Consider the full information solution For the two productiVIty states (} and 0, where (} >0, the 
borrower rece1ves his reservation ut1hty equal to 
- -
a"" r " a r U (B,B); I tp(r,B)R1 (r)dr; U (B,B); I tp(r,B)R1 (r)dr. However, If the mvestor offered the same r !. 
contracts when mformat1on was m fact asymmetric, then the borrower would report the lower state 0 when 
() " a " a a" a·· the true state was as well as when It was {}.To see this, U (B, B)- U (B, IJ); U (IJ, IJ)- U (IJ, IJ) 
- -
r .. .. .. r .. .. ; I (q>(r, (}, (})- q>(r, e, IJ))Ri (r)dr ; I 1f(IJ- IJ)H(K(r, IJ))Rl (r)dr > 0. 
! ! 
24 The information rent 1s just sufficient m the optimal solutiOn to ehc1t truthful reporting by the borrower. 
25 This IS what makes the contract menu incentive compatible w r t. truthful mformation reportmg by the 
borrower 
8' 
26 This mformatiOn rent equals J J7rH(K(r,s))R1 (r)drds 
~[ 
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Consequently, the higher the true productivity state 9, the greater is the distortion of 
investment away from its efficient level in order to minimise the informatiOn rent that the 
borrower receives. 
The effect of the information which is privately revealed to the investor can be seen by 
considering the set of feasible contract menus from which the investor is able to choose. 
In the absence of a public observation of the unit cost of capital, the borrower will only 
be willing to accept a contract menu for which the investor would have no incentive to 
misreport the true capital costs. These are the contract menus which satisfy the investor's 
incentive compatibility constraint, as given by (8). Therefore, requiring the investor to 
truthfully reveal his private observation of the unit cost of capital creates a welfare loss 
(see 0. Hart (1983) for a discussion of this point) by restricting the space of feasible 
mechanisms (contract menus), and not by creating a distortion in the optimal investment 
schedule. 
This latter point leads us to an important assumption of the analysis. We have assumed 
that the investor commits to the contract menu which the borrower accepts. However, It IS 
interesting to note the sequential order of events in the game The borrower (truthfully) 
reports the actual productivity state after which capital is invested. However, were the 
investor able to use the optimal contract denved above to elicit truthful reporting of the 
actual productivity state and then replace this contract by one for which investment was 
efficient (i e capital only invested up to the point where marginal return equals marginal 
cost), additional gains from investment, which are to be shared between the investor and 
borrower, would be available (for contract renegotiation and credibility see Baron (1989), 
Hart and Tirole (1988) and Laffont and Tirole (1990)). This arrangement would be 
beneficial to both parties to the contract and would therefore (at least at a first glance) 
provide a superior equilibrium. The problem that anses however with such an 
arrangement IS one of credibility. Were the borrower to be aware that the original 
contract would be tom up and replaced by a new one once he had truthfully declared the 
productivity state, the initial incentive to truthfully report the realised productivity state 
would vanish and we would be back to square one whereby the investor is effectively 
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offering the borrower the symmetric information contract when in fact information about 
the productivity state was not publicly observable. 
3.5 Optimal contract menu: With a pay floor 
We now turn to consider the case of a borrower for which the investor provides a pay 
floor. In the next sub-section we extend the analysis of the previous section, and then 
discuss the results. 
3.5.1 Derivation of the optimal contract menu 
Suppose for any possible (r,e) pair that the minimum payoff that the borrower can receive 
is -127, where L is a constant. This means that for each realisation of the productivity 
state e there exists an r e [r, r] such that for unit cost of capital realisations greater than 
this critical r value the borrower payoff is a constant -L (the floor level). Since the profit 
is increasing in the productivity state e and decreasing in the unit cost of capital r, we 
expect that this cntical value of r is mcreasing in e, i.e. the more favourable is the 
productivity state to investment the higher must be the unit cost of capital above which 
the borrower's liability becomes limited to -L. 
27 The analysis which proceeds IS mdependent of the sign of L. However, it IS preferable to thmk of L as 
non-positive, smce the ex post profit IS known pnor to the smking of capital Assummg that the an mvestor 
would smk funds mto a venture which he knows to be loss making undennmes the assumptiOn that there IS 
no renegotiatiOn after the borrower has accepted the contract menu 
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This way of modelling hmited liability for the borrower can now be used to derive the 
incentive compatibility constraint with a pay floor at -L. Define the cntical value of unit 
cost of capital re at which the pay floor of a type 9 borrower reporting type B becomes 
binding, by the following equation 
(22) 
For some fixed 1t and L, (22) explicitly defines re as a function of 9 and implicitly as a 
function of B through K(r, B) and a(r,B). Equation (22) also states that re = re(B, K,a). 
Once the borrower has seen B he reports iJ. At this stage the expected utility of the 
borrower is U" (B,B) where 
re r 
U"(B,B)= frp(r,B,B)R,(r)dr+ f-L.R,(r)dr 
r re 
re 
= frp(r,B,B)R1 (r)dr + [R(re)- R(;)]L 
[ 
Differentiating (23) w.r.t. 9 gives 
oU"(B,B) 
oB 
re , 
B B, fJre forp(r,B,B) ( )d ( ) Ore rp(re, , )R1(rJ-+ R1 r r+R1 re -L 
oB ! oB oB 
But from (22) the first term on the right hand side of (24) IS - L.R1 (re) are . 
oB 
Therefore 
"' re A 
oU" (B,B) = forp(r,B,B) R (r)dr 
oB r oB ' 
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Differentiating rp(r,B,B) =tr(BH(K(r,B))-a(r,B)rK(r,B))(9) w.r.t. e and setting i; 
equal to B in (25) gtves the borrower's incentive compattbihty constraint via (12) as 
(26) 
For incentive compatible contracts, from (22) with i; equal to B, re is gtven by 
Integrating (26) gives 
(}re 
U"(B)=U"(f!)+ J ftrH(K(r,s))R1(r)drds (28) 
where the limits of integration are r e [r, re] and s e [(l, B]. Thus, since the second term 
in (28) is non-negative provided K(r,B) is non-decreasing in 928, the participation 
constraint of the borrower can be replaced by 
U" (!!_) ~ 0 (29) 
The participation constramt of the borrower is again excluded from hereon since U" (!l) 
ts a constant. 
Now in exactly the same way as we derived (20), from (26) 
8 ore B 
IU"(B)F;(B)dB=U"(B)-Jf" F() H(K(r,B))F1(B)R1(r)drdB(30) - - ~ F; (B) 
28 See footnote no 15 
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We now write the investor's expected utility as (see (17)) 
Br 8 
lf(BH(K(r,B))- rK(r,B))F, (B)R1 (r)drdB-t" (B)F, (B)dB (31) 
Subshtutmg (30) into (31) then gives the investor's expected utility (ignoring the constant 
U"(B)) as 
8~ F~ J JCBH(K(r,B))- rK(r,B) +IT-- H(K(r,B)))F, (B)R1 (r)drdB !1 r F,(B) 
or 
+ J,f(BH(K(r,B))-rK(r,B))F,(B)R1(r)drdB (32) 
Pointwise optimisation29 of (32) w r.t K(r, B) gives the first order condition for the 
optimal investment schedule K(r, B) V'SV'r as 
[(B +IT F(B) )H'(K(r,B))- r]R, (r)dr + f[BH'(K(r,B))- r]R1 (r)dr 
A F1(B) AC 
where rc=rc(B,K,a) from (27), and A,Ac are the ranges of r defined by 
A={rlre[r,rc(B,K,a)]} and Ac ={rlre(rc(B,K,a),~)} respectively. 
29 A formal denvatiOn of the first order conditiOn (33) usmg an optimal control approach IS given m 
Appendix IV. 
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In order to observe what the first order condition (33) states, invoke as a benchmark the 
optimal investment schedules for each of two extremes, bemg a pay floor that IS always 
bindmg and the opposite case of a pay floor which never binds. 
From (33), if the pay floor never bmds, Ac = {0}, r (B,K,a) = r (a constant), and 
c 
therefore 
[B+;r F(B)]H'(K b(r,B))-r=O F (B) n 
I 
V'9V'r (34) 
Alternatively, if the pay floor always binds, then A= {0}, re (B,K,a) =[,and 
BH'(K ab (r,B))- r = 0 V'9V'r (35) 
Since the cntical unit capital cost varies with investment, such that the third term in (33) 
is non-zero30, the optimal investment schedule K(r, B) given by (33) takes values for 
each r and 9 which are between the investment levels corresponding to the schedules 
which are optimal when the pay floor always binds (K0 b(r,B)) and when the pay floor 
never binds ( K nb (r, B)), i.e. Kab (r,B) 5. K(r,B) 5. K nb (r,B) V'9V'r 
DmgranunatJcally, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 sketch the variation of K(r, B) with r and 9 
respectively31 (the unbroken curve). 
30 Smce the th1rd tenn m (33) is non-zero, a solutiOn to (33) which is unadm1ssible IS an mvestment rule 
given by (34) for reA and a rule given by (35) for reA', leadmg to a discontmmty m K(r,9) at r = r, 
31 The shapes of the sketches for the benchmark cases (pay floor always or never bmds) are denved m 
Appendix V 
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K(r,S) 
r 
F1gure 3.1 
K(r,a) 
Knb (r,S) 
Kab (r,S) 
e 
Figure 3.2 
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For a monotonic optimal investment schedule given by (33), we also note the following 
remark. 
Remark2: The necessary and sufficient conditions for the global applicability of 
locally true incentive compatibility constraints (7) and (13) are 
K0 (r,8)~0 and K,(r,8)5.0 (see Remark I for the equivalence of 
conditions K,(r,8)5.0 and g,(r,8)5.0) From Figures 3.1 and 3 2 we 
see that these monotonicity conditions are satisfied for the optimal 
investment function with a pay floor which is sometimes (3rc<r) bindmg. 
3.5.2 Discussion 
The optimal investment schedule given by (33) has an intmtive economic rationale which 
derives from the way in which the incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower (26) 
introduces distortions into the mvestment schedule. In the case of unlimited liability 
where the pay floor is never binding, the borrower Will participate ex ante32 (provided 
( 15) is satisfied), and receive pay which depends on the actual productivity state for all 
possible r e [r, ~ 1 , irrespective of the actual realised unit cost of capital. 
However, when the liability of the borrower is limited for re [re, r 1 realisations, the pay 
of the borrower is fixed and equal to -L over this range of r. If the borrower knew ahead 
of time that he were to receive a fixed payoff, then ex ante he would have no incentive to 
report B "' 8 (here as well as for all the previous analysis there is an implicit assmnption 
that unless the borrower has an incentive to untruthful revelation he will report 
truthfully). Since the borrower is uncertain as to the future realisation of r, this will only 
32 Note that It IS more accurate to descnbe borrower partiCipatiOn as ex post w r t e but ex ante w r t r 
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apply to the borrower in an expectations sense over the range of possible r for which his 
payment would be fixed, given Ius knowledge of the actual 9. 
Since the investor introduces distortions away from the efficient investment level by 
overinvesting m order to award the borrower an information rent wluch Gust) induces the 
borrower to truthfully reveal the actual productivity state (when his pay varies with the 
productivity state), the mvestor can reduce the distortions necessary for incentive 
compatibility if there exist possible future realisations of unit capital costs for which 
given the actual productivity state 9, the pay of the borrower would be constant. 
In fact, were the pay floor of the borrower to always bind for all possible realisations of 
unit capital cost, then no information rents are awarded ex ante given that the borrower 
would be unable to benefit from his private information. In this case the borrower would 
receive the floor pay with certainty and truthfully reveal 9, with the first best (9 public) 
investment schedule prevailing (as given by (35)). 
In summary smce there exist some unit capital cost realisations for which the borrower 
expects to receive a fixed payment, the incentive compatibility constraint will not 
precipitate a distortion in the investment schedule for this range of future outcomes. This 
is because the optimal investment schedule minimises the information rents that the 
borrower can command, but rents exist only to induce truthful reporting when the 
borrower can gain by misrepresenting the true productivity state. Reducing the sensitivity 
of the pay of the borrower to the productivity state, which is private to the borrower prior 
to the contract, therefore serves to reduce the possible gains from misrepresentation and 
consequently the inefficiencies introduced into the investment schedule. 
Another important point should be mentioned. Introducing a pay floor for the borrower 
has reduced the distortionary affect upon the optimal investment schedule for all 
realisations of unit cost of capital. This creates a total welfare enhancement. However, the 
welfare enhancement is second order in the sense that it relates to the first order condition 
for optimal investment (c.f. (34) and (35)). The reduction in expected utility for the 
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investor from insuring the borrower against a pay below the floor level, will exceed Ins 
share of welfare gain from the second order improvement in the efficiency of investment, 
smce providing the insurance creates a first order loss for the investor, if the floor is 
binding. Overall, introducing the pay floor therefore reduces the expected utility of the 
mvestor. 
To be more precise, let p1 and Pnr denote the expected utility of the investor With and 
Without a pay floor. Denote K(r,O) the solution to the first order condition (33) and 
Knb(r,O) the solution to first order condition (34). Abbreviating R1(r)F.JO)drd8 by dt, 
and the profit for productivity state 9, unit capital cost r, and investments K and Knb by 
X 33 and X nb respectively, gives (see (2) and (3)) 
and 
P1 = J J((I-11')X-nrK(l-a))dr+ J J<X+L)dr 
!:BA LoAc 
Pnr = I I((I-11')Xnb -nrKnb(l-a))dr 
:E :E B r 
Subtracting (37) from (36) gives (With slight manipulation) p1 - p.1 equal to 
f I((I-11')(X -Xnb)-nr(l-a)(K -Knb))dr+ J fcx -Xnb)dr 
~A ~~ 
- I I (-L-(jlnf)dr 
r_OAC 
where (/Jnf = 11'(X + rK(l-a)) = 11'(8H- arK) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
Observe that K 0 b(r,8)5,K(r,8)5,Knb(r,O), and that K 0 b(r,O) (as given by (35)) 
max1mises profit Therefore, the first and second terms in (3 8) are positive, smce profit 
33 X(B, r, K) = BH(K)- rK 
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falls as capital investment is increased beyond first best, i.e. X > X nb and K < K nb. The 
first and second terms in (38) are also the investor's share of the second order gain in 
welfare from providing a floor which reduces the (ex post) mefficiency in investment. 
The sum in the braces of the last term (38) is positive The sum of these terms is the 
difference between the floor pay -L, and the pay that the borrower would receive 
conditional on r e [r,, r] without the floor. Since -L exceeds the pay of the borrower for 
all re [r,,;] without the floor, the sum of the terms in braces is positive. Hence, the last 
term in (3 8) is the first order loss in investor utility through providing a floor. 
Since the introduction of a pay floor for the borrower reduces the expected utility of the 
investor, given that both the investor and the borrower have identical precontractual 
beliefs about the unit cost of capital, we predict that the investor would not offer a pay 
floor unless he received a compensatory subsidy for doing so. However, were the 
mvestor to have (relatively) superior beliefs to the borrower concerning the probability 
distribution ofr, we might be tempted to think that the investor could devise a mechanism 
whereby he would benefit from this superior mformation. 
In the next section we examine the issues raised if the investor has supenor 
precontractual informatiOn, before collecting concluding remarks. 
3.6 Signalling phenomena 
Throughout the discussion of investment and asymmetric information in this chapter, we 
have assumed that prior to the design of the contract mechanism34 the investor has 
identical beliefs to the borrower concerning the probability distnbutwn of unit capital 
34 which IS a direct revelation mechamsm smce it mduces the borrower to reveal the actual margmal 
produc!lvity of capital by the way m which he chooses between contracts m the contract menu 
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costs. It is however more realistic to assume that, even 1f the investor were uncertain 
about what the realised unit (opportunity) cost of capital would be, that he would at least 
maintain superior beliefs35 in comparison to those of the borrower36• 
Before concluding this chapter, we assess the implications of adm1tting signalling 
phenomena into the game between the investor and the borrower, i.e. the investor has 
precontractual information not endowed to the borrower which may be signalled by the 
contract menu offered37• 
In order to focus on the determinant features of a game which admits this phenomenon, 
also suppose (temporarily) that the marginal productivity of capital is pubhc and that the 
realised unit cost of capital (which is ex ante uncertain) is observed symmetrically by 
both the investor and the borrower38• The investor's type is defined by the (superior) 
beliefs which he holds about the probability distribution of unit capital costs. 
35 For example, the investor and the borrower share the same expected value of r, but the investor IS 
correctly able to assign greater probability to values of r close to the mean relative to the probability mass 
that the borrower assigns to the same range of values 
36 !t IS trivial to show (by followmg exactly the procedure presented in this chapter) that If the beliefs of the 
mvestor and the borrower about rare given by R1 (r) and Rh (r) respectively, then the risk ratio term in the 
F(B) Rf (r) 
optimal contract menu is replaced by the adjusted term ----. However, a contract menu which 
F1 (B) R{ (r) 
mcludes this term (Implicitly In K) for a borrower with beliefs given by Rh (r)will immediately signal 
R1 (r) 
37 The beliefs of the borrower about the type of investor that he faces which result followmg (Bayesian) 
updatmg with m formatiOn signalled by the contract menu are referred to as "mtenm" beliefs 
38 As seen m 3.4 2, the only effect of the mvestor's pnvate observatiOn of the realised umt capital cost IS 
that the set of feasible mechamsms IS reduced with no distort10nary effect on m vestment The symmetric 
observatiOn of realised umt capital costs therefore removes obfuscatiOn of the key Issues discussed m this 
bnef digression 
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Maskin and Tirole (1992) examine a three stage game in which the investor's private 
information is either an argument of the borrower's utility function or of the probabilities 
that the borrower assigns to the variables entering his utility function39• In this ("common 
values") game, the mvestor offers a contract wh1ch can be either accepted or rejected by 
the borrower. If accepted, the contract is executed, in which each party carries out the 
contracted actions (which are observable) after which allocations are made accordmg to 
the contract. The borrower has no private information. 
The conclusion reached by Maskin and Tiro le ( 1992) is that the investor cannot gain by 
withholding private information at the contract offer stage, and may not even be able to 
secure the payoff that he would receive were his information made public at that time.40 
An example of this type of scenario is that considered by Spence (1973,1974), in which a 
highly productive employee (acting as principa141 by offering a contract to a potential 
employer) may be forced to invest in wasteful signalling42 activity (achieving education 
that does not enhance his productivity) in order to be set apart from less efficient 
potential employees This IS a common values example because the private information 
of the employee relates to his productivity which directly affects the payoff of the 
employer. 
Further, if the borrower also has private information, the conclusiOns (and analysis) in 
Maskin and Tirole (1992) remain unaffected43• The intuitive reason for this is the 
following. From Maskin and Tirole (1990), if different investor types were to pool at the 
39 The oppos1te case stud1ed m Maskm and T1role (1990) 1s that of"pnvate" values, m which the mvestor's 
pnvate mfonnatwn !S ne1ther an argument of the borrower's ut1hty functwn nor of the probab!l!l!es that the 
borrower ass1gns to the vanables entering h1s ullhty function 
40 Th1s result 1s m contrast to the pnvate values case m wh1ch the investor can do str1ctly better than 1f h1s 
infonnat10n were pubhc at the contract offer stage Instead, the mvestor may prefer to conceal his pnvate 
mfonnatwn at the contract offer stage and reveal1t dunng the executwn of the contract 
41 the econom1c actor who des1gns and offers a contract 
42 The d1stmct10n between s1goalhng and screemng is that m the fanner the mfonned party offers the 
contract and m the latter 11 is the unmfonned party offers the contract (Maskm and T1role (1992) p 29) 
43 This is only true when the preferences of the mvestor and borrower are lmear in each ofthe1r allocations 
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contract offer stage by offering the same contract menu (thereby withholding information 
about their type), then the participation and individual rationality constraint for each type 
of borrower would only have to be satisfied in expectation over the different types of 
possible investor which the borrower faces, where the distribution is w.r.t. the (Bayesian) 
updated beliefs of the borrower44• It is therefore possible for the case of a risk averse 
investor and borrower, that the investor could raise his utility above the full-information45 
level (where the incentive compatibility and participation constraints of the borrower 
must each hold separately for each type of investor) by violating some constraints, as 
long as these violations are offset by the violation of the constraints for some other types 
of investor46• However, if instead both investor and borrower are nsk neutral w r.t. 
monetary transfers, the shadow prices of the mcentive compatibility and participation 
constraints of the borrower are equal for each type of mvestor, in which case the investor 
neither gains nor loses if the borrower has private information, since there is no gain 
available from "tradmg slack" on these constraints 
Lastly, we can draw an analogy between the results of this chapter and the signalling case 
of Maskin and Tiro le ( 1992) We concluded above that when the informational advantage 
of the mvestor exists at the contract stage, then (for the "common values" case) the 
investor may not be able to secure his full-information payoff'7• In the bi-lateral 
information game studied in this chapter, we have also arrived at this result by 
concluding that when the investor must commit to a mechanism which induces him to 
truthfully reveal the unit capital costs when they become realised, that a welfare loss 
results given the restriction in the space of feasible mechanisms, with no contnbutory 
44 Which equate to the precontractual beliefs given poohng by different mvestor types. 
45 In which the mvestor truthfully declares his type from the outset 
46 Maskm and T!role (1990) suggest that m essence, different types of mvestor trade "slack" With one 
another one type accepts some slack on the participatiOn constramt, whereas another type does exactly the 
opposite 
47 This result may now be seen to essentially denve from a conflict which arises between mvestors of 
different types In the Spencmn educatiOn model (1973, I 974), high productivity employees do not wish to 
be pooled with their low productivity counterparts. 
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distortion in investment. This result is in accordance with that of Maskin and Tirole 
(1992), albeit that the timing of the amval ofmformation is different. 
We now turn to collect concluding remarks. 
3.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we undertook an mvestigation of the effects of awarding a pay floor for a 
borrower who could privately observe a multiplicative productivity parameter that 
determined the capital invested by an investor with whom the borrower shared revenue 
net of some proportion of the costs of capital 
We found that in the absence of a floor, a problem of ovennvestment arose, because the 
borrower was awarded an information rent in order to induce him to truthfully reveal the 
actual marginal productivity of capital. This information rent caused capital to be 
invested past the point at which Its marginal product equalled its marginal cost. However, 
it was shown that mtroducing a floor to the pay of the borrower could be expected to 
mitigate tlus problem at the expense of a net welfare loss to the investor. 
Notwithstanding the significant differences 48 between limited liability profit sharing 
contracts and debt contracts, some comparison can be made with the literature on ex ante 
48 An example ofth1s can be seen from the following observatiOn For a debt contract, the vanab1hty m pay 
that borrower and lender may receiVe occur over mutually exclusive ranges of the possible profit outcomes 
Absent bankruptcy, the lender receives a fixed pay whilst the borrower IS sole residual claunant to the 
outcome net of the fixed financmg cost Contmgent on bankruptcy, the lender IS sole residual claimant 
whilst the borrower receives a constant zero payoff However, for hm1ted hab1hty shanng contracts, the 
range of outcomes over which payoffs to each party are variable are not mutually exclusive Absent 
bankruptcy both lender and borrower necessanly receive variable pay, the lender no longer rece1vmg a 
fixed fee but mstead sharmg m profit. 
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information asymmetries when loan size may vary between types49• Specifically, Milde 
and R!ley (1988) show that higher quality loan applicants, with greater marginal 
productivity of capital, can signal their type to competitive50 lenders by accepting larger 
loans than would be the case If their type was publicly observable51 • This accords with 
the result derived in this chapter in which capital is overinvested. However, the impact of 
a pay floor is to alleviate overinvestment, and therefore any positive relation between 
these results IS essentially due to similarity in the information structure of the models in 
which these problems are analysed 
Additionally, Milde and Riley (1988) state that increasing the borrowing cost per unit of 
capital at all loan sizes will decrease the loan size for all types. For a profit sharing 
contract, the analogous change would be a decrease in the share ratio (11), thereby 
reducing the surplus allocated to the borrower for all outcomes in which the pay floor 
does not bind. Since overinvestment is mcreasing in the share ratio (see (33) and (34)), 
increasing the cost of loanable funds by reducing the share ratio will decrease investment 
when the pay floor is not binding52• This observation IS therefore a positive comparison. 
Lastly, we mention an important point concerning information which is private to the 
borrower. In the problem we considered in this chapter, we assumed that the utility of the 
borrower was separable in money and effort, and absorbed the cost of effort into the 
reservation utility. The separability assumption together with an endowment of private 
information that directly affected the profit available for allocation, meant that the 
49 Type refers to e m both studieS 
" In our study, lenders are non-competitive as they may retam a positive (expected) surplus 
51 Note that the loan cost schedule m M1lde and R1ley (1988) specifies a per umt capital cost which IS 
mcreasmg m loan size for all types 
52 Note that the appropnate companson here IS between the share contract m which the pay floor IS non 
bmdmg, and a debt contract m which the promised payment can be made. This allows a companson of the 
affects of an mcrease in the cost of loanable funds upon the surplus retamed by the borrower for each 
contract type. 
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inefficiencies introduced by information private to the borrower were affected by the 
imposition of a floor to borrower pay. 
However, consider instead a problem 53 in which the only information which is private to 
the borrower is about his effort dtsutility54. The investor must design a contract menu 
whtch is a schedule of borrower pay and associated effort (observable) for each type55 of 
borrower. The inefficiency which is introduced attempts to limit the information rent that 
borrowers with low effort disuttlities may earn by being able to pass themselves off as 
high effort disutility types if the full information contract is offered when types are 
privately known. 
However, introducing a floor to borrower pay in this example would not affect the 
inefficiency caused by the private information of the borrower, since the incentive 
compatibthty constramt is unaffected56 by the allocation of ex post profit to the 
borrower57• 
In contrast, were utility to be non-separable in money and effort, in which case the utility 
of a given amount of money that the borrower enjoys also depends on the effort that he 
expends, then the imposition of a floor to agent pay would affect the ineffictencies58 
created by information about effort disutility being privately endowed to the borrower. 
53 this problem IS analysed m Macho-Stadler and Perez·Castnllo {1997) 
54 1 e a parameter k where the dtsutthty of effort e IS kQ(e) and Q(e) IS mcreasmg in eat an mcreasmg rate 
" as given by k 
56 A A A A 
specifically, If rp(k,k) = w(k)- kQ(e(k)), where w(k) IS the allocatiOn of ex post profits to the borrower 
• • arp(k, k) arp(k,k) • drp(k) 
for type k, then drp(k,k) = dk + • dk and--= -Q(e(k))for truthful revelallon The 
ak ak dk 
mcent1ve compatibility constramt IS therefore unaffected by the form of w(k). 
57 For comparison also note a causality relatiOn, in which tmposmg a floor (cethng) to borrower effort 
mduces a floor ( cethng) to borrower pay 
58 
whereupon the borrower receives more than the value ofh1s margmal product. 
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Separability of utility between money and effort is therefore a key assumption in 
understanding the impact of pay floors upon the economics of information asymmetry. 
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Appendix I 
Deductibility of capital costs from the share base 
The motivation for using the deductibility of capital costs from the share base Will be 
illustrated by two examples. The first invokes consideration of the Pareto efficiency of 
linear sharing contracts when the investor and agent are both risk averse and the second 
shows how the deductibility of cap1tal costs from the share base might lead us to expect 
to encounter either an over or under mvestrnent problem when mvestrnent decisions are 
delegated. 
(A) Pareto efficiency and risk averse participants 
We follow the analysis of decision making under uncertainty developed by Ross (1973) 
Consider a risk averse investor and a nsk averse agent with state independent utility 
functions QPO and n•o respectively, where QP'O > 0, QP"O < 0, 0"'0 > 0, and Q""O < 
0. 
Let H(e, K) be a production function depending on the ex ante uncertain productivity 
state E and capital stock K, where H,(e, K) > 0 and HK(E, K) > 0 and productiOn output 
has unit value. Denote EO the expectatiOn operator w r t. the equivalent subjective 
probability beliefs held by both agent and investor. Also denote cp(·) a fee schedule for 
the agent (i.e. a mapping of production value net or gross of capital costs to agent 
remuneration). 
If r is the unit cost of capital and the cap1tal cost is fully deductible from the share base, 
then the optimal choice of investment for the investor and agent IS given by the solution 
to the folloWing single variable maximisation problem: 
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max EQP[H(&, K)- <p(H(&, K)- rK)- rK] 
K 
max EO'[ <p(H( &, K) - rK)] 
K 
(AI) 
(A2) 
If the same investment decision can maximise the well-being of both agent and investor 
then we equate the first order conditions from (AI) and (A2) such that 
EQP'(·)[HK- <p'(·)(HK- r) -r] = EQ''0[<p'0(HK- r)] = 0 (A3) 
Ross then states (for an isomorphic problem) that for (A3) to be true for all possible fee 
schedules we must have 
Now specify that the fee schedule is Pareto effic1ent such that the schedule maximises a 
linear combination of mvestor and agent expected utility. Then 
=> 
max E[QP(H( &, K) - <p(H( &, K) - rK) - rK) + ~Q'( <p(H( &, K) - rK) ] 
<pO 
(AS) 
where ~ is a constant. 
Therefore, if the investment decision maximises the expected utility of both agent and 
investor and the fee schedule is Pareto optimal, then (A4) and (AS) yields 
(A6) 
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From (A6) we see that when the investor and agent share the cost of cap1tal and [HK- r] 
* 0, then a linear fee schedule is pareto optimal when the mvestment deciswn mronmises 
the expected utility of both agent and investor (since p(l - cp') - cp' = 0 implies that cp' = 
constant and q>(W) = aW + b, where a and bare constants). 
Consider next that instead of the cost of capital being fully deductible from the share base 
(i.e. the share base is the production output value minus the cost of capital) that the 
investor alone pays the cost of capital (i e. the share base is now the productiOn output 
value only) Then the first order conditions derive from 
Investor: 
Agent: 
max EQP(H(E, K)- <p(H(E, K))- rK) 
K 
max En• (<p(H(E, K)) 
K 
(A7) 
(AS) 
such that if the investment decisiOn max1mises both the agent and mvestor expected 
utility then 
(A9) 
Again, the Pareto efficiency condition for the fee schedule is (AS) (with the arguments 
being given by H(e, K) - q>(H(E, K))- rK for the investor and q>(H(E, K)) for the agent) 
which together with (A9) yields 
HK [p(l - q>')- cp'] - rp = 0 (AlO) 
From (A I 0) it is clear that cp' * constant, such that non-deductibility of the capital cost 
from the share base has precluded the attainment of Pareto efficiency by linear sharing 
contracts when the expected utiht1es of the agent and investor are both maximised by the 
same investment decision. 
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(B) Over/Under-investment 
We next consider the simple case of the investment decision which maximises the 
expected utility of a risk neutral investor and a risk averse agent. Suppose that the 
production function is separable and multiplicative in uncertainty such that H(E, K) = 
g(E)H(K), g'(E) > 0, H'(K) > 0, and H"(K) < 0. Suppose also that ae[O, 1] is the degree of 
deductlbility of capital costs from the share base Then the expected utility of investor 
and agent is given by 
Investor: E(l -7t)g(E)H(K)- (1 - a11)rK (All) 
Agent: EQa(7t(g(E)H(K)- arK)) (Al2) 
where we assume that the agent receives a share 11e(O, 1) of revenue net of a proportion 
a of capital costs rK (for simplicity and without loss of generality we take the base wage 
as nil). Maximising (All) and (Al2) w r.t. K we see that the utility maximising 
investment level for the investor and agent respectively is given by the implicit solution 
to the following: 
Investor: 
Agent: 
H' = (I - a:r)r 
(1- :r)g 
H' = arEQ" [:r(g(e)H(K)-arK)] 
EQ" [:r(g(e)H(K)- arK)]g(e) 
where g = Eg(e)> 0. Consider the following lim1tmg cases: 
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(a) Fully deductible cost of cap1tal: a= 1 
In this case (A13) gives the investment decision that the investor would make implicitly 
from 
For the agent from (Al4), 
But 
H' =rig 
H' = rE?" [~r(g(s)H(K)- rK)] 
EO." [~r(g(s)H(K)- rK)]g(s) 
E[0. 0 [~r(g(s)H(K)- rK)]g(s)] = E0. 0 [1r(g(s)H(K)- rK)]Eg(s) 
(A15) 
(A16) 
+ Cov[0.0 [1r(g(s)H(K)- rK)],g(s)] 
< E0. 0 [~r(g(s)H(K)- rK)]Eg(s) 
since for a (strictly) risk averse agent 0.8"0 < 0 and the covariance term is negative. 
Therefore (A16) becomes 
H' >rig (A17) 
Comparing (A15) and (A17) we conclude that since H"(K) < 0, when the cost of capital is 
fully deductible from the share base and the agent chooses the investment decision, then 
there exists a problem of under-investment from the view point of a risk neutral investor 
(pnncipal). 
(b) Non-deductible cost of capital: a= 0 
In this case the share base is simply the production output value g(e)H(K). From (A13) 
the investment decisiOn of the investor is given implicitly by 
3.46 
CHAPTER3 INVESTMENT AND HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY 
H' = r > 0 
(1- K)g 
(A18) 
For the agent given that n••o > 0 and g(E) > 0 V&, then a= 0 gives 
H'=O (A19) 
Smce there exists diminishing marginal returns to investment (by assumption), (A19) 
establishes that the agent will comm1t (without limit if possible) the entire capital made 
available by the investor for investment purposes. From (Al8) and (Al9) we also 
conclude that when the cost of capital is not deductible from the share base and the agent 
chooses the investment decision, then there exists a problem of over-investment from the 
view point of a risk neutral investor (principal). 
From the above illustrations we see that the deducbbility of capital costs has a significant 
role to play when considering the (Pareto) efficiency of linear sharing contracts as well as 
upon the way in which an agent may be motivated differently towards the level of 
investment compared to an investor on whose behalf he is actmg. 
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Appendix 11 
Global applicability oflocally true incentive 
compatibility constraints 
In the following analysis59, we derive the conditions which justify the global use of 
incentive compatibility constraints which are, of themselves, only locally true. The results 
obtain with or without a pay floor for the borrower. 
For a bilateral information asymmetry, we need to consider the incentive compatibility 
constraints of both the borrower and the lender. 
Borrower incentive compatibility 
The global incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower is 
u· (8,8)?. u· (8/J) V8e[~,B],V 8 e [~,8] (A20) 
From (10) 
Since (from (9)) 
and therefore 
-
r 
U"(8,B) = frp(r,8,B)R1(r)dr 
! 
rp(r,8,B) = n(8H(K(r,B))- a(r,B)rK(r,B)) 
rp(r,iJ,iJ) = n(BH(K(r,B))- a(r,B)rK(r,B)) 
Subtractmg (A23) from (A22) and substituting into (A21) g1ves 
59 m wh1ch we draw from the survey work of Baron (1989) 
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-
' U" (0,0) = U" (0,0) + Jtr(O -O)H(K(r,O))R, (r)dr (A24) 
' 
From (A20), the global incentive compatibility constraint can now be written 
-
' U" (0,0)- U" (0,0)?. Jtr(O -O)H(K(r,O))R, (r)dr (A25) 
Similarly, 
and 
Therefore 
' 
rp(r,O,O) = tr(OH(K(r,O))- a(r, O)rK(r,O)) 
rp(r, 0,0) = tr(OH(K(r, 0))- a(r ,O)rK(r,O)) 
-
' U"(O,O) = U"(O,B)+ Jtr(O-O)H(K(r,O))R1(r)dr 
' 
and since U" (0})?. U" (0,0) from (A20), 
-
' 
(A26) 
(A27) 
(A28) 
U" (0,0)- U"(O,O) ~ Jtr(O -O)H(K(r,O))R1 (r)dr (A29) 
' 
Combining (A25) and (A29) gives 
- -
' ' Jtr(O -O)H(K(r}))R, (r)dr 0" (0,0)- U" (0,0) ~ Jtr(O -O)H(K(r,B))R, (r)dr (A30) 
~ r 
From (A30) we immediately60 see that globally true incentive compatibility constraint 
(A20) implies that K(r,O) is non-decreasing in 9. Thus, thatK(r,O) is non-decreasing in 
e is a necessary condition for global incentive compatibility. 
We now consider sufficiency. We will show that K(r,O) non-decreasing in 9 is also 
sufficient. 
60 smce H'(K) > 0 
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From (14), 
and 
0; 
u· (8,8) = u· ((Z) + I InH(K(r,s))RI (r)drds 
~!: 
9; 
u· (B,B) = u· ® + I InH(K(r,s))RI (r)drds 
~! 
Substituting (A31) into (A32) gives 
or 
u• (B,B) = u· (8,8) + JfnH(K(r,s))R1 (r)drds 
0! 
Now substituting (A33) into (A24) gives 
8; ; 
(A31) 
(A32) 
(A33) 
u· (8,0) = u· (8,8) + ffnH(K(r,s))RI (r)drds + In(8- B)H(K(r,B))RI (r)dr (A34) 
9 !: ! 
0 
Rewriting (8-B)H(K(r,B))as JH(K(r,B))dsin(A34) gives 
0 
o; 
U" (8,8)- u· (8,0) = I In[H(K(r,B))- H(K(r,s))]RI (r)drds (A35) 
0! 
Therefore, by inspection of (A35) we deduce that if K(r,8) is non-decreasing in 9, then 
the incentive compatibility constraint (A20) is indeed globa!61 • Consequently, the 
incentive compatibility constraint (13) (or eqmvalently (14)) which is only locally true, 
will apply globally tf and only if K(r,8) is non-decreasing in 9. 
61 We reqmre the nght hand side of(A35) to be non-negative, m wh1ch case the mtegrand of (A35) must be 
non-negat1ve, and therefore K(r,9) must be non-decreasmg in 9 To see why, if iJ ~ 8 then the mtegrand IS 
non-negative, and 1f 8 ~ iJ then the mtegrand is nonpos1t1ve but the d1rect1on of the mtegral1s reversed, so 
the mtegral1s non-negative. 
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Investor incentive compatibilitv constraint 
Fmt we deduce the necessary condition. The global incentive compatibility constraint for 
the investor to truthfully reveal the true unit cost of capital when it is realised, for all 
posstble values of the unit cost of capital given some e E [ fl., e] is 
p(r,r;O);?: p(r,r;O) 
By following exactly the same procedure used for the incentive compatibility constraint 
of the borrower, from the definitiOn of investor pay (4), we deduce that 
p(r, r) - p(r, r) ;?: (r - r )(I- a(r, 0)1r )K (r, 0) (A37) 
and p(r,r)- p(r,P)::; (r -r)(I-a(r,0)7r)K(r,O) (A38) 
Therefore (r- r)(I-a(r,0)7r)K(r,O)::; (r- r)(I- a(r,0)1r)K(r,e) (A39) 
and a necessary condition for global incentive compatibility is that (1- a(r,0)7r)K(r,O) 
is non-increasmg in r62• In similitude with the case of the borrower, the necessary 
condition also proves to be suffictent, as will now be demonstrated. 
Let g(s,O)"' (I-a(s,0)7r)K(s,O) Then from (8) 
' p(r,r;O) = p(r_,O)- fg(s,O)ds = (I-7r)(}H(K(r,O))- g(r,O)r (A40) 
r 
62 note that we are constdermg incentive compattbthty for the mvestor and need only concern ourselves 
wtth the dependence of K(r,S) on the umt cost of capttal r. Any results about the global relevance of the 
mcenttve compattbthty constramt of the mvestor w r t r apply equally for all values of a spannmg its 
support. 
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f 
and p(r,r;B) = p(r_,B)- Jg(s,B)ds = (1-;r)BH(K(r,B))- g(r,B)r (A41) 
But p(r};B) = (1-;r)BH(K(r,B))- g(r,B)r (A42) 
Combining (A41) and (A42) gives 
p(r,r;B) = p(r,r;B)- g(r,B)(r- r) 
f 
= p(r_,B)- Jg(s,B)ds- g(r,B)(r- r) (A43) 
! 
' f 
= p(r,r;B) + fg(s,B)ds- Jg(s,B)ds- g(r,B)(r- r) (A44) 
! ! 
where the last equality (A44) follows from (A40). 
Rearrangmg (A44) yields 
f 
p(r,r;B)- p(r};B) = Jg(s,B)ds- (r- r)g(r,B) 
' 
f 
= J[g(s,B)- g(r,B)]ds (A45) 
Hence, if g(s,9) is non-mcreasing in s, then63 the left hand side of (A45) is non-negative, 
i.e. (1- a(s,B)~r)K(s,B) non-increasing in s is also a sufficient condition for global 
incentive compatibility. 
63 for example when f > r, g(s,B);, g(f,B) for all se [r,f] and vice versa 
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Appendix Ill 
0; 
(I) f fp(r,B)F;(B)R1(r)drdB: 
f!: 
By defimtion p(r,B)+cp(r,B)=BH(K(r,B))-rK(r,B). Therefore the investor's 
expected utility is 
8 ; 8 r f fp(r,B)F;(B)R1(r)drdB = f f(BH(K(r,B))- rK(r,B)- cp(r,B))F;(B)R1(r)drdB 
~ [. f ! 
Now Jfcp(r,B)F;(B)R1(r)drdB = JF;(B)(Jcp(r,B)R1(r)dr}B 
~ [. ~ ! 
= J F; (B{J cp(r, B)R1 (r)drle=e }e 
• 
= f F; (B)U" (B)dB 
~ 
where the last equality is from (I 0). Therefore the investor's expected utility is 
. ' . 
f f<BH(K(r,B))- rK(r,B))F; (B)R1 (r)drdB- fu" (B)F; (B)dB 
~! ~ 
(3) fu"(B)F;(B)dB = U"(B)- fJ:r F(B) H(K(r,B))F;(B)R1(r)drdB: ~ ~' F; (B) 
• 
Integrating Ju" (B)F; (B)dB by parts gives 
~ 
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- -
fU"(B)F,(B)dB = [F(B)U"(B)]:- fdU"(B) F(B)dB 
~ - ~ dB 
8 ' 
= F(B)U" (B)- F(§)U" (§)- f f:rH(K(r,B))R1 (r)F(B)drdB 
~r 
where the second equahty follows from (13). The result is immediate upon rewriting the 
integrand in the second equality, and substituting the values of zero and unity for the 
cumulative distribution of 9 at its supports. 
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Appendix IV 
Derivation of the optimal investment schedule 
from first principles using an optimal 
control approach 
Let the expected utility of the principal be 
W[U 0 ,K]= J fY(U 0 ,K,r,B)drdB 
:!:0 :!:r 
- -
(A46) 
where l-0 ={BIB e [fZ,B]}, 'Zr = {r Ire [r,r]} From (26), the expected utility of the type 
9 borrower, u•(e), is determined by K(r,9) according to the constraint 
dU 0 
--= Jg(K,r,B)dr 
dB A 
(A47) 
where g(K,r,B) =1rH(K)R1(r), and A= {r Ire [r,rc(B,K,a)]} From (A47) it is true 
that 
(A48) 
for all possible functions TJ(B), where TJ(B) is also the shadow price of constraint (A47), 
and J(B)' = dj(B). Adding (A46) and (A48) yields 
dB 
where Ac =l. \A. 
r 
W[U 0 ,K]= f [fer +TJg)dr+ Jrdr-TJua'}B (A49) 
l-0 A AC 
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Now define the Hamiltonian 
H=H(Ua,K,I],B)= I<Y+qg)dr+ IYdr (ASO) 
A AC 
Then (AS!) 
Suppose that Ko(r,9) and u.•(e) denote the optimal pair of functions. Consider the 
variations 
K(r,B) = K 0 (r,B)+ pp(r, B) (A52) 
and 
(A53) 
where Jl(r,9) and 1;(9) are arbitrary functions, and ~ is a constant. Then 
a ,...., a a [ ' } W[U. +P~,K.+Pp]= I H(U. +P~.K.+Pf.J,17,B)-q(U. +PO B (A54) 
:Ee 
In order that Ko(r,9) and u. •(e) are the solutions to the problem, we require that the first 
variation of the functional W[Ua ,K], denoted OW[Ua ,K], is zero at~= 0, i.e. if 
def d 
1 
0W[Ua,K] = -W[U/ +P~,K +Pf.Jl =0 
dp 0 P=O 
then from (A54) we require 
I [
ailcua, K , 17, B) ailcug, K , q, B) } 
OW[U.a,K.]= 0 ao ~+ 0 p-qf B=O(A55) 
:E au aK 
e 
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Integrating the last term in (ASS) by parts gives 
(AS6) 
Therefore, substituting (AS6) into (ASS) gives 
If we now impose the transversality condition [77,;']~ = 0, then since the functions~ and 
!!. are arbitrary, we demand that 
ve (ASS) 
where the first order conditions are evaluated at the optimal functions Ko(r,9) and u. 8(9). 
Now, from (ASO) 
if= f<Y+qg)dr+ fYdr= f Ydr+ fqgdr 
A AC t A 
r 
(AS9) 
Specifically, J JY(ua,K,r,B)drdB = f [ fX(K,r,B)R,(r)dr-ua]F;(B)dB (A60) 
:1:8 :1: ~ t r B r 
where profit X(K,r,B) = BH(K)- rK, so that 
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Also, from (26), g(K,r,B) = nH(K)R1 (r) 
Substituting (A61) and (A62) into (AS9) gives 
From (ASS) and (A63), BH(Ua' ~, TJ,B) -17' y1elds - F; (B)= -TJ'(B), so that 
au 
77(B) = F(B) 
takmg the constant of integration to be zero. 
(A62) 
(A64) 
Also, recalling that A= {r IrE [r,rc (B,K,a)]}, using Liebnitz's rule to differentiate the 
Hamiltonian w.rt. K in (A63), applying the first-order 
condition if K (Ua ,K,TJ,B) = 0 from (ASS), and noting that F; (B)> 0 VB by assumption, 
R(B + n F(B) )H'(K(r,B))- r]R, (r)dr + j[BH'(K(r,B))- r)R, (r)dr A F; (B) AC 
(A6S) 
where we have used 77(B) = F(B) from (A64). 
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Appendix V 
LetJ(Y) =X where Y = H'(X). Then J'(H'(X))W(X) =I so that J'(·) < 0 given that 
H"(X) < 0 Also J'(H'(X))H"'(X) + J"(H'(X))[H"(X)]' = 0 so that J"O < 0 
assuming that H"'(X) < 0 
Now let (!(B)= B + 7t F(B) in (34), where we assume that the risk ratio increases in e 
F, (B) 
faster than -7t·1 s.t. (!'(B)> 0. Then Knb(r,B)is given explicitly (suppressmg the 
subscript nb) by 
K(r,B) = J[-r-J (!(B) (A66) 
Differentiating (A66) w.r.t. rand 9 yields 
K (r B)= - 1-J'[-'-] < 0 (A67) 
' , (!(B) (!(B) 
K (r B)= - 1-J"[-r-J < 0 (A68) 
" ' (1 2 (B) (!(B) 
K (r B)= r(!'(B) J'[-r-J > 0 (A69) 
8 , (12(B) (I(B) 
K (r B) rf2 (B) [zr J'[-'-] + J"[-'-]] s; 0 (A 70) 88 
' (1 4 (8) (!(B) (I(B) 
K (r B)-- (!'(B) [J'[-'-]+-'-J"[-r-]J > O(A71) 
'
8 
' - (12 (B) (!(B) (!(B) (!(B) 
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In summary, Knb (r,B)is increasing in 9 and decreasing in r. It is concave in both 9 and r, 
and the slope of Knb (r,B)w r.t. r is increasing in 9. 
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CHAPTER4 
DICHOTOMOUS INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, 
UNOBSERV ABLE EFFORT AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we examine dichotomous incentive schemes aimed at dealing with the 
problem of moral hazard in a single-period principal-agent framework when agent 
actions (here chosen prior to the realisation of some uncertain event) are not observable 
by the principal. By dichotomous we mean that the mcentive contract awards the agent a 
realised pay derived according to one of two possible rules. Which rule obtains is 
conditional on some criteria, the fulfilment of which is ex ante uncertain. A s1mple 
example of a dichotomous contract might be a base wage plus a fixed bonus component 
of pay cond1tional upon the attainment of some performance target. 
Research m this area has primarily focused on whether these type of contracts can 
implement a first-best effort1 level. A first-best effort level1s that effort which max1m1ses 
the expected utihty of the principal subject to participatiOn by the agent (see Holmstrom 
(1979) and Mirrlees (1974)). An incentive contract will usually not implement a first-best 
effort level when actions are unobservable since the agent is free to make an effort choice 
which optimises his own util1ty and not necessarily that of the principal. This latter 
additional constraint leads to the optimal contract only implementing a second-best effort. 
The intuitive reason for this is that whilst the agent and pnncipal may well both be 
motivated to enjoy the returns from the venture, it is only the agent who bears the cost (in 
terms of effort disutility) in generating these returns. Risk sharing considerations may 
1 Effort and action will be used mterchangeably. 
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also serve to exacerbate the problem, for example when the principal is risk neutral and 
the agent risk averse there is a conflict between incentives and insurance for the agent 
(see 2.2.1.1 ). This leads to a lack of goal congruence between principal and agent and 
consequently the supply of an effort level which is not first-best 
Intuitively we expect that if the principal can impose arbitrarily large penalties for an 
inferred effort level below that of first-best, then he might be able to enforce the first-best 
effort choice. This is indeed the case and has been shown by Gjesdal (1976)2• What is 
important in understanding this result is that the outcome ( e g. revenue or profit) is the 
result of an ex ante uncertam state of nature together with the agent effort. The 
punishment is tnggered when, given the realised outcome, the effort of the agent must 
have been below the first-best assuming that the worst possible state of nature has 
occurred. Thus it is with certainty that the principal is able to know that the agent has 
shirked. This element of certainty together with the dichotomous contract can force the 
agent ex ante to choose the first-best effort choice for sufficiently large penalties. This 
bears a direct relation to the fact that when the principal has complete information about 
the agent effort and can observe it with certainty, then a forcing contract (legally 
enforceable given observability and verifiability of effort) can be used to achieve the 
first-best 
However, a practical problem arises in that there may exist institutional constraints such 
as bankruptcy laws and limited liability constraints that mean that the threat of a penalty 
otherwise sufficient to induce the first-best effort may not be viable and may therefore 
not eliminate the incentive problem. In extending the work of Gjedal (1976), Lewis 
(1980) has shown that the use of a lump-sum penalty of any size (not necessarily that 
which would have been large enough to elimmate the incentive problem completely 
Without liability constraints) based on some measure of performance like output that 
2 Osband (1987) emphasises how achievement of the first-best by applymg unbounded punishments 
depends on whether the support for the output distnbut10n is statiOnary or moves wtth the effort supplied by 
a nsk averse agent. For statiOnary support (e g Holmstrom (1979)) the first best ts approached only 
asymptotically, in contrast to the case of moveable supports (e g. Lewts (1980)) 
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varies continuously with the effort of a strictly nsk averse agent can improve a contract 
by reducing the incentive for the agent to supply an (unobservable) effort which is not 
first-best. In other words the use oflump-sum bonuses or penalties in incentive contracts 
is Pareto-improving but may not necessarily implement the first-best effort choice by the 
agent if there are limited liability constraints 
Mehta (1993) has studied the effect that imposing bounds on the rewards/punishments 
has upon the attainment of efficiency in incentive contracting. In Mehta' s model, an 
efficient incentive contract is one that minimises the risk premium paid to the agent for 
bearing risk in an mcentive contract that induces the agent to supply some fixed level of 
effort rather than to supply none at all. By making some rather strong assumptions (the 
distribution of outcomes is binomial) Mehta is able to determine cond1tions (involving 
the effect of effort upon the probability of successful outcomes) under which the 
imposition of liability constraints does not impair the attainment of efficiency when the 
principal uses a dichotomous incentive contract. The economics of his result is that to 
maintain efficiency using dichotomous contracts with limited instead of unlimited 
liab1lity, the inference from the realised outcome about effort must be stronger. 
However, Mehta's study lacks generality. An earlier study by Innes (1990) stressed the 
importance of the monotonicity properties of the pnncipal's allocation from ex post 
profits when the agent is instead risk neutral (in order to abstract from risk sharing 
considerations). Innes was able to show when bi-lateral limited liabihty obtains (the 
principal requires a minimum rate of return on capital invested) that a monotone 
nondecreasing fee schedule precludes the attrunment of the first-best effort level, whereas 
when there is no such monotonicity property a first-best effort level may be elicited from 
the agent (depending upon the technology and the extent of external investment required 
by the agent). Of critical importance in deriving this result is the monotonic hkelihood 
ratio property (MLRP). This implies that for any g1ven profit level, increased effort leads 
to relatively greater probability weight on all higher profit levels (MLRP implies first 
order stochastic dominance but not vice versa). With any contract that delivers an 
allocation to the pnncipal that is stnctly increasing in some region, some of the benefits 
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of the margmal effort supplied by the agent are shared with the principal. Thus since the 
agent still bears the total cost of effort, he will choose an effort that is less than first best. 
However, in the absence of a monotonic contract constramt the situation is different. 
Innes considers a contract which delivers the principal an allocation which is non-
monotonic, whereby profit is entirely allocated to the principal if it is less than some 
threshold level and is completely awarded to the agent otherwise. By giving the agent the 
entire share of profits in some high-profit states, the share of marginal-effort benefits 
captured by the principal in lower-profit states is offset by principal losses from a higher 
probability of zero payoff. By appropriate choice of the critical profit level above which 
the principal gets nothing, the agent will lose none of the marginal benefits (at the first-
best effort choice) and first-best efficiency may prevail. 
Following on from Innes' work, Park (1995) and Kim (1997) considered instead limited 
habihty for only the agent in determining general existence conditions for contracts that 
induce the agent to supply the first-best effort level. Kim highlights the importance of a 
limited liability constramt (which sets a lower bound to the payoff the agent receives of 
zero) in that it precludes the use of a fixed rent contract. As is well known, in the absence 
of such a constraint when the agent is risk neutral a fixed-rent contract is found to be 
optimal. This is because by allowing the agent to be sole residual claimant the principal 
Will induce the agent to supply the first-best effort level and can extract the expected 
surplus in excess of the agent reservation utility via the fixed rent paid by the agent. 
Being risk neutral the agent does not suffer utility loss from bearing the entue risk of the 
venture and there is therefore no conflict between insurance and incentives (see 2.2.1.1). 
However, when the liability of the agent is limited such a contract may not be feasible 
since for some low profit outcomes the profit net of the fee may leave the agent with a 
payoff less than zero. Assuming MLRP Kim derives a necessary condition that when 
satisfied ensures a first-best effort level for a contract in which the agent and principal 
proportionally share the output, but for which the agent receives a lump-sum bonus when 
the output exceeds a predetermined target He also shows that if this condition does not 
hold, then there exists no contract that will aclueve the first-best effort since the bonus 
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contract IS amongst the most efficient contractual forms when the agent has lim1ted 
liab1lity. 
The form of dichotomous contracts that we consider are those whose trigger depends on 
the output side of the production process. An alternative form of dichotomous contract 
may depend on the imperfect monitoring of productive input supplied by the agent 
(effort) as in Harris and Raviv (1979), who show that such monitors are Pareto 
improving. Other literature on the effect of hmited liability on the attainment of the first-
best effort level assumes that the agent sees the state of nature prior to choosing effort. 
Sappington (1983a) shows that in such a case a first-best outcome is not poss1ble. His 
results, however, do not hinge crucially on the presence of the agent's limited liability, 
but on the presence of the agent's private information. The agent's private informatiOn 
obtained before choosing an effort makes his strategy set much bigger. This restricts the 
principal's contractual ability, causing the preclusion of the first-best outcome. Finally, 
Lawarree and Audenrode (1996) also assuming the agent to be risk neutral and to see the 
state of nature prior to choosing effort have shown m the presence of limited liability and 
imperfect output observability, when there are two agent types who differ only in 
productive efficiency, that both agents receive a positive rent and that even the most 
efficient agent will not produce at his first-best effort level. 
In this chapter we examine dichotomous mcentive schemes which award the agent a 
contingent share of the outcome. This share ratio takes one of two values depending on 
whether or not the realised outcome exceeds some pre-specified target. In contrast to 
those schemes considered by Kim (1997) and Park (1995), for which a risk neutral agent 
is awarded a fixed bonus for target achievement which is permitted to be as large as 
necessary to elicit socially optimal effort, these schemes place an upper bound on such an 
inducement. Consequently, for some technologies, the assumption of risk neutrality 
prohibits the supply of a first-best effort level. This permits a meaningful discussion of 
risk aversion, and whether and how risk aversion will impact the inducement of the agent 
to supply the required effort. 
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4.2 The Model 
We consider a principal-agent model m which the principal offers an agent a contract for 
the supply of productive effort in a risk bearing venture on a take it-or-leave it basis. The 
supply of effort is costly to the agent and the principal is unable to observe agent effort. 
Since effort cannot be a contracted variable, the principal's problem is to design an 
incenttve scheme whtch induces the agent to make an effort choice which is socially 
optimal (first-best), and wluch awards the agent according to the publicly observable 
realised outcome. 
Denote the (non-negative) outcome by X = X( e,& ), where e is effort supplied by the agent 
prior to the realisation of ex ante uncertain state of nature & e[&0 , &I]. & has (strictly 
positive) density function G1(&) and cumulative distribution G(&). Production technology 
specifies Xe(e, E)> 0, x.(e, E)> 03 and Xee(e, E)~ 0, Xe, (e, E)~ 0, x •• (e, E)~ 04 Ve,&. 
The agent is taken to have separately additive utility in money and effort5• 
The principal chooses a target outcome Xe. For realised outcomes above or equal to X,, 
the agent is awarded a proportion 1t e (0,1) of the outcome, and for reahsed outcomes 
below Xe, the agent is awarded a proportion A.1t of the outcome where A. E [0,1]. 
Formally 
q;~(X)={: if 
if 
X <X 
c 
X <!X 
c 
3 The margmal product of effort and state of nature is non-negative 
(I) 
4 The margmal product of effort IS non-mcreasmg m effort and non-decreasmg m realised state, and 
production IS non-decreasing m the state With non-mcreasmg returns i e effort and productiVIty state are 
substitutes, each with decreasing returns to scale. 
' Thts means that agent nsk preferences w r t money are mdependent of effort. 
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which is illustrated m a plot of c:p(X) versus X below. 
c:p(X) 
1l 
B=11 (1-A.)Xc 
0 
0 X 
Figure 4.1 
From Figure 4.1 we may note the limitation for B, the discontinuous increase in agent 
allocation for X 2! Xc. The maximum value of B (at A. = 0) is 11Xc, and the agent 
allocation is bounded above by the linear share line with gradient 11 through the origin. In 
Kim (1997) and Park (1995), the share ratio is continuous and the agent receives a 
contingent bonus which does not restrict the pay of the agent to values contained on or 
below the stra1ght line in Figure 4.1 of gradient 11 (see 4.3 for further comparison). 
Depending on the performance target Xc which is specified in the contract between the 
principal and the agent, the pnncipal may either know with certainty or remam uncertain, 
as to whether the agent has supplied less than the first-best effort For example, if Xc = 
inf X( e' ,E) = X( e' ,Eo), which is the lowest possible outcome given that the agent supplies 
the first-best effort, then the principal punishes the agent by allocating the ex post 
real1sed outcome according to the reduced share ratio A.11 only when he is completely 
certain that the agent supplied less than the first-best effort e '. If the target outcome is set 
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above X( e • ,Eo) then punishment is more severe in the sense that the agent may receive the 
reduced share when he had actually supplied the requisite amount of effort. 
Intuitively the lower the effort e supplied by the agent, the greater must be the realised 
state E in order to achieve the target outcome, and v1ce versa. This is formalised by 
defining c( e) by the following equivalence: 
-
Xc = X(e,c(e)) (2) 
From (2) we see that c( e) is the realised state of nature wh1ch just ensures that the agent 
achieves the target outcome for a given effort e. For a fixed value of Xc, by 
differentiatmg (2) totally and applying the chain rule, 
dc(e) = Xe(e,c(e)) <O 
de X 8 (e,c(e)) 
(3) 
The expected utility of the agent when supplying effort e is u• where 
s(e) 81 
U" = f O"(J:rX(e,c))dG(c)+ Jn"(:rX(e,c))dG(c)-Q(e) (4) 
8o s(e) 
Q(e) IS the disutllity of effort e, where Q'(e) > 0 and Q"(e) ~ 0, such that effort disutility 
is increasing in effort at a non-decreasing rate. n•(W) is the utility of money W, where 
n•'(W) > 0 and n•"(W) ~ 0, such that utility of money is increasing in money at a non-
increasing rate. Finally, the first-best effort level e· is given by the solution to 
& 
I * * JXe(e ,c)dG(c)-Q'(e )=0 (5) 
&0 
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whereby the margmal product of effort equals its marginal cost, and the first-best 
allocation is one in which the agent supplies effort e' and receives (in expected value) his 
reservation utility U . 
4.3 A comparison of schemes 
Before formally analysing contingent share ratio schemes, we undertake a comparison of 
the expected payoffs of lump-sum bonus schemes of the type considered by Kim and 
Park, with the contingent share ratio scheme in ( 1 ). 
For a lump-sum bonus scheme in which the agent is awarded a (linear) share A.n of ex 
post profits for all outcomes, and receives a lump-sum BLS if the outcome is no less than 
Xc, the expected payoff is 
cl cl 
I ..t;rX(e,c)dG(c) + IB LSdG(c) 
GO E(e) 
(6) 
From (4), for a payoff which awards a (linear) share A.n of ex post profits for outcomes 
less than Xc, and a (linear) share n of ex post profits otherwise, the expected payoff is 
cl cl 
I ..t;rX(e,c)dG(c)+ I(l-..t);rX(e,c)dG(c) (7) 
GO E(e) 
Rewriting (7) gives the expected payoff for the contingent share ratio scheme as 
~ ~ ~ 
I ll7cl'(e,c)dG(c)+ I BsRdG(c)+ I(l-ll)7r(X(e,c)-Xc)dG(c) (8) 
8
o e(e) E(e) 
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where BsR = (1-A. )7tXc = difference in share ratio x performance target. 
By comparing ( 6) and (8) we can immediately identify some important differences 
between the two schemes. The first difference to note is that the lump sum bonus in the 
case of contingent share ratio contracts may not be determined by the principal 
independently of other contract parameters. Its value is instead derived from the 
performance target and the difference m share ratiO which obtains for outcomes no less 
than, and below, the target outcome. 
A second, and essential difference, derives from the way in which bonus schemes create 
mcentlve pressure. The rationale for awarding an agent a lump-sum performance bonus is 
that none of the marginal benefits of effort are shared with the principal for this element 
of pay. In contrast, when the agent shares the outcome in some fixed proportion, the 
agent is allocated a pay which is less than the value of Ins marginal product, and as a 
result is less motivated to provide effort. For contingent share ratio schemes, mcreasing 
the lump-sum bonus by reducing A. creates two effects. The first is to increase incentive 
pressure by increasmg the lump-sum bonus. The second, and offsettmg effect, is to 
reduce incentive pressure by reducing the marginal share (A.1t) of outcomes which are less 
than the performance target. The overall effect of reducmg A. is therefore ambiguous and 
depends on the production function, the distribution of exogenous uncertainty, and the 
performance target (see 4.5). 
However, in the case of lump-sum bonuses whose value is chosen explicitly, as opposed 
to being implicitly determined by other contract parameters, increasing the bonus 
unambiguously increases incentive pressure6• 
& & 
6From (6), U 0 = J .<JZX(e, e)dG(e) + _r' B LsdG(e)- Q(e) Therefore, differentiating the FOC we 
"o c(e) 
0 oU0 - d~(e) 
obtam---- = -G (c(e))-- > 0. 
oBoe I de 
LS 
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A third and more subtle difference relates to the choice of performance target by the 
principal. For contingent share ratio schemes, increasing the lump-sum element of pay 
through increasing the performance target also reduces the probability of achieving the 
lump-sum element of pay, for a given level of effort. However, for lump-sum schemes, 
the bonus element is a constant, independent of the performance target. Therefore, in 
contrast to contingent share schemes, increasing incentive pressure through increasing the 
lump-sum bonus is not reduced by an associated decrease (for the same level of effort) in 
the probability of target performance achievement. 
A fmal and obvious difference seen by comparing ( 6) and (8) is that extra incentive 
pressure exists in contingent share schemes from an additional share (l-A.)7t of outcomes 
in excess of the performance target (the last term in (8)), in comparison to the lump-sum 
scheme given by (6). 
Having introduced the basic model we now formalise the discussion of incentive pressure 
through the use of contingent share ratio incentive contracts. We start by considering a 
general (money) risk preference for the agent and then go on to examine how increasing 
the risk aversion of the agent from zero (risk neutrality) to higher levels of nsk aversion 
impacts the use of contingent share ratio schemes. 
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4.4 General (money) utility preference 
The agent chooses h1s effort in order to maximise his expected ut1lity. The first order 
condition is obtained from ( 4) by applying Liebnitz's rule7 to give 
au· = [n· (it~(e,e(e))-n" (~(e,e(e))pJ;;(e)) de( e) 
ae de 
e(e) ' 8! ' 
+ I it~,(e,&)Q" (it~(e,&))dG(&)+ I~.(e,&)Q" (~(e,&))dG(&)-Q'(e) 
8 o e(e) 
=0 (9) 
However, in order that the agent supply an effort level at least equal toe·, we require that 
auo 1 d • . . -- eva uate at e 1s non-negat1ve, 1 e 
ae 
[ 
- * 
• - * • - • - • d& e Q"(it~(e ,&(e ))-Q"(~(e ,&(e ))~1 (&(e )) ( ) de 
- * &(e ) * , * 81 * , • * 
+ I it~,(e ,&)Q" (it~(e ,&))dG(&)+ I~,(e ,e)Q" (~(e ,&))dG(&)-Q'(e ) 
8o e(e*) 
:e:o (10) 
Additionally, if <p(X) (see (1)) is to achieve a first-best allocation then in addition to (10) 
1t must also give the agent exactly his reservatiOn utility, i.e. 
- * &(e ) 81 I n•c.:t~(e*,e))dG(e)+ In·c~ce*,e))dG(e)=QCe*)+U (11) 
& - * o &(e ) 
7 see Stephensen (1973) p182. 
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Combining (10) and (11) we arrive at a necessary condition for q>{X) to implement the 
first best allocation: 
* 8EQ" (rp~~(e , e))) > Q'(e*) 
* * EQ" (rp(X(e , e))) U + Q(e ) 
(12) 
where E(·) is the expectation operator over all states of nature. 
This condition has an intuitive economic explanation. The left hand side is the 
proportional rate of change of expected utihty of money w.r.t. effort ate= e·. The right 
hand side IS the proportional rate of change of disutility of effort w r.t. effort ate = e •. We 
therefore see that if an incentive scheme is to achieve the first-best allocation then at the 
first-best effort, the incentive pressure caused by the marginal effect of effort on money 
must be no less than the pressure to supply less effort due to effort disut1htl. 
We note that the crucial feature for the bonus share scheme to elicit the first-best effort is 
that the agent's payoff increases discontinuously at some point. While the bonus share 
contract necessarily forces the agent to give up some of the marginal benefit of effort 
through sharing the outcome, thereby reducing the agent's effort, this effort-reducing 
incentive is offset by the effort-enhancing incentive created by a jump m agent payoff for 
achieving the target. The jump B in agent payoff at X = Xc is seen graphically in Figure 
4.1. 
From (12) we see that essential to an optimal response of increased effort by the agent in 
answer to the use of the threat of a possible reduction in share ratio, is that the left hand 
side of (12) be decreasing in A., i.e. greater punishments elicit greater effort at least until 
the optimal response of the agent is to supply e •. 
8 We can also mterpret {12) as an elasticity expressiOn 
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If the maximal expected utility of the agent (the expected utliity when effort is utility 
maximising) is decreasing in A, then so also Wlll be the proportional rate of change of 
expected utility w r t. effort. Therefore, critical to <p(X) as a scheme to mduce an increase 
in effort towards first-best is that 
..E_[8EO." (rp(X(e, e))]< 0 for 
aA. ae 
e:::; e' (13) 
We therefore differentiate the first order condition (9), which defines maximal effort e(A) 
as a function of A (for given 11), in order to learn how the agent responds to a change m A 
Instead of differentiating (9) directly and collectmg terms in de(A)/dA, a srrnpler method 
to derive de(A)IdA is to notice that the first order condition can be expressed as 
au" 
= f(A., e(A.)) = 0 
oe e=e(A.) 
(14) 
where f(A, e(A)) is given by the differentiated expression in (9). Differentiating (14) 
w.r t. A gives 
of(A.,e(A.)) + of(A.,e(A.)) de(A.) = 0 
aA. oe(A.) dA. 
and therefore 
de(A.) =-[of( A., e(A.))J[of(A., e(A.))]-
1 
dA. oA. oe(A.) 
(15) 
The denommator of (15) is of(A.,e(A.)) = 02~a < 0 since the expected utility of 
oe(A.) ae e=e(A.) 
the agent is assumed concave in effort in order that the maximal effort of the agent is 
unique. Therefore, the sign of de(A)IdA is the sign of the numerator of(15), i.e. 
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s 
where = means equal in sign. 
de( A.) 
d:i 
=- -- ate=e(A.) s a [au· J 
aA. ae 
Partial differentiatiOn of (9) w r t. A. gives9 
(16) 
(17) 
where e = e(A.), the maximal effort for the agent with contingent proportional share ratio 
reduction A.. 
Equation (17) gives us an important result. It tells us whether the effort of the agent, 
which is mdividually maximal, will increase or decrease as the share ratio which obtains 
when the performance target is not reached is varied. As Will become clear in the next 
subsection, depending on the technology and the performance target specified, for a risk 
neutral agent there exist conditions for which the threat of a lower share ratio will reduce 
rather than increase the maximal effort. 
9 It should now be clear why we have used a states space model v1z-a-v1z an mduced d1stnbut10n model, in 
order to consider nsk avers1on For an induced d1stnbut10n ( G(X I e)) model, the first-order condition for a 
X X 
nsk averse agent isu; = { 0°(.<11X)dGe(X[e)+ f 0°(/IX)dG (X[e)-Q'(e)=O. From (16), the 
"- X e 
c 
s1gn of the change m max1mal effort w r t A 1s g1ven by d1fferent1ating the first-order cond1t1on w r t A 
However, for an induced d1stnbut10n model th1s only generates a first-order denvat1ve for 0'() For a 
further compar1son of the two modellmg approaches see Appendix 11, wh1ch denves a states space 
representatiOn ofMLRP. 
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4.5 Risk neutrality 
To see why in general an ambiguity exists as to the sign of the change of maximal effort 
with A., observe from (17) that for a risk neutral agent (Q8 '(A.7tX) = I and n•"(A.1tX) = 0), 
s &(e) 
de(A.) = !.._ Jx(e,s)dG(s) 
dA 8e E 
0 
(18) 
Since the upper limit of the integral is decreasing in effort, whilst the integrand is 
increasing in effort, the overall sign of the rate of change of the expected outcome over 
the range of states for wh1ch the performance target is not achieved is ambiguous. 
In order to remove this ambiguity and to render the impact of risk aversion interesting, 
we assume a technology which precludes the use of schemes such as <p{X) (given by (1)) 
as devices used to ehc1t greater effort when the agent is risk neutral, such that de( A.) > 0. 
dA. 
The following assumptions are sufficient to ensure that de( A-)> 0 for a risk neutral 
dA. 
agent. 
Assumption 1:10 3__(G1 (c(e)) de( e))!> o de de Ve 
dc(e) [-X X +X X )-[X X -X X )--
10 d dc(e) c ee e ec c ec e cc de -
---= --------,------""- evaluated at (e, c(e) ). 
de de X 2 c 
Observe that the first term m the numerator IS non-negative, since Xee( e, & ) ,:; 0 and Xee( e,e) ~ 0 Also, the 
. d dc(e) 
second term IS non-negaltve smce Xee(e,e) ~ 0 and XEE (e, e),:; 0 Therefore, --- ~ 0 
de de 
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Assumption 2: 
s(e*) f Xe(/ ,s)dG(s) 
& 
Xc<~o~---.--~*.-
G,(s(e*)) ds(e ) 
de 
To see why these assumptiOns are sufficient to positively sign (18) (in which case the 
maximal effort decreases as A. decreases), (for clarity) define Z(e) by the following 
eqmvalence, 
- -
0 &(e) [( ) &(e) Z(e) "'- Jx(e,s)dG(s) =XcG,(s(e))~+ Jx e(e,s)dG(s) (19) 
oe& de & 
0 0 
where the second line follows from Liebnitz's rule and (2). Then 
( - J - &(e) dZ e d - d& e - - d& e _(_) =Xc- G1(&(e))-(_) +Xe(e,&(e))G1(&(e))__u+ JXee(e,s)dG(&) de de de de & 
0 
<0 (20) 
where the sign of(20) follows from (3), AssumptiOn 1, and dtminishing returns to effort. 
Since Z'( e) < 0, tf Z( e *) > 0, then Z( e) > 0 for e ::; e •. Therefore, to ensure that Z( e) > 0 for 
all e ::; e •, we assume that Z( e *) > 0, which is Assumption 2. 
For the remainder of this chapter we make Assumptions 1 and 2 such that the threat of 
share ratio reductiOn contingent on an outcome less than the target profit, will actually 
decrease rather than increase the effort of a risk neutral agent. 
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Intuitively, we might expect that schemes such as <p(X), which fail as a means to elicit 
greater effort when the agent is risk neutral (given Assumptions 1 and 2), Will be more 
likely to induce an increase in effort when the agent is instead risk averse. This IS because 
uncertainty as to the fee schedule adds an extra layer of discomfort to a risk averse agent 
who would already suffer a drop in welfare compared to his nsk neutral counterpart, due 
to ex ante uncertainty about the ex post outcome, from which his reward is allocated. 
In the following analysis we find that this is indeed the case, but of importance to the 
principal is the actual degree of risk aversion of the agent. We start by introducing 
(Arrow-Pratt) measures of risk aversion, and then identify the importance of matchmg the 
actual degree of nsk aversion of an agent to a suitable dichotomous share contract. 
4.6 Risk aversion 
Relative risk aversion Xr(W) and absolute risk aversiOn XA(W) are defined as follows 11 : 
" 
Xr (W)"' 
!.1" (W)W 
' 
(21) 
!.1" (W) 
" 
(w) =- !.1" (W) XA - • (22) 
!.1" (W) 
where n•(W) is the utility of money w. 
In order to illustrate these concepts, consider an investor who is endowed With some 
initial wealth. The investor must decide how much of his initial wealth he wishes to 
11 See Huang and L1tzenberger (1988) pp20-23 
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invest in some risky asset, the balance of which earns a risk free rate of return. If the 
investor has constant relative risk aversion, that is his degree of relative risk aversion is 
invariant w.r. t. wealth W, then as his wealth changes, the proportion of wealth invested in 
the risky asset would stay the same. This must therefore imply that the absolute dollar 
amount of wealth invested in the asset increases as h1s wealth increases, i e. that his 
absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth, where absolute risk aversion is a measure 
used to describe how the absolute dollar investment of initial wealth in the risky asset 
varies as wealth changes. 
Since constant relative risk aversion implies decreasing absolute risk aversion, where the 
latter preference appeals to real attitudes towards nsk, we will assume it henceforth. 
Additionally, constant relative risk aversion, though not critical to the following 
discussion, will provide simplification. 
4. 7 Critical relative risk aversion 
If the princ1pal is to viably use the threat of a possible reduction m share ratio as a means 
to elicit greater effort, then 1t is vital that such a threat should be credible12• In the 
following analysis, we identify three important ranges of(constant relative) risk aversion. 
These are xe[O, x(O)], xe(x(O), x(l)], and xe(x(I), oo) (definitions of x(O) and x(l) 
proceed from the following analysis). For risk aversions in the lower interval, threats of 
punishment are counterproductive and only tend to reduce effort (as seen for the case of 
nsk neutrality). For risk aversions in the upper range, threats of punishment (however 
severe) elicit greater effort Lastly, for agents with risk aversion in the middle range, 
reducing /.. below unity will, for /.. values above some critical value /..ce(O, 1), decrease 
the effort of the agent. Only for reductions in /.. below this critical value, will the threat of 
punishment elicit greater effort 
12 In the sense that It does not induce the agent to lower effort levels 
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We derive these results by recalling (17), 
(23) 
Consider, d~ [wna' (W)]= n; (W)+wn·" (W) = n; (W)[I- Xr(W)] (24) 
where the second equality follows from the defimtion of relative risk aversiOn (21) 
Substituting (24) mto (23), gives 
d~~)! X en; (-1:zXc)G,(e(e)) d:~e) + ly Xe d(::zX) [ -1:zXn.' (-1:zX)}G(c) 
0 
where the first equality follows from (24) and the second from the assumption that the 
agent has constant relative risk aversion X· 
We now proceed to use (25) to establish the sign of the rate of change of maximal effort 
with /.. at the extremum values of/.., bemg zero and unity. This allows us to identify the 
cntical values of relative nsk aversion (x(O) and x(I )) for which the rate of change of 
effort with/.. changes sign at either of the extremum values of/... 
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From (25) 1t immediately follows that for A. = 0, 
s d -( ) &(e) 
= XcG,(c(e))~+(l- x) JxedG(e) 
de & 
(26) 
0 
smce n"(W) is increasing for all W. Therefore, 
~ >(<)0 
aii..t=O 
if X< (>)X(O) (27) 
where x(O) = 1 
X cG, (c(e)) ds(e) 
de 
-=-_ ___..!. _ ___..!. and e = e0 (the mruuma1 agent effort when A.= 0)13• 
In exactly the same way, we derive Be I whereby 
81.-t=l 
~I >(<)o 
aii..t=l 
if X< (>)X(1) (28) 
13 Note that x(O) and X(l) are defined Implicitly smce maximal effort and the money utility functions 
depend upon the degree of relative nsk aversion By (twice) mtegratmg (21), the money utility function for 
an agent with relative nsk aversiOn less than one IS O.'(W)~w'·x /(1-x) VW ~ 0. 
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X en; (n:Xc)G,(c(e)) d~~e) 
and x(1) = 1 - -=-------'------' where e = e, (the maximal A.= 1 effort). 
&(e) 
J X en" (n:X)dG(s) 
& 
0 
We can also order the values ofx(O) and x(1) as given by the following propositwn. 
Proposition 1: X(O) < x(l) 14• 
Proof. See Appendix I. 
What Proposition 1, (27) and (28) tell us is that for agents with relative risk aversion X < 
x(O), reducing A. will reduce effort irrespective of how close A. Is to zero. For agents with 
x = x(O), the benefit of greater effort from reducing A. will just appear only for the 
maximum possible contmgent reduction in share ratio, being A.= 0. For all other values of 
A. above zero, agents with x < x(O) will supply less effort as a result of a possible 
reduction in share ratio if the performance target is not reached 
For X> x(l), the degree of constant relative risk aversion is sufficient in the sense that the 
threat of a proportional reductwn in share rat1o for outcomes less than the performance 
target will elicit greater effort for all values of A. on its support. For x = x(l ), whilst the 
threat of A. equal to zero elicits greater effort, the threat of A. infinitesimally below unity 
only just induces the agent to supply greater effort. 
14 Agents are assumed to have relallve nsk aversion less than one m all of the proceedmg analysis for x(O) 
and x(l) For relallve nsk aversion greater than one, maximal effort IS triVIally decreasmg m ), for all 
AE[O,I], as seen from (25) 
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For x(O) < x < x(l ), the threat of A. equal to zero induces greater effort, but the threat of A. 
JUSt below unity is counterproductive to the principal in that it reduces effort 
Consequently, there exists a critical contingent proportional reduction in share ratio, A.c, 
for which punishment threats less severe than A.c induce less effort (are 
counterproductive), whilst punishment threats more severe than A.c increase effort. 
The following table summarises the effects of a change in A. upon the maximal effort of 
the agent, where plus (minus) indicates a decrease (mcrease) m effort with a decrease in 
A., being the sign of the change in max1mal effort with A.: 
RANGE ~ ~ COMMENT A-=0 A-=1 
X <x(O) + + Counterproductive 
x(O)::;; X< X( I) - + A.ce(O,l) exists 
X( I)< X - - Sufficient aversion 
Table 4.1 
The existence of some critical contingent proportional reduction in share ratio for risk 
aversion x in the range x(O) :<;; x < x(I) is g1ven by Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: Ifx(O) :<;; x < x(l), there exists some A.ce(O,l) where for A.:<;; A.c, (maximal) 
effort is non-increasing15 in A., and for A.> A.c, (maximal) effort is increasmg in A.. 
15 Recall that y = y(x) IS increasmg m x If dy/dx > 0 and decreasmg m x If dy/dx < 0. 
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It must be noted that the value of A.c depends on the precise value of X for X,(O) 5 X< x.(I ), 
with A.c close to unity for X just below X,(l ), and A.c close zero for X just above X,(O). 
Finally, from (25), for constant relative risk aversion not less than one, de( A-)< 0 
dA-
V'A.e[O,l], given (3). Therefore, from (10), (11) and (12) a necessary condition for a first-
best allocation16, where A.= 0 induces the greatest effort is 
- * el 
* - * - * de(e ) J * ' * 
-!:l"(JZX(e ,e(e ))G1(e(e )) + KXe(e ,e)!:l" (7rX(e ,e))dG(e) 
• - * * 
e(e ) > Q'(e ) 
& * 1 * U +Q(e ) Jn• (7rX(e , e))dG(e) 
- * e(e ) 
(29) 
4.8 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we examined the use of dichotomous incentive contracts when agents are 
risk averse and have limited liability. The dichotomous contracts which were the subject 
of this chapter conditioned the ex post allocation of the agent on the realisation of an ex 
ante uncertain outcome via a linear sharing rule, as well as on whether or not the outcome 
was no less than some pre-specified performance target. 
16 It ts worth stressmg that hmtted hability does not necessanly preclude a first-best allocatiOn when the 
agent sees t after supplymg effort (29) However, hmtted agent habthty does preclude the first-best when 
the agent sees t prior to supplymg effort (Sappmgton (1983a)) 
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Typically, limited habihty and risk aversion are considered substitutes in the analysis of 
incentive schemes, since both assumptions impede the use of franchise contracts, either 
by rendering them unenforceable through liability limitations, or suboptimal due to the 
allocation of risk which results from their use. 
However, in this chapter we have exposed the importance of the precise degree of risk 
aversiOn when technology considerations and too low a performance target preclude the 
use of a dichotomous incentive contract for nsk neutral agents, in which the (linear) 
profit sharing ratio is contingent on the outcome. It was found that there exists a critical 
proportiOnal reduction in share ratio for agents with (constant relative) risk aversion in 
some range, for which less severe threats of share ratio reduction will be 
counterproductive to the supply of effort by the agent. We also derived a necessary 
condition for the attainment of the first best allocation (first best effort and the agent 
achieves his reservation utility in expectation) for a risk averse agent with relative risk 
aversion greater than one. 
In the next chapter we extend the basic model of contingent share ratiO contracts to 
permit a capital contribution by the agent. By requinng the agent to commit some of his 
own capital as a substitute in part for the capital committed by the principal to the 
venture, we formalise the notion that agent commitment m the sense of capital 
contribution permits less severe threats of punishment in order to induce the agent to 
greater effort levels. As such, the relationship we will examine is one of capital 
partnership, but is still considered an agency since effort is unilaterally supplied by the 
agent. In formalising this argument, we derive sufficient conditions for a Pareto 
improvement. We then briefly illustrate how an imperfect monitoring technology 
augments the use of dichotomous incentive schemes 
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Appendix I 
PropositiOn I: X(O) < x(I) 
Proof. The followmg observations are relevant for eo> e, 17: 
- -
&(e0 ) < &(e1) (AI) 
Xe(e0 ,&)<Xe(ep&) Vr. (A2) 
' ' Q" (rl'(e0 ,s)) !> Q" (:zX(e1,s)) Vr. (A4) 
(AI) follows from (3), (A2) from diminishing returns to effort, (A3) from risk aversion 
and X,> 0, and (A4) from risk aversion together with Xe > 0. 
From (27) and (28), consider 
=----'-----'-~=--------'----'--
&(e) 
0 Jx e (e0 ,s)dG(s) 
& 
0 
&(e) 
0 J Xe(e0 ,s)Q" (rl'(e0 ,s))dG(s) 
& 
0 
(by (2) and (A3)) 
17 If maximal effort at A = 0 IS less than for A = I, then there IS no rationale for the use of pumshment 
threats to ehc1t greater effort e0 2: e1 IS consistent with the propositiOn 
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>=-------------~--~--
&(e) 
I ' J Xe(ep&)Q" (JrX(ep&))dG(&) 
& 
0 
-
GJ (~(el ))Q; (JrX c) dd:J) 
~=-------------~--~--
&(e) 
I ' J Xe(ep&)Q" (JrX(ep&))dG(&) 
& 
0 
(by (AI), (A2) and A(4)) 
(by Assumption 1) 
Then from the definitions of x(O) and x(l) (see (27) and (28)), x(O) < X(l ). 
Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 11 
MLRP in the states space model 
Suppose a production technology X( e,E) for effort e and exogenous uncertainty E, where E 
e [Eo, &I] is described by a distnbutwn function G(&). An induced distribution approach 
synthesises the production function and exogenous uncertamty to arrive at a model 
specifying a distribution G(X I e) of outcomes Xe [Xo, Xt]. 
For an induced distribution model, MLRP is a g,(X I e)> 0, or equivalently 
ax g(XIe) 
VXe[Xo, Xt] (AS) 
where g(X I e)ts the probability density function for distnbutton G(X I e). 
This means that for any outcome X, an increase in effort leads to relatively greater 
probability weight on all higher profit levels (Milgrom (1981)). 
Now consider the states space model. 
Prob (Xe[Y, Y+dY]Ie) = Prob. (X> Yle)- Pro b. (X> Y+dYie) 
lil lil 
=_ J G1(e)de-_ JG1(e)de 
e(Y,e) li(Y+dY,e) 
- -
=G1 (e(Y,e))e (Y,e)dY 1 
where the subscript denotes differentiation w.r.t. the first argument. 
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Therefore, from (AS) and Prob. (Xe[Y,Y+dY][e) = g(Y I e) dY (by defirution), the 
equivalent states space MLRP assumption is 
a a - -
--inG1(&(X,e))t: (X,e)>O aX ae I V'Xe[Xo, XI] (A6) 
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CHAPTERS 
DICHOTOMOUS INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION AND 
ADDITIONAL SIGNALS 
5.1 Introduction 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, dichotomous incentive schemes will only 
achieve a first-best allocation, wherem the agent rece1ves his reservation utility in 
expectatiOn whilst supplying the first-best effort, when the proportional rate of change of 
expected utility of money w r.t. effort is no less than the proportional rate of change of 
disutility of effort w r.t. effort evaluated at the first-best effort level (Chapter 4, (12)). 
In this chapter we explore ways in which the incentive pressure created by dichotomous 
incentive schemes can be supplemented either through capital contnbution by the agent, 
or through conditioning agent pay on an additional imperfect, but informative, signal 
5.2 Agent capital contribution 
We have so far considered a principal-agent relationship in which the agent supplies 
unobservable effort in return for a share of the outcome, where for all possible 
realisations of an exogenous uncertainty variable e, the outcome is non-negative. The 
Jiab1hty of the agent was necessarily therefore hm1ted to zero 
Without a liability constraint for a nsk neutral agent, the principal would make the agent 
sole residual claimant and extract the entire surplus with a fixed rent contract (see 
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2.2 1.1). However, given that such a contract would lead to negative payoffs in low 
productivity states, scope was created to study alternative contract forms designed to 
mduce the supply of the first-best effort, when instead the pay of the agent was 
constrained to be non-negative. The alternative contract form studied was a linear share 
contract in which the share ratio could increase discontinuously upon the attainment of a 
target outcome specified ex ante. Such dtchotomous contracts which provide a risk 
neutral agent with a jump in payoff at some pre-specified outcome may, given a suitable 
technology and performance target (see 4.5 of previous chapter), increase the effort 
supplied by the agent in companson to contracts m which the (linear) share ratio of the 
agent is constant for all possible outcomes 
In order to abstract from risk sharmg considerations and to examine the marmer in which 
capital contnbution or the mcorporation of addttional signals may provide increased 
incentive pressure, throughout thts chapter we assume that a suitable technology and 
performance target exist for which the threat of a lower share ratio for outcomes less than 
the performance target elicits greater effort from a risk neutral agent than would 
otherwise be supplied 
The basic rationale for exploring capital contribution by the agent is as follows. If the 
money liabthty of the agent IS limited to the capttal contributed by the agent gross of 
opportunity costs, then the underlymg1 share ratio of the agent may be permitted to 
increase, whzlst mcreasmg A., the proportional reduction in share ratio, so as to maintain 
the utility of the agent (net of effort costs) in expectation in respect of a contribution. Thts 
may create extra incentive pressure if the sensitivity of the maximal effort level of the 
agent for compensating changes (which preserve total utility) in threat level and capital 
contribution are different. A second possible source of (Pareto) improvement may also be 
generated due to the difference in the opportunity costs of capttal through substituting the 
1 By underlymg we mean the share rat1o wh1ch obtams upon achievement of the performance target 
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agent's capital with that of the principal at the margzn2• We therefore wish to explore 
changes in maximal effort when both the underlying share ratio and the threat of a 
possible reduction are adjusted to reflect a cap1tal contnbution by the agent, in order to 
mcrease the utility of the principal wh1lst holding the agent at his reservation amount3• 
It is also true of agency relatiOnShipS common to real world economics, that capital 
partnership contracts often admit the supply of effort by only a subset of participants, 
with so-called sleeping partners supplying only capital and not effort. It is precisely the 
moral hazard which arises from unobservable effort in capital partnerships with at least 
one sleeping partner that we w1sh to capture m this chapter. 
In the next section we present the model, which is an extension of the model of Chapter 
4, after which we derive sufficient conditions for a capital contribution by the agent to 
generate a Pareto Improvement. 
2 If the prmc1pal faces an mcreasing margmal opportumty cost of capital, then for large scale proJects 1t IS 
feasible that the margmal opportumty cost of an mcrementally small amount of extra capital, may at some 
level of ex1stmg contnbutwn by the prmc1pal, be less for the agent than for the prmc1pal 
3 The only related moral hazard literature with hm1ted agent hab1hty of which we are aware IS Brander and 
Spencer (1989), who consider the ch01ce of finn debt level by an owner-manager who can substitute his 
own capital Lower eqmty levels decrease debt secunty and raise the required premmm for a given level of 
borrowmg Brander and Spencer further show that the subslltutwn of borrowed funds for eqmty mvestment 
mduces less effort and output from the firm. This IS because the probability of firm bankruptcy mcreases 
with the level of borrowmg (other thmgs equal) thereby reducmg the range of states of nature m which the 
owner receives a return from h1s effort 
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5.2.1 The Model 
Let total fixed investment 14 be the sum of capital E contnbuted by the agent, and capital 
I - E contributed by the principal. The return (net of initial investment) that the agent and 
the principal can earn if they invest their wealth in the next best opportunity available to 
them is V"(E)5 and VP(I - E). Revenue net of all costs except capital costs is X( e, I, E), 
where e is agent effort and E is the realised state of nature. 
The expected utilities of the agent and pnncipal, u• and UP, are given by 
s(e) el 
U"= f AJT(E)X(e,e)dG(e)+ fJT(E)X(e,e)dG(e)-Q(e)-E-V"(E) (1) 
eo s(e) 
s(e) el 
UP= J (1-AJT(E))X(e,e)dG(e)+ J(I-JT(E))X(e,e)dG(e)-(1 -E)-V"(! -E) 
eo s(e) 
(2) 
where Xc = X(e,e(e)), and both the principal and agent are risk neutral. Note that we 
have suppressed the dependence of e(e,I) and X(e, I, E) on I, since we assume that total 
investment is fixed. Also, the underlying share ratio of the agent 1t(E), being the share 
ratio which obtains if the outcome X(e, E) is no less than the performance target, 
explicitly depends on the capital contnbuted by the agent 
4 We assume mvestment IS fixed m order to abstract from scale effects 
s For the agent this IS better thought of as a borrowmg cost 
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5.2.2 Pareto improvements 
We are now ready to derive sufficient conditmns for a Pareto improvement through 
capital contribution by the agent The approach taken in this section is to derive a 
relatiOnship between compensatmg changes in E and 'A which maintain the total expected 
utility of the agent at the reservation amount, as simplified by the first order condition for 
which agent effort is maximal. The corresponding change in the expected utility of the 
principal can then be derived. Pareto improvements are admissible when this change is 
positive. 
The first-order condition of the agent IS obtained by differentiating (I) w.r.t e to give 
au· 
--= 
oe 
=0 (3) 
From (3), the first-order condition may be solved to give the maximal effort as a function 
oft. and E (for fixed I and Xc), 1 e e = e('A,E). 
We can therefore express the expected utlhty of the agent as a function of 'A, E, and e('A, 
E), whereby the explicit dependence of utility on 'A and E is given by (I), and the implicit 
dependence of utility on 'A and E through maximal effort e('A, E) is given by (I) and the 
first-order condition (3) (as used to express the dependence of maximal effort on A and 
E), 1 e. 
u• = u• ('A, E, e('A, E)) (4) 
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If we now consider compensatmg changes in /.. and E such that introduction of capital by 
the agent leaves the expected utility of the agent unchanged, then the relationship 
between d/.. and dE is given by differentiatmg (4) totally to yield 
dU" = au" dA.+ au" dE 
BA. <,E BE '·' 
(5) 
where we have used the first-order condition (3) to set the derivative of u• w r.t. effort 
equal to zero. Setting dU8 equal to zero we derive 
O= au" dA.+ au" dE 
BA. •. c BE '·' 
(6) 
Now consider the utility of the principal. For maximal agent effort e = e(/.., E), from (2), 
the utility ofthe principal may be expressed as 
UP= UP (/.., E, e(/.., E)) (7) 
The change in principal utility for compensating changes m /.. and E is obtained by total 
differentiation of (7) to yield6 
dUP =[aupl e, +awl ]dA.+[aupl eE + aup ]dE (8) 
ae l,E aA. <.E ae l,E BE '·' 
Substituting (6) into (8) for dE> 0 gives 
6 Note here that the denvat1ve of the pnnc1pal's expected ut1hty w r t effort IS positive, whereas the 
denvat1ve of the agent's expected ut1hty w r t effort IS zero evaluated at the same (maximal) effort level 
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s~up [au· ~u· ] ~u· JUP = -- eE- e, + 
ee l,E CA <,E 8E d eA <,E 8E '·' 8E '·' eA •. E 
(9) 
8U" &(e) 
where we have used the fact that-- = J7r(E)X(e,&)dG(&) > 0 from (1) in order to 
eA ,c eo 
sign dUP. Now, from (1) and (2), 
(10) =---
CA <,E CA <,E 
and for fixed total mvestment I, 
cUP eU" ' 
+- =VP(l-E)-V"(E) 
8E '·' 8E _. 
(11) 
Substituting (10) and (11) into (9) for dE> 0 gives 
. cUP • eU" Hence, given that -- ~ 0 for e ~ e and -- > 0, sufficient conditions for a 
ee l,£ CA <,E 
Pareto improvement by substitution of agent for pnncipal funds are 
Sufficient Condition I: VP (l-E)>V" (E) (13) 
Sufficient Condition 2: (14) 8U" 8U" -- e >-- e CA E- 8E l 
e,E e,A. 
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It is also possible to alternatively express condition (14). Define the following 
equivalence 
BU" 
- =f'(..i,E,e(..i,E))=O 
Be e=e(..i,E) 
(15) 
where r(..i, E, e(..i, E)) is equivalent to (3) when e = e(A.,E). 
Differentiating (15) totally gives Brl d..i + Brl dE+ Brl de(..i, E)= 0, i.e. 
B..i ,,E BE ,,A Be A,E 
Combining (6) and (16) gives for dA. ot 0 (or dE ot 0) 
£!j [Bu" BU" J [BU" Brl BU" £!j J &I A,E ---;u- •.E e E - BE ,,A eA = - B..i ,,E BE ,,A BE •.A ail ,,E (17) 
Now substitutmg (17) into (12) and noting that Brl < 0 (a concavity assumptwn 
Be A E 
required to ensure that the maximal effort of the agent is a unique interior maximum), 
Sufficient Condition 2 may equivalently be wntten 
7 Note that we cannot trivially set the quotients of dA. and dE equal to zero m (16), since dA. and dE are 
related to each other by ( 6) 
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Sufficient Condition 2: aua arl aua arl 
aA. '·" aE •.• <: aE •.• aA. ,,E 
(18) 
In order to interpret the second sufficient conditiOn, we must sign the comparative static 
effects 
5.2.3 Comparative static effects 
Using (1), (3) and (15), we may state explicitly the following comparative static effects: 
aua = 7r'(E)[&T AX(e, &)dG(&) + &fx(e, .s)dG(.s)]-1- va' (E) 
aE ., -
'·• 0 &(e) 
(19) 
a11 [ - de( e) .s(e) ] s 
- =7r(E) G,(&(e))Xc--+ JXe(e,&)dG(&) =e. <0 
8A ,E de ~ 
. ~0 
(20) 
where the s1gn of (20) follows from assuming that the threat of a reduction in share ratio 
contingent on an outcome less than the performance target increases the effort of a risk 
neutral agent (see Chapter 4, (18) and (19)). Also from (3) and (15) 
arl = 7r'(E) Q'(e) 
8E •. -t 7r( E) 
(21) 
We assume henceforth that 
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u;l < o and :r'(E) > o 
d 
(22) 
The reason for doing so is as follows. Since u; I > 0 (from (1 )), in order for there to 
<,£ 
exist a utility conserving trade-off (see (6)) between capital contribution (dE> 0) by the 
agent and lighter punishment threats (dA. > 0), we require u;L .• < 0. This trade-off is 
motivated by the idea that a capital contributiOn by the agent induces greater alignment of 
the goals of the agent and pnncipal, in the sense that the relationship takes on the 
substance of a partnership, in which the principal IS a sleeping partner who supplies no 
effort, whilst retainmg the form of a principal-agent relationship in which the principal 
retains all bargaining power 
Also, recognising the potential loss of capital by the agent, the principal awards the agent 
an underlying share which is increasing in the capital contributed by the agent, i e. 
:r'(E) > 0 8• 
Summarising the comparative static effects, 
BU" BU" BrJ BrJ >0,-- <0,- >O,and- <0 
B2 ,,£ BE '·" BE '·" B2 ,,£ 
(23) 
We can now interpret (14) (or equivalently (18)). 
8 It IS also worth noting that (22) permits a non-tnv~al fulfillment of the second sufficient condition {18), m 
that 1f capital contnbutwn and reduced pumshment threats both mcrease ut1hty, with 1r'(E) > 0, then the 
left hand side of(l8) would be posiilve whilst the nght hand s1de of(I8) would be negallve 
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5.2.4 Interpretation 
From (6), au· = au· d:tl 
BE '·' 8:1. ,,E dE !l 
(24) 
where d:il is the tangent of the iso-utihty line of the agent in (E, A.) space for 
dE !l 
compensating changes in A. and E9• 
Substituting (24) mto (14) gives 
(25) 
BU" From (23), smce -- > 0 and e, < 0, (25) becomes 
8;{ ,,E 
(26) 
However, the iso-maximal effort lines for the agent are defined by e(A., E) = c, where c is 
some constant effort. Therefore, since e, d:i + e E dE = 0 for constant maximal effort, 
(27) 
Combining (26) and (27), the second sufficient condition reduces to 
9 Th1s is the margmal rate of substitutiOn between ). and E, 1 e -U' EIU\ 
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d).l < d).l 
dE iJ - dE •<<.E)=c 
(28) 
Hence, the sufficient conditions for a Pareto improvement are 
VP {1-E)>Va (E) and d).l ::; d).l 
dE iJ dE e(<.E)=c 
(29) 
The first sufficient condition in (29) states that an improvement from capital cost savings 
is possible if the marginal opportunity cost of capital for the agent is less than the 
marginal opportunity cost of capital for the principal at the investment levels for each, 
being E and I- E respectively. 
The second sufficient condition in (29) is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 5.1 
u• 
/..o 
0 Eo E 
Figure 5.1 
5.12 
CHAPTERS DICHOTOMOUS CONTRACTS AND CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION 
In Figure 5.1, an initial equilibrium is assumed to ex1st, without the introduction of 
capital by the agent, with a dichotomous contract which specifies the max1mum threat of 
A.= 0 at (0,0), and an agent who supplies effort c,. Oa represents the gradient of the iso-
maximal effort line for effort c1 at (0,0), whilst Ob represents the gradient of the iso-
utility line of the agent at (0,0). The iso-utllity !me of the agent ou• is assumed convex10• 
Two concave !So-maximal effort lines are shown for efforts c, and c2, where c2 > c,. 
Agent utility is increasing to the northwest, whilst the ut1lity of the principal is increasing 
to the southeast 
An improvement is possible through the substitutiOn of capital Eo by the agent and the 
use of a reduced threat of share ratio reduction, A.o Movmg along the !SO-utility line of 
the agent, this involves a change in contract parameters from (0,0) to (Eo,Ao), with the 
agent instead supplying effort c2. Since iso-effort line c2 lies to the south-east of iso-effort 
line c~, the utility of the principal is increased whilst maintaining the utility of the agent. 
Th1s improvement is only possible if the ovoid area contained within ou• and OC 1 is 
non-empty. Non-emptmess of this region obtains 1fthe gradient of line Oa is greater than 
line Ob, which is the second sufficient condition m (29). 
Requiring a contribution of capital by the agent as a substitute for the capital invested by 
the principal, with an associated mcrease in the expected share of ex post outcome, is one 
way of increasing the mcentive of the agent to prov1de effort, whilst possibly (see (29) for 
sufficient conditions) generating a Pareto improvement 
In the next section, we consider the way in which information about the effort supplied 
by the agent, in addition to the inference available from the realised outcome, can be used 
by the principal in obtaining (or movmg closer to the attainment of) the first-best 
allocation. 
10 A convexity expression for agent ullhty 1s denved m Append1x I 
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5.3 Additional signals 
We have assumed so far that the only mference available to the principal concemmg the 
effort of the agent is the publicly observable outcome X(e,E). Consequently, the incentive 
contract could only be conditioned on the realised outcome observed ex post. However, 
in reality it is possible that there may exist other signals about agent effort that facilitate 
improvements to the incentive contract. An example of this is direct monitonng or 
supervision, in which a noisy signal about agent effort may be available. Holmstrom 
(1979) states that when an informative s1gnal!s costlessly obtained and administered into 
the contract, that 1t has positive value no matter how nmsy it is, and that a contract which 
uses the signal will strictly Pareto dommate a contract in which the signal1s not used. 
We will illustrate the use of additional signals for dichotomous contracts in which the 
agent is again precluded from receiving negative pay, by reference to lump-sum bonus 
contracts instead of contmgent share ratio contracts, since the latter needlessly obfuscate 
the conclusiOn reached in this sectwn 
Let there exist a publicly observable s1gnal y(e,Jl) which is mcreasing m the effort 
supplied by the agent and the ex post reahsatwn of an ex ante uncertain random variable 
ll· For simplicity assume that E and Jl are independent, and that Jl may be described by a 
distribution function 'P(Jl) with support [Jlo,Jlt] Consider an incentive contract <p(X,y) 
where 
-{0 q:>(X,y)-
B(y(e,p)) 
if 
if 
X<X 
c 
X2!X 
c 
(30) 
Incentive contract <p(X,y) IS a s1mple bonus contract m which the agent receives a lump-
sum payment B(y( e,Jl)) contingent upon a realised outcome not less than Xc The 
expected utility of the nsk neutral agent is then u• where 
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.UI cl 
U" = I Irp(X, y)dG(c)a'l'(p)- Q(e) 
.Uo 8 0 
Substituting (30) mto (31) with X c = X(e, &(e)) we get 
.u, 
U" = (1- G(c(e))) I B(y(e, .u))a'l'(.u)- Q(e) 
.uo 
(31) 
(32) 
Differentiating (32) w.r.t. e to obtain the first-order condition, the necessary condition for 
the mcentive scheme given by (30) to elicit the first-best allocation (e*,u) for an agent 
with reservation ut1hty U is 
.u, I B'(y(e, p))y, (e, p)a'l'(p) 
.uo 
• evaluated at e = e . 
.u, I B(y(e, .u))a'l'(.u) 
.uo 
G, (c(e)) de( e) 
--=-=d=e- > Q'(e) 
1-G(c(e)) U +Q(e) 
(33) 
From (33) we see that if the mcentlve contract can be conditioned on the ex post 
observation of signal y, then the incentives to supply effort can be increased The first 
term denotes the incentive pressure created by cond1tionmg the lump-sum bonus on the 
ex post observatiOn of signal y If B'(y) > 0, and Ye(e,f.l) > 0 then the first term is positive. 
Thus when the lump-sum bonus is increasing in a s1gnal y which 1tself is increasing in 
agent effort, extra mcentive pressure IS created in addition to the incentive to achieve the 
target outcome, as given by the second term on the left hand s1de of (33). Incentive 
pressure therefore derives from two effects, the incentive to mcrease the lump-sum 
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transfer to the agent through extra effort, and the mcentive to supply sufficient effort in 
order to achieve the target and to therefore obtam the Jump-sum bonus. 
An example of the significance of extra mformation concemmg unobservable agent effort 
can be seen from the following propositiOn 
Proposition I· If G 11(e) 2: 0 and there exists some X~ for which (33) is binding with B'(y) 
= 0, then there exists some x~- <X~ for whiCh (33) IS binding with B'(y) > 0 
Proof. See Appendix 11 
The importance of Proposition 1 is seen as follows. Typically (as noted by Park (1995)), 
if the first-best allocation IS achievable by the use of a Jump-sum bonus contract, then 
there will exist a range of performance targets for which this remains true. As shown in 
the proof of Proposition I, 1f the density function (GI(E)) is non-decreasing in E, then the 
incentive pressure (being the proportional rate of change of expected money utility w.r.t. 
effort) will be increasing in the target outcome Subsequently, if the first-best allocation 
IS not achievable for the greatest possible target outcome (X(e·,e,)), then no incentive 
scheme can elicit the first-best allocatiOn, given that (pure) lump-sum bonus contracts 
((30)) are the most efficient dichotomous contract form (Park (1995)). 
However, from Proposition I, if there exists an additional signal y from which 
information concerning the agent effort supplied can be inferred, then by conditioning the 
incentive contract on this signal, the necessary condition for the existence of an incentive 
scheme that achieves the first best allocation (33) becomes less restrictive in the sense 
that the lower bound of target outcomes which achieve the first-best is reduced. This 
provides a clear advantage to the use of dichotomous contracts that use an informative 
signal over those that disregard such signals when available, when the first-best 
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allocation IS not attainable for the latter contracts m the absence of the use of additional 
signals 
Lastly we note that the use of a lump-sum bonus contract to illustrate the benefit of an 
additional mformative signal about agent effort is Without loss of generality. In fact, for 
any incentive contract, provided the expected pay of the agent is increasing in signal y, 
the agent has an incentive to increase y through greater effort, whenever the resulting 
utility from the share of the margmal product value for the agent exceeds his marginal 
effort cost. This means that a fixed bonus with target outcome decreasing in the 
observation of y may also be used to m crease agent effort, or even a contract with a m1x 
of signal dependent target and signal dependent bonus elements 
We now conclude this chapter by collectmg some final remarks. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to consider two variations to the use of dichotomous 
incentive contracts. In the first we extended the contmgent share ratio model of Chapter 4 
to permit a substitution of capital by the agent, thereby deriving sufficient conditions for 
a Pareto improvement In the second, we illustrated how the admission of additional 
publicly observable signals as contract variables in the simplest of dichotomous contracts, 
the pure lump-sum bonus contract, could expand the available set of contracts which 
achieve a first-best allocation. 
An important aspect of incentive contracts for risk averse agents is the uncertainty faced 
concerning the end of period income. As mentwned in Chapter I, fixed wage contracts, 
which provide no mitigation of moral hazard problems, are in reality the basic contract 
paradigm. In contrast, profit shanng contracts reduce the moral hazard problem, but may 
create enough risk that the income premium reqmred by the agent to ach1eve the 
reservation utility may be sufficiently large as to impede the efficient use of these 
contracts. 
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However, an important advantage of profit sharing contracts over fixed wage contracts is 
not captured in a single-period setting. Notwithstanding the benefit of incentive effects, 
profit sharing contracts induce a greater survtval probability for firms when the principal-
agent relatwnship is repeated. Thts ts because the revenue necessary to break-even in 
each period ts less than that of a corresponding wage firm by the amount of wages paid to 
agents. Therefore, the pay premium reqmred by risk averse agents for beanng risk IS less 
tf the single-period relatiOnship IS repeated due to a greater expected time over which pay 
is received"· 
Some natural questions which arise from thts tdea are, for example, how many 
repetitions, or what inter-period eammgs retention policy, are required before the income 
risk is reduced sufficiently that the agent is awarded no more than his reservation 
amount? An alternative way to address these questions IS to mstead derive a measure of 
threshold risk averswn, such that With the premium savings available from repeating the 
profit sharing relationship in comparison to repetitiOn of a single-penod wage agreement, 
a risk averse agent is just indtfferent between the two contract types. 
In Appendix Ill a multi-period model is developed which captures this issue, and a 
methodology is established to answer the above questions 
In the next chapter, we synthesise much of the discussion of preceding chapters by 
considering a problem whiCh combmes both adverse selection and moral hazard due to 
the unobservability of effort. This chapter Will therefore not only provide an 
understanding of problems in which the dtstnbutwn of information disadvantages the 
principal to an even greater extent in companson to pure moral hazard or pure adverse 
selection, but also permtts a drawmg of the thesis towards a natural pinnacle prior to 
concludmg in Chapter 7. 
11 This also assumes that the reservatiOn utility IS not available to an agent for a duratiOn of time which IS 
the difference between the expected time to bankruptcy of the wage and profit sharmg firms 
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Appendix I 
The isoutility line of the agent is given by 
Using the operator 
d?..l (8u"j8EL 
dE u =-(8u"/8?..L 
d d?..81 81 
dE = dE 8?.. E + 8E .! 
(AI} 
(A2) 
differentiate (AI) totally w.r.t. e, using the FOC (3), the independence of the order of 
dtfferentiatwn w.r.t E and A. (given(!)) of the cross (second order) partial denvative of 
u• w r.t E and A., and the fact that U\, equals zero (from (I}}, to give 
d';. s 8U" 8'u" 8U" 8'U" 
=-----+2----
dE' u 8?.. 8E 2 8E 8?..8E 
(A3) 
where it is understood that partial dtfferenttation w r t. E (A.) holds constant A. (E). From 
(I) 
8'U" [s(e) 81 l " 
, = :r'(E) J ?..X(e,8)dG(8) + fxce,8)dG(8) -V" (E) 
8E 8 -
'·' 0 8(e) 
(A4) 
-
8 2U" 8 (e) 
--= f:r'(E)X(e,8)dG(8) > 0 
8?..8E 8 
0 
(AS) 
8U" 8U" Therefore, since-- > 0 and-- < 0 (by assumption), the convexity of the 
8?.. ,,E oE '·' 
agent's isoutility line is ambiguous. 
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Appendix 11 
Proposition I: IfG11(E) ~ 0 and there exists some X~ for which (33) is binding with B'(y) 
= 0, then there exists some x~-<Xf for which (33) is binding with B'(y) > 0. 
Proof If we can show that the proportiOnal rate of change of expected money utility 
w.r.t. effort (the left hand s1de of (33) with B'(y) = 0) IS increasing in target outcome, then 
we will have proved the propositiOn From the definitiOn ofXc, 
* - * Xf = X(e ,t:(e )) (A6) 
Keeping e' constant (th1s is defined by Chapter 4, (5)) and d1fferentiatmg (A6) totally 
gives 
a a (A7) --=----
axf X 5 at:(e) 
*-* *-* whereeand&areat (e ,&(e )).Also, at (e ,t:(e )),from(Chapter4,(3)) 
- * at:(e ) Xe 
ae X 5 
(AS) 
Using (A7) to differentiate (AS) w.rt. X~ g1ves 
- * a ot:(e ) 
oXL ae c 
a Xe 
------= 
X 5 ot:(e) X 5 
X X -X X I 5 et: e && < 0 2 -X 5 X 5 
(A9) 
From (33) with B'(y) = 0, the proportional rate of change of expected money utility w.r.t 
effort at e' is 
5 20 
CHAPTERS DICHOTOMOUS CONTRACTS AND CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION 
• 1-G(c(e )) 
Differentiating (AIO) w.r.t. X~ gives 
a 
ax~ • 
a ( ao) ao a (1-G(·))- G (-)- +G (-)---(1-GO) ax~ I ae I ae ax~ 1-G(c(e )) 
(AlO) 
(All) 
- • s 
where O means c(e ) and the second= follows from (A7) and Xe> 0. From (A7), (A9) 
and Xe > 0, the first term in the braces m (All) is non-pos1tive, and the second term in 
- . 
the braces is non-positive for Gll(E) ~ 0 smce ac(e ) < 0 Also, the final term in (All) is 
ae 
- . 
positive since ac(e ) < Oand the density G,() IS stnctly positive. Therefore, for Gll(E) ~ 
ae 
a 
0, L 
axe 
Q.E.D. 
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Appendix Ill 
Income risk and the acceptability of profit 
sharing contracts by risk averse agents 
in a multi-period relationship 
Consider a firm, in which there are N zdenflcal agents, each of which are compensated 
equally for a single period contract of duration t. If each agent receives a wage rate w, 
then the uncertain profit of the firm at time t is X, where 
X=Y-Nwt (Al2) 
Y is the uncertain revenue, net of all costs excluding the fixed wage bill, generated in 
time t. All profit for the period is distnbuted at the period end. We assume that the 
stochastic varmble Y is a normal dzstnbutwn such that 
Y = vt + crt112 & (A13) 
v is the revenue dnft rate, cr2 is the revenue variance rate, and & is a normal distribution 
with mean zero and unit variance (i.e. & - ND(O, I)) The expected profit for the period 
EX is then given by 
EX= (v-Nw)t (Al4) 
wherev >Nw. 
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For the single and multi-period relatwnsh1p, the principal acts as guarantor, thereby 
securing a trade credit facility. The liability of each agent is limited to zero, whilst the 
principal bears all losses. 
Multi-period Model 
Consider a finite time horizon T divided into n equal intervals of duration t, where T is 
the contract period for each agent The start time of the m th period is denoted tm-h where 
m= I, 2, ... , n. Profit m each period (wh1ch is after wages) is realised at the period end, at 
wh1ch time the firm retains a proportion TJ E [0, I] of 1ts cumulative earnings to date and 
carries the retained earnings mto the next penod 
Provided that the cumulative earnings to date (denoted Z) are greater than zero, where 
agents receive pay via profit shanng, the firm pays out (I- TJ)7t of its cumulative earnmgs 
to date to the agents, and (I - TJ)(I - n) of its cumulative earnings to date to the principal 
at the end of each period, for penod ends other than the contract expiry date At the 
contract expuy date, if the cumulative eammgs to date are greater than zero, then the 
cumulative earnings are entirely d1stnbuted to the principal and agents m accordance 
with the sharmg ratio 
If the cumulative earnings to date at a penod end other than the contract expiry date are 
less than zero but not less than a bankruptcy limit -C, then no profit share is paid to either 
the principal or the agents, and for agents who are paid via fixed wages, each agent 
receives the fixed wage, the firm carrymg forward the trading deficit into the next period. 
Conditional on surv1val to the contract expiry date, all trading deficits are made good at 
that time. If however the cumulative earnings are less than or equal to -C at any period 
end, the firm is bankrupt and all losses are made good at that time. 
The cumulative earnmgs Zm-i at the end of the m-1 th period, are given by 
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Zm = Ym- Nwt + T]Zm-1 
= ~~ + crt112 8 m+ T]Zm-1 (A15) 
where Y m is the revenue (net of all costs except wages) generated in the m th period, em 
is a normal distribution with mean zero and umt vanance, Zo = 0 and ~ = v- Nw. 
For 11 > 0, (A15) establishes a recursive expressiOn for the survival probability of the firm 
past time tm, P ~(Zm <: -C I Z1<m <: -C), where Zm is the cumulative earnings up to and 
including time tm,m <: 1, Z1<m denotes Zo, z~. .. , Zm-J. and P~(Zm <: -C I Z1<m <:-C) is equal 
to 
This relationship is denved by observmg that the probability that Zme(X ,X +dXm) 
m m 
conditionaluponZ,e(X, X +dX )fort=O, 1 ,2, .. ,m-1 (denotedi<m)isgivenby 
I I I 
dX 
m 
(A17) 
and then integrating (A 17) over the intervals of X , where i = 1, 2, , m-1 and X <: -C 
I I 
Conditional Expected Utility 
We assume that the expected utility from a multi-period contract is the sum of the 
discounted conditiOnal expected utility in each future period, where the condition is 
survival of the firm into each future penod in which the contracting parties expect to 
receive utility from the contract, and the discount factor translates future utility to its 
present value 
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Thus, if l;(<l>(Zm)) is the utility of wealth <l>(Zm) receivable at ttme tm by a contracting 
party, and o(tm) is the discount factor assigned to future utility receivable at time tm, then 
the total expected utility of an n-period contract IS 
n L: E[l;(<l>(Zm)) I Z,<m ~ -C]o(tm) 
m=l 
where usmg (A16), E[l;(<l>(Zm)) I Z,<m ~ -C]Is 
"' "' (o)2pll)-m I I 
z =-ooz =-C 
m m -1 
"' I m I ~(c!J(Z ))exp-- r (Z - fJt- qZ /dZidZ2 
z = -C m 2u2t J = I J J -
I 
Methodology 
(A18) 
dZ 
m 
(A19) 
Denote a single period contract which awards a fixed wage wand no profit share (w, 0)', 
and a correspondmg pure profit sharmg contract with no fixed wage element (0, n)' The 
agents are assumed risk averse, whilst the principal is risk neutral. We then fix w and 1t 
such that the expected pay for each contract party from either (w, 0)' or (0, n)' is equal 
This means that the agent prefers (w, 0)', whilst the principal is indifferent between (w, 
0)' and (0, n)', since in contrast to the (risk neutral) principal, each (risk averse) agent 
requires a pay premium for bearing nsk m the profit sharing contract over the pay of the 
fixed wage contract, in order to be indifferent between the two contract types. 
The essential feature that we wish to capture IS that over a multi-penod horizon, the 
enhanced survival probability of a profit sharmg firm over that of a wage firm implies 
that a multi-period contract whtch is the repetitiOn of the single penod contract in which 
the principal is indifferent between pure wage and pure profit sharing, creates a 
preference by the principal for profit sharing Therefore, since the principal expects to 
receive utility that ts increasmg in his share of profits, this sharing ratio may be reduced 
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for the multl-penod contract m order to mamtam his mdlfference between a pure wage 
and a pure profit sharing agreement 
Additionally, the enhanced surv1val chances of the profit sharing firm over a multi-period 
horizon may be sufficient for agents to come to prefer a multi-period pure profit sharing 
contract which 1s the repetltton of the smgle penod pure sharing agreement, over that of 
the corresponding pure wage agreement. If the expected benefit from enhancement in 
surv1val probability alone 1s not suffic1ent to persuade agents to accept a pure multi-
period sharing contract which IS a repetltton of the smgle period contract, then provided 
that the expected utility of agents is increasmg m the1r shanng ratio, the sharing ratio of 
the agents can be mcreased by reducmg that of the principal up to a limit where the 
principal is just indifferent between the two (multl-penod) contract types 
However, the degree of nsk averswn of the agents 1s of critical importance. Even w1th an 
incremental transfer of sharing ratio from the prmc1pal to the agents, it may be the case 
that agents are too risk averse to come to prefer shanng contracts It is th1s threshold level 
of risk aversion that we wish to derive. 
Critical risk aversion 
Let yt(·) denote the greater (lesser) of Y and zero. By performing a Taylor expansion of 
uncertain pay about its mean value, the expected ut1lit1es of contracts (w, O)' and (0, 1t)5 
for each agent and the principal are 
Agents: (w, 0)': 
(0, 1t)' : 
Q"(wt) 
n•(EW(O)) + (112) n•"(EW(O))E(W(O)- EW(O)i 
where W(O) = (1t I N)Y', EW(O) = (1t I N)EY+ and 
Principal: (w, 0)': 
(0, 1t)' : 
Pt 
vt- (1t I N)EY+ 
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The value of the profit sharing ratio if which establishes mdifference between (w, 0)' and 
(0, re)' for the principal is derived by settmg ~t equal to vt- (re I N)EY'", i e. 
_ Nwt 
tr=--
EY+ 
(A20) 
Suppose now that the relationship is repeated n times. The principal will now prefer (0, 
if )m to (w, O)m (where m denotes multiple repetitions of the single period contract). To 
restore the indifference of the prmcipal between (0, if )m and (w, O)m, if (the total share 
* * ratio of the agents) is increased to if , where if is derived from equating the expected 
* utilities of the principal between (0, if )"'and (w, 0)"', i e 
n + 
= L: E[(l - L'.(m) TJ)Zm + lm I Z,<m;;:: -C]op(tm) (A21) 
m=l 
where Zm0 = vt + <rti/2 Cm +Y]Zm-I 0, Zm = ~t + crti/2 Cm+ TJZm-I.Zo0 = 0, lm0= (Zm0 + er-
C(Zm 0 + C)'/ (Zm 0 + C), L'.(m) = I for m * n, L'.(n) = 0, and the pnncipal discounts future 
utility at time tm by 8p(tm) By rearrangmg terms, (A21) gives if* explicitly 
Then-period utilities of the agents are: 
(w, O)m: n a L: E[Q (wt)i Z,<m ~ -C]8.(tm) 
m= I 
(0, if*)"'· 
where 8a(tm) IS the discount factor by which each agent discounts utility at time tm 
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Now assuming that each agent has constant absolute risk aversion XA, and denoting the 
expectation of the utility of pay Wm at tm cond1t1onal on event 'tm, E[Q'(W m)l-rm] = n• 
(E[Wmltm])-(112)XAQ''(E[Wml-rm])E[(Wm -E[Wml-rmlil-rm], the threshold risk averswn 
makmg each agent indifferent between (w, O)m and (0, ii *)m is 
(A22) 
where w0 =(if •/ N)(l- t.(m)7J)Z 0 +, and subscnpt c denotes expectatwn conditional on 
m m 
survival, with the superscript 0 denoting zero base wage. 
Remark 
The methodology used to derive (A22) 1s certainly more general than the assumptions 
used to bmld the model. The most obvwus hm1tat10n ofth1s model is the use of absolute 
returns, in which the revenue generated m each period is independent of the cumulative 
earnings at the beginmng of the penod Other simplifications include a constant drift (v) 
and variance ( cr2) rate, a constant earnings retention policy between periods, and the 
assumption of a normal distnbution for period returns. 
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CHAPTER6 
DICHOTOMOUS LIMITED LIABILITY PROFIT SHARING 
CONTRACTS WITH UNOBSERV ABLE EFFORT AND 
HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY 
6.1 Introduction 
The moral hazard problems considered thus far in the thes1s have separately exammed 
the 1mpact of imposmg a floor to the pay of an agent who has either been endowed With 
pnvate informatiOn about the marginal productivity of a project for which he appeals to a 
financier to invest venture cap1tal (Chapter 3), or is able to supply effort which carmot be 
observed or at least venfied by the investor (Chapters 4 and 5). 
The aim of th1s chapter is to synthesise the problems explored m Chapters 3, 4, and 5 m 
order to examme a situation in which a borrower supplies unobservable effort (moral 
hazard) and is pnvately informed as to the margmal productivity of capital prior to the 
formalisatiOn of a contract (adverse select10n) 
In the next section we review some of the key literature in mformat10n economics which 
prov1des insight into issues wh1ch anse in problems that combme both moral hazard and 
adverse selection 1. 
1 Another example of a m1xed problem (taken from P1card (1987)) mcludes an msurer who IS unable to 
1dent1fy low and h1gh nsk mdividuals, and who also cannot observe the level of care taken once msurance 
IS purchased 
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6.2 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
In the literature which exammes mixed moral hazard and adverse selection problems, 
where the principal and agent are risk neutrae, the central message is that the optimal 
solution does not necessarily entail welfare losses when compared to the optimal pure 
adverse selection contract in which effort is observable and agent type is apnon hidden 
(see review article by Guesnene et a! (1988)). 
In focusing concentratiOn on the design of contract mechamsms which implement (or at 
least approximately Implement) the optimal pure adverse selection fee schedule and 
associated effort levels for each agent type when effort IS unobservable, Picard (1987) 
derives an optimal menu3 of reward schedules where agent pay is the sum of a fixed (type 
contingent) fee4, and a transfer which is either lmear or quadratic m the difference 
between the actual outcome and that which is expected given the agent's type5 
To appreciate the intuitiOn of optimal fee schedules which are hnear, consider the 
situation of a market for the services of agents where a prmcipal designs a contract menu 
which exploits the competition among potential agents whilst inducmg them to reveal 
their types6 (McAfee and McMillan (1987)) The margmal disutihty of effort IS lower for 
2 In the followmg diScussiOn, all contractmg parties are nsk neutral unless otherwise stated 
3 Caillaud et a! (1986) (and Melumad and Reichelstem (1986)) consider an alternative ImplementatiOn 
approach to the use of a family of reward schedules They examme the cond1t10ns which permit 
ImplementatiOn VIa a smgle reward schedule A necessary conditiOn that this reward schedule must satisfy 
IS that Its expectatiOn (over exogenous uncertamty) for a given effort must be equal to the function which 
maps type dependent effort to Its associated reward (also by type) m the menu of contracts, such that each 
approach Implements the same outcome However, mformatwnal requirements are usually stronger m 
smgle schedule mechamsms, possibly as a result of which this techmque IS far less prevalent m the 
literature 
4 which can be positive or negative 
' When the mappmg from agent effort to reward for each type IS convex, a hnear fee schedule IS optimal 
For non-convex mappmgs, the quadratic schedule Implements the mcent1ve compatible allocatiOns 
6 See the revelatiOn prmc1ple d1scussed m 2 2 2 I 
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higher agent types and potential agents are asked to report their type, after which the 
wmning agent chooses an effort not observed by the pnncipal. For a contract wluch 1s 
hnear in output to be optimal for the principal, mcentive compatibility reqmres that the 
share component of the agent's fee schedule must increase with agent effiCJency7 This is 
because 1t does not pay a potential agent w1th low abihty to cla~m that he 1s more able 
than he really 1s, given that he would then be penalised by a contract which h1ghly gears 
h1s pay to a level of output which is expected to be lower m companson to h1s more 
efficient counterparts Further, as a result of a more h1ghly geared contract, more effic1ent 
agents are induced to work harder, with the most able agent supplying a socially optimal 
effort and retaming h1s ent1re marginal output8• 
In McAfee and McM!llan (1987), a trade-off exists in that the greater the diversity m the 
efficiency of potentml agents, the less successful IS the contract in mducing effort. In a 
Similar framework9 for which agents are instead nsk averse and precontractuaiiy 
endowed w1th private mformation about expected productiOn costs, McAfee and 
McM1Ilan (1986) consider the trade-offs of an incentive contract awarded to the lowest 
(cost) b1ddmg agent, wh1ch makes rewards dependent both on the b1d and on realised 
costs 10 These authors identify an effect only present m the mixed adverse selection and 
moral hazard b1ddmg model B1ddmg competition amongst agents increases (b1ds 
declme) as their share of cost over/under runs decreases. For example, 1f their share IS 
7 The shanng proviSIOn m a contact both screens the potent1al agents and ehc1ts effort 
8 The fully deduct1ble/franch1se contract 1s therefore only opt1mal for the most efficient agent, but 1s 
otherw1se totally meffic1ent For all other agents, by lowenng the mduced level of effort below the first-
best (full-mfonnatwn) solutiOn wh1ch obtams when types are precontractually observable, the pnnc1pal 
captures some of the mformatwn rents wh1ch less effic1ent agents (who would otherw1se pass themselves 
off as bemg more effic1ent) can ach1eve 
9 Important differences m elude the assumptwn of the ex1stence of a symmetnc Nash eqmhbnum m wh1ch 
agents b1d m exactly the same way g1ven the1r true expected costs, 1 e a b1d functwn wh1ch 1s the same for 
all agents The approach m McAfee and McM1llan (1986) 1s to unpose a contract wh1ch IS lmear m cost 
over/under runs, and denve the opt1mal share rallo g1ven symmetriC behavwur by agents who each subm1t 
b1ds wh1ch max1m1se the1r expected ut1ht1es as we1ghted by the probab1hty ofthe1r b1d bemg the lowest 
10 Th1s type of contract IS ev1dent for example m pubhshmg nghts, whereby payments to an author mclude 
a fixed sum equal to the b1d, plus royalt1es 
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one, each agent must bid to cover his entire cost, thereby constraining the bid to be h1gh 
However, With a share ratio close to zero, each agent can effectively ignore his costs m 
makmg a bid, thereby forcmg agents to b1d lower and increasmg the competitiOn among 
them Essentially, the need to mcrease b1ddmg competitiOn by allocatmg agents a lower 
share of ex post costs acts together with insurance in the trade-off with mcentlves11 
Optimal mcentive contracts which are hnear m cost over/under runs have also been 
reported by Laffont and T1role (1986) m a model of firm regulatwn w1thout biddmg m 
which a central planner procures a pubhc good that provides a consumer surplus. 
ProductiOn cost depends on an intnns1c cost parameter (pnvate to the firm), 
(unobservable) cost reducmg effort, and a random vanable With zero mean The planner 
optimally pays a fixed sum and reimburses a fraction of the costs. This fraction 1s 
inversely related to the fixed transfer12 and mcreases w1th the firm's announced expected 
costs, as (perfectly) Signalled by 1ts choice from a contract menu specifymg productiOn 
quantity and transfer to the firm by type, With the transfer also dependent on (observable) 
realised cost13 
The optimahty of linear or quadratic schemes for problems wh1ch mix moral hazard and 
adverse selectiOn relies cruc~ally on assuming that agents are nsk neutral. In common 
with the case of pure moral hazard for wh1ch agent type 1s publicly observable, linear or 
11 
as a result ofwh1ch, even under nsk neutrality, corner solutiOns (values at either end of a support) for the 
share ratiO are never optimal 
12 The most efficient finn chooses a fixed-pnce contract, with the less efficient finns optmg for an mcen!Ive 
contract The fixed transfer mcreases with the proportiOn of total costs that the firm IS willmg to share 
13 In denvmg these results, Laffont and Tiro le ( 1986) apply an unusual approach They consider a restricted 
class of possible deviatiOns from an eqmhbnum ([l,e([l)) m which, after havmg untruthfully announced Its 
mtrms1c cost efficiency (as [l'), a finn supplies a cost reducmg effort (e<fllfl')) which IS different from the 
effort associated With the announcement which would be optimal for the planner, were the announcement 
to have been true (e(P')), 1 e e(fllfl') = e(p) + P' - fl The set (P' ,e(fllfl')) IS referred to as the concealment set 
They show that the linear contract rules out deviatiOns for this restricted class and then show that the 
solutiOn makes deviatiOns outside of the concealment set also unprofitable for the firm 
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quadratic mcentive contracts mduce meffictenctes14 under an assumption of risk 
aversion15 At vartance wtth lmear or quadratic schemes, dtchotomous mcentive contracts 
which impose large penalties for outcomes below a pre-spectfied performance target may 
implement the opttmal pure adverse selection allocatiOns and effort 16 when agents are 
mstead nsk averse. 
Zou (1992) examines dtchotomous contracts for which risk averse agents, who differ 
accordmg to their effort disutJhties, self-select a contract (an effort/fee schedule pair) 
parametised by agent type When the dtstnbutwn of output has a fixed support and output 
realisations permtt a suffictently accurate inference of agent effort17, moral hazard may 
be approximately18 ehmmated Altematively, tfthe lower bound of the output dtstnbution 
strictly mcreases wtth agent effort, then the moral hazard element of the relatwnshtp can 
be entirely eliminated. 
To appreciate why moral hazard ts completely ehmmated m the case of movable 
supports, we observe from Zou (1992) that the performance target is set equal to the 
lower bound of the support evaluated at the effort level which is optimal m the pure 
adverse selectwn problem for that agent type. Smce outcomes below thts lower bound are 
a perfect signal that the agent has supphed less than the reqmred effort, threats of 
14 due to the premmm for bearmg nsk requtred by the agent (see 2 2 I I) 
" Note agam that McAfee and McM11lan ( 1986) Impose a hnear share contract and denve the share ratiO 
which maximises the pnnc1pal's ut1hty when agents are nsk averse There IS no assertion that a hnear 
contract IS optimal 
16 These schemes can also be used when agents are nsk neutral and can be credibly threatened With 
pumshment for low realised profit outcomes However, for these schemes to apply, the prmc1pal IS 
supposed to exactly know the entire set for the support of the (bounded) stochast1c component m the 
productiOn functiOn In contrast, lmear or quadratiC schemes are less mfonnatwnally demandmg (P1card 
(1987)) 
17 such as for a normal distnbutlon, where the hkehhood ratio diverges to -oo when the output approaches 
the lower bound of the distnbutwn 
18 1 e the optimal dichotomous scheme asymptotically Implements the best pure adverse selectiOn outcome 
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sufficiently large penalties forcei 9 the agent to supply the desued effort and achieve the 
performance target Additionally, and most importantly for nsk averse agents, by 
awarding the agent a fixed allocatiOn (dependent only on type) for outcomes above the 
performance target, which is equal to the agent's pay in the pure adverse selection 
problem20, all mcome nsk is removed, thereby eliminatmg the cost which would 
otherwise accrue given the risk aversiOn of the agent 
The results m Zou (1992) discussed above rely on the credibility of the pnncipal 
imposing severe penalties on the agent for outcomes below the performance target 
Clearly, when the liability of the agent is instead hmited, such schemes become 
unenforceable However, given that the principal can never obtam a strictly greater 
expected utility than that which he would obtam if effort were mstead observable2I, a 
methodology has been applied22 m Zou (1992) by which we may attempt to synthesise 
the topics in the previOus chapters of this thesis. After we present the model in the 
following section, we will introduce the mixed adverse selectiOn and moral hazard game 
by discussmg the methodology that will allow us to denve the necessary condition for 
implementatiOn of the optimal pure adverse selectiOn outcome by a contmgent share ratio 
scheme m which borrower income cannot be less than zero 
19 the utthty of m come must tend to -oo as mcome tends to -oo 
20 In the pure adverse selectiOn problem, agent pay IS fixed per type, smce there ts no reqmrement to 
provtde mcenttves gtven that effort IS observable and therefore enforceable Any fee schedule whtch 
conditions the pay of agents on reahsed profit Imposes unnecessary costs due to nsk aversiOn 
21 Thts IS shown formally m Zou (I 992) (Corollary I) The mtui!Ion ts that the best solutiOn to a constramed 
ophmtsatiOn problem cannot be Improved upon by mcreasmg the number (or seventy) of constramts 
22 That the optimal pure adverse selectiOn outcome represents the benchmark (or first-best) outcome of the 
combmed moral hazard and adverse selectiOn was earher shown (mter aha) by Laffont and Ttrole (1986), 
Ptcard (1987), Guesnene et al (1988), and Catllaud et al (1988) 
66 
CHAPTER6 UNOBSERV ABLE EFFORT AND HIDDEN PRODUCTIVITY 
6.3 The Model 
In this sectwn we introduce a model which synthesises a variant of each of the models in 
Chapter 3, 4, and 5 We then discuss the hybrid model with specific reference to the 
original specificatiOns, prior to a subsequent discussion of the methodology used to 
denve and Implement the pure adverse selectwn solution usmg a contmgent share ratio 
scheme 
Let 8 e [_(:/, B] be a multiplicative productivity parameter23, such that for capital 
mvestment K(8), effort e(8), and ex ante uncertam state of nature ee[e0,ei], there exists a 
production technology H(K(8),e(8),e) which generates revenue 8H(K(8),e(8),e) 
H(K(8),e(8),e) IS increasmg me, and mcreases in K(8) and e(8) at a decreasing rate, i e 
H,(.,.,.) > 0 for i = 1,2,3, H,(,,) < 0 for I = 1,2, where subscripts denote partial 
differentiation w r t the Ith argument of H(, , ) The certam and constant publicly 
observable margmal opportunity cost of capital Is r, and profit IS 8H(K(8),e(8),e)- rK(8). 
23 An mterestmg model m which agent type 8 IS a probability distnbutiOn G8(e) of exogenous uncertamty E 
IS applied m Sappmgton (1983b) Sappmgton detenmnes whether the outcome of a prmcipal-agent 
relatiOnship will be ex-post efficient when the agent's mformation IS mitmlly better than that of the 
pnncipal, m the sense that the agent alone knows the actual distnbutiOn of uncertamty, and uncertamty E IS 
resolved pnor to the supply of unobservable effort The analysis concludes that although the nsk-neutral 
agent's supenor mformatiOn will often lead the prmcipal to mduce mefficient outcomes mtentwnally, such 
Will not always be the case This means that the standard result of mefficiency m all states except the 
highest when the agent's mformatwn IS miiially perfect (the agent knows the actual value of E) does not 
carry over to the case of Imperfect mformatiOn (the agent knows only the distribution of uncertamty) 
Sappmgton also separately denves conditions sufficient to ensure either an efficient or mefficient outcome 
Further, the assumptions of contmuous or discrete distnbutwns G9(E) are shown to qualitatively differ The 
reason for this IS as follows Smce the pnncipal will sometimes find It optimal to mduce mefficient 
outcomes for some distnbutwns m order to reduce the rents that must be awarded the agent m more 
productive environments, It IS advantageous to be able to manipulate payoff differentials more freely 
However, the condii!ons under which It Will be possible to do so are stronger when G9(e) IS contmuous than 
when d1screte because the mcentlve compatJblhty constramts are less restncttve m the latter case 
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Since a pay floor at zero is imposed for the agent, we assume that profit IS non-negative 
for all 8 and e. The investor has pnor beliefs about borrower types captured by 
cumulative distributiOn F(8), and the cumulative distribution of e IS G(e) The dJsutility of 
borrower effort e(8) IS Q(e(8)), where Q'(e(8)) > 0 and Q"(e(8)) > 0. 
Features wh1ch exist m the Isolated models and not m the hybrid case are the following. 
In the pure adverse selectiOn problem in Chapter 3, sortmg (separation) of borrowers was 
achieved by parametismg a set of mvestment and deductibility of capital cost pairs on a 
reported message vanable B. Importantly for moral hazard due to unobservable effort m 
the present context, we instead achieve separation of borrowers usmg a set of m vestment 
and effort pairs, and set the deduchb1lity of capital cost (a(8)) equal to one for all types 
of borrower. 
A feature of the hybnd model not present m the isolated case, is a production functiOn 
which explicitly includes effort as a factor of production In contrast m Chapter 3, effort 
was assumed equal for all borrowers, the disutlhty of which was written into their (equal) 
reservatiOn utilities, with an Implicit assumptiOn of separability between the dependence 
of the productiOn functiOn on borrower effort and mvestor capital As such, 1t IS true m 
general for the productiOn functwn24 m the present context that the margmal productiVIty 
of capital is not only detennined bye, but also by effort e(8) and a random variable e 
We now mtroduce the game played between the mvestor and borrower, which explams m 
detail the methodology applied m solving the mixed problem 
24 unless we make SimphfYmg assumptiOns For example, If the production functiOn IS a8H(K(8)) + 
b H ( e(8)) + e, where a and b are constants, then 8 IS the rnargmal productivity of capital, but not effort 
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6.4 The Game 
An investor 1s faced w1th a borrower who IS privately mformed about h1s type 8 and is 
reqmred to supply productive effort e(8) m generatmg uncertam profits 8H(K(8),e(8),E)-
rK(8). If the investor could observe effort, then he could offer the borrower a s1mple 
contract menu wh1ch mduces the borrower to truthfully reveal his type The contract 
menu would be a set of effort and mvestment paus { e(8), K(8)} parametised on a 
message variable wh1ch is the borrower's reported type, where the relatiOnship between 
e(8) and K(8) is determined by the type 8 mcentlve compatibility constraint. From the 
revelatiOn pnnc1ple (2.2 2 I) th1s IS w1thout loss of generality, and the investor's problem 
reduces to 1dent1fymg the contract menu from amongst the fam1ly of menus wh1ch mduce 
truthful reporting, that menu wh1ch delivers him the greatest expected utility Self-
selection of one of these pairs by a borrower not only determines the recommended 
effort, but also the expected pay of the borrower, since the borrower IS depicted to share a 
proportiOn 7tE(0,1) of ex post realised profit. 
Stnctly speaking, in a pure adverse selection context in which effort 1s observable, there 
is no gam to the investor m conditioning the pay of the borrower on ex post profits, since 
effort is enforceable and contracts need not prov1de mcent1vcs If the borrower were nsk 
averse, unnecessary losses result for the mvestor by cond1tionmg the pay of the borrower 
on ex post profits Th1s observatiOn provides JUStificatiOn for the modellmg simplification 
admiSSible m Zou (1992), where a contract menu { e (8), q; (9)} is offered to an agent 
w1th utility Q'(qi' (B))-Q(e (0),9). Agents reporting truthfully receive fixed pay q; (B), 
and differ according to theu margmal disutility of effort as captured by 8 
In the context of the pure adverse selectwn problem in th1s chapter, where there is no 
moral hazard, the borrower's realised utility 1s mstead <p(8,B)-Q(e(B)), where <p(9,B) = 
n(8H(K(B),e(B),E)- rK(B)). It 1s clear that a contract menu such as {e(8), K(8)} which 
mduces truthful type revelatiOn IS equivalent to { e(8), q; (8)} for a nsk neutral borrower 
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provtded that the fixed pay ?j (8) equals the expectatiOn of <p(8) (tdentlcal to <p(8,8)) 
taken over the dtstnbution of&jor znvestment K(8), i e q; (8) = E,nX(8,E) where X(8,E) = 
8H(K(8),e(8),E)- rK(8) In the analyses of the proceeding sectwns, we impose agent pay 
to be a proportional allocation of ex post profits, and merely observe m passmg the 
simplificatiOn avmlable when exa!llining pure adverse selection problems for which pay 
schemes may be permttted to reward agents wtth fixed allocations which do not vary with 
the realisatiOn of ex post profit. 
Turning now to the mtroduction of moral hazard mto the problem faced by the mvestor, 
at issue 1s how the mvestor can maximtse his expected utility through the destgn of a 
contract mechamsm when the the borrower chooses hts effort to maximise hts own 
uttlity. A cructal observatiOn m answenng thts questiOn denves from the tmpact of moral 
hazard on the incenttve compatlbtlity constraints m the mtxed problem. 
It transpues that moral hazard does not affect the distortionary mfluence of the 
borrower's precontractual pnvate informatwn25 Therefore, the compound mcentive 
problem, that of truthful revelation of pnvate informatiOn and the procurement of greater 
effort from the borrower, dtstil into two separate problems As such, the mvestor offers 
an expanded contract menu The contract menu is the set of effort and mvestment patrs 
for each borrower type whtch would be optimal m the pure adverse selection problem, 
and m addttton, a type contmgent dtchotomous scheme The effort and associated 
mvestment patr chosen by the borrower mduces truthful type revelation, and the 
contingent share ratio scheme precipitated from the choice of effort/mvestment pair, 
attempts to induce the borrower to supply the recommended level of effort. In order for 
the expanded contract menu to achteve the outcome of the pure adverse selectwn 
25 To see thts note that If the expected utility of a borrower of type B supplymg effort e and reportmg hts 
type to be iJ IS U 0 (B,B,e),then(local) mcentivecompatibihtymeansthat u"!.(B,O,e)l. =0 and 
B B=B 
a " a a "' I moral hazard ensures Ue (B,B,e)=O Therefore, dU (B,e)=Ue(B,B,e) O=B However, thiS IS the 
(local) mcentive compatibility constramt without moral hazard (for effort e) 
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problem, the contmgent share ratiO scheme must also leave the borrower (and therefore 
the mvestor) with exactly the same expected utility 
Lastly, for the contingent share ratio scheme to award the borrower the same expected 
utility as he would ach1eve in the pure adverse selectiOn problem, there must be no 
chance that the borrower can be pumshed by a lower share ratio 1f he had actually 
supplied the recommended amount of effort The performance target 1s therefore set 
equal to the profit wh1ch would obtam were the borrower to supply the recommended 
effort and the lowest poss1ble value of E were to be realised The share ratiO wh1ch 
obtams for outcomes no less than the performance target 1s equal to the share rat1o in the 
pure adverse selectiOn problem Therefore, 1f the scheme mduces the borrower to supply 
the recommended effort, his expected utility 1s the expectatiOn of h1s share of ex post 
profit taken over the entire support of EE [ Eo,E 1], with a share ratio equal to 1t 
We may now summar1se the game for the m1xed problem. The investor offers the 
borrower a contract menu {eA(8),KA(8),A.(8),Xc(8)}\f8 on a take-1t-or-leave-1t baSIS, 
where { eA(8),KA(8)} \7'8 are the mcentive compatible effort and mvestment pair for each 
type of borrower m the pure adverse selectiOn problem The set {A.(8),X,(8)} \7'8 define a 
contingent share ratio scheme with proportiOnal share ratiO reductiOn A.(8) and profit 
target X,(8) The share ratio of the borrower which obtains 1f realised profit IS no less 
than the performance target IS n, and for realised profit less than the performance target, 
the share of ex post profits allocated to the borrower IS A.(8)n The target X,(8) equals the 
lowest poss1ble profit 1f the borrower supplies effort eA(8). If accepted, the borrower 
selects a contract mtended for his type from the menu The mvestor then smks cap1tal 
KA(8), after which the borrower supplies effort eA(8), bemg mduced to do so by the 
incentive pressure created by the associated contingent share ratiO scheme State of nature 
E is then realised from EE[Eo,E1], after wh1ch allocatiOns are made to the mvestor and to 
the borrower from realised profits 
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In the next section we denve the optimal contract menu for the pure adverse selectwn 
problem, after wh1ch we turn to examine the conditions for wh1ch a contmgent share ratio 
scheme implements th1s solutiOn m a combmed moral hazard and adverse selection 
settmg 
6.5 The Pure Adverse Selection Problem 
Recall from 6 2 that the best outcome possible for the mvestor m the m1xed problem IS to 
design a contract mechamsm which 1s mcentive compatible and mduces a borrower to 
Implement the mvestment and effort pair wh1ch would be optimal were effort to be 
observable. In th1s section we denve the contract menu whiCh 1s opt1mal in the pure 
adverse selection problem 
6.5.1 Incentive compatible mechanisms 
Suppose that the pay of a borrower of type () who declares h1s type to be iJ for state of 
nature E 1s rp(O, iJ,&), where rp(O,iJ, &) = 7rX(O, IJ,c) = :r(OH(K(B),e(B),&)- rK(B)) 
The expected utility of a type 0 borrower declanng iJ is then ua (O,iJ) where 
&I 
ua (O,B) = f7rX(O,B,c)dG(c)- Q(e(B)) 
& 
0 
' ' 
= E8 7rX(O,O,c)- Q(e(O)) 
where the (unconditional) expectatiOn operator IS over stochastic state of nature E. 
Global incentive compatibility reqmres that 
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U"(B,B);?: U"(B,B) l:i9e[~,7h l:iBe[~.B](2) 
\\!here (g1ven smtable a monotomc1ty conditiOn, see Appendix I) we can mstead replace 
the global mcent1ve compallb!ilty constramt of (2) with the locally true conditiOns 
ae 
=0 au· (B,B) (3) 
where the second condition m (3) ensures that the first condition is both necessary and 
sufficient to ensure that the local stationary point e = B is a maximum for a type B 
borrower26 
Now differenl!atmg U" (B,B) totally (by the cham rule), settmg e = B, and applymg (3), 
we denve 
dU" (e) au· ce.e) 
= 
dB ae 
(4) 
Substituting (I) into (4) now y1elds 
dU" (B) .:.:...::..._d~B:...:.. = E5 trH(K(B),e(B),s) (5) 
whereU"(fJ,fJ) is wntten as U"(B), and (5) may be mtegrated to give 
" U" (fJ) = U" (~) + J E 
5
trH(K(s),e(s),s)ds (6) 
~ 
"Note that by d1fferent1atmg u'!. = 0 totally, and then settmg B = B, the second order condition may also 
B 
bewntten Ua·l· > 0 BB B=B 
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Smce all borrowers except type fl_ have an incentive to pass themselves off as lower e 
types 1f the mvestor were to offer the full mforrnation (observable type) contract menu, 
borrowers are awarded an information rent in the adverse selectiOn problem2\the second 
term in (6)) wh1ch is increasing m type (9) 
6.5.2 The optimal pure adverse selection contract menu 
We are now ready to derive the optimal pure adverse selection contract menu, denoted 
{eA(9), KA(9)}\i9E[{l_,B]. The mvestor's expected utilityUP(B)for a type 9 borrower 
who self-selects a contract from an mcentive compatible menu { eA(9), KA(9)} 1s g1ven by 
U" (B)= E (BH(K(B),e(B),&)- rK(B))- E rp(B,s) 
c & 
=E BH(K(B),e(B),s)-rK(B)-U"(B)-Q(e(B)) (7) 
& 
where (7) follows from (I) w1th e = e The mvestor designs a contract menu which 
maxim1ses the expectatiOn of the utility UP(B) he rece1ves from a type 9 borrower over 
the d1stnbution of poss1ble types that he faces, subJect to incentive compatibility and 
part!Clpatwn by the borrower From (6), th1s latter constramt 1s satisfied for all types 1f 
U" (fl_) 2: U, where U iS the reservation utility of each borrower type28• 
The solutwn w1ll satisfy the mcenhve compatibility constraint of the borrower if U"(B) 
m (7) is given by (5) or eqmvalently (6) Therefore, takmg the expectatiOn of UP(B)over 
the dJstnbutwn of types, the expected ut1lity E8UP(B)ofthe mvestor is g1ven by 
27 see discussion m 3 4 2 , and parlicularly footnote no 23 
28 Assummg that the reservation utility for all types of borrower IS equal 1mphes that borrowers can only 
extract rents from their pnvately endowed productiVIty m formatiOn If they contract an agreement w1th the 
mvestor Outs1de of th1s relatiOnship their m formatiOn has no value 
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(j 
f[E 8H(K(8),e(8),&)- rK(8)- U" (8)- Q(e(8))]dF(8) (8) 
!1 " 
In order to s1mphfy (8), we mtegrate E 8U" (8) by parts, whereby 
ju" (8)dF(8) = F(B)U" (B)- F((j_)U" ((j_)- idU:~8) F(8)d8 
e 
= U" (B)- fJZ"E H(K(8),e(8),&)F(8)d8 (9) 
!1 " 
and the second lme in (9) follows from mcenl!ve compatibility (5) Subsl!tutmg (9) mto 
(8) we denve the expected utility (1gnonng U" (8) which IS a constant) as 
8rl(e + JZ" F(8) JE H(K(8), e(8),&)- rK (8)- Q(e(8))]dF(8) (1 0) Jl F1 (8) " 
Now maxim1smg (1 0) by pomtw1se optim1sat10n w r t e(8) and K(8), the optimal pure 
adverse selection contract menu {eA(8), KA(8)} IS given for all 8E[(j_,8] by the first 
order condit10ns29 
(11) 
29 G1ven the general form of productiOn functiOn H(KA(8)h(8),B), SJgnmg eA'(8) and KA'(8) IS amb1guous 
However, by d1fferent1atmg (I!) and (12) w r t 8, assummg H 12() ~ 0, and $'(8) > 0, where $(8) = 8 + 
nF(8)/F1(8), KA'(8) > 0 Further, 1fQ"(eA(8))-,P(8)H22() > 0 (as for example 1fQ(e) ~ e", where OJIS only 
JUSt greater than one), then eA'(8) > 0 
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e 
( B + :r F(B)) J H 2 (K A (B),e A (B), s)dG(c)- Q'(e A (B)) = 0 (12) Fl(B) e 
0 
We are now ready to establish the necessary conditiOns for implementatiOn of the 
solutiOn to the pure adverse selection problem when moral hazard obtams, and effort 1s 
mstead unobservable. 
6.6 Adverse Selection with Moral Hazard 
Havmg denved the optimal pure adverse selection contract menu { eA(8), 
KA(8)} ve E [ t;!, B ], we are now ready to derive the cond1t10ns under wh1ch a contingent 
share ratiO scheme can implement effort eA(8) after a borrower selects (eA(8), KA(8)) 
from the menu 
Let the target profit be Xc(8) = X(KA(8),eA(8),Eo), where X(KA(8),eA(8),E) = 
8H(KA(8),eA(8),E) - rKA(8). Denote the cntlcal realisatiOn B(e(B)) of ex ante uncertain 
var1able E for effort e(8) and investment KA(8) of a e type borrower such that 
Xc(8) = X(KA(8),e(8), c(e(B))) (13) 
From (13), if type e borrower supplies effort e(8), for B ~ c(e(B)), X~ X c (B), and for 
s < &( e( B)), X < X c (B) . Define a contmgent share raho scheme such that the share ratiO 
- -
of the borrower IS 1t for & ~ &(e(B)), and A.(8)1t for B < B(e(B)). Then the expected utility 
ua (B,e(B)) of a type e borrower who truthfully declares his type and supplies effort e(8) 
IS 
• 
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&(e(B)) cl f 2(B):rX(KA (B),e(B),&)dG(&) + _ f:rX(KA (B),e(B),&)dG(&)- Q(e(B)) (14) 
c 0 c(e(B)) 
D1fferentiatmg (14) w r t. e(8), a necessary conditiOn for the borrower to supply an effort 
no less than eA(8) is u: (B,eA (B))?. 0. This IS because If u: (B,e(B)) > 0 for e(8) < 
eA(8), the utility of the borrower can be m creased by m creasing effort to eA(8) Also, for 
a borrower who supplies effort e(8) ?. eA(8) thereby recelVlng expected utility 
E.nX(KA(8),e(8),E)-Q(e(8)), there IS no mcentive to provide effort greater than eA(8) 
since the margmal benefits and none of the associated costs of effort are shared with the 
mvestor. 
For {eA(8), KA(e)} given by (11) and (12), the type e borrower therefore chooses an 
mcentlve compatible contract (eA(8), KA(8)), supplies effort eA(8), and receives expected 
utility E.nX(KA(8),eA(8),E)-Q(eA(8)), provided 
e(e (B)) 
A f 2(B):rXe(KA(B),eA(B),&)dG(&)+ 
c 
0 
cl 
f:rXe (KA (B),e A (B),&)dG(&) 
c(e (B)) 
A 
Also note however from (13) that Xc(8) = X(KA(8),eA(8),Eo) = X(KA(8),e(8), &(e(B))) 
implies that &(eA (B))= &0 Therefore, (15) simplifies to 
(16) 
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From (6) (withU"(~) = U), the expected type e borrower utility IS 
0 
U" (B)= U + I E /rH(K(s),e(s),s)ds Therefore, for a borrower supplymg effort eA(8), 
Q 
from (14) with s(eA(B)) =sa, the optimal pure adverse selection allocation obtains If 
~ e 
I :rX(KA (B),e A (B),s)dG(s) = U + Q(e A (B))+ IE8~rH(K A (B'),e A (B'),s)dB' (17) 
~ e 
Fmally, dividmg (16) by (17) we obtain the necessary condition for contract menu 
{ eA(8), KA(8), A-(8), X,(9)} ve to Implement the best pure adverse selection outcome30, 
~ -
I X e(K A (B),e A (B),s)dG(s)- (1- -t(B))Xc (B)G1 (s 0 ) ds(e A (B)) 
8 
de 
0 > 
81 
IX(K A (B),e A (B),s)dG(s) 
8 
0 
e 
U + Q(e A (B))+ IE8~rH(K A (B'),e A (B'),s)dB' 
e 
where eA(8) and KA(9) are denved from (11) and (12) 
(18) 
3° For threats of a lower share ratiO l.(8)n to mduce effort greater than e (< eA(8)), we assume that 
0 iJE8 <p(O,e) < 0 From (14), w1th X(8,e) Identical to 8H(K(8),e(8),E)- rK(8), th1s reduces to 
iJA.(9) oe 
- d~(e) c(e) 
Xc(8)G (8(e))--+ J 8H2(KA(8),e,8)dG(c)<O Note that With Xc(8) equal to the lowest 
I de c 
0 
possible profit when the borrower supplies effort eA(8), this expressiOn reduces to 
dc(e (8)) 
X c (8)G (8(e (8))) A < 0 wh1ch 1s necessanly true 
I A de 
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6. 7 Discussion 
Some mterestmg features of the necessary cond1t10n (18) ex1st m comparison to the 
equivalent pure moral hazard condition (Chapter 4, (29), for a nsk neutral borrower, 'A > 
* . 0, and Xc = X(e ,&0 )) The pure moral hazard condition 1s 
&J - * 
f * * dc(e ) Xe(e ,c)dG(c)-(1-A.)Xc G1(c0 )----''---'-
eo de > Q'(e *) 
& 
I * 
Jxce ,c)dG(c) 
& 
0 
- * U +Q(e ) 
(19) 
For the contmgent share ratio contract m the mixed problem to implement the best pure 
adverse selectiOn outcome, the target profit had to be set equal to the profit wh1ch obtams 
' 
1f the borrower supplies the recommended effort ( eA(8)) for the lowest realisation of 
exogenous uncertamty (e0). However m the pure moral hazard case, the target profit can 
be set m excess of the corresponding lowest profit (1 e. the profit which obtains for effort 
e' and realised uncertamty e0 ) 31 Th1s difference reflects a restrictiOn m the space of 
dichotomous mcentlve schemes32 which implement the effort level most preferred by the 
mvestor, when there is an increase m the severity of the mformatwn asymmetry between 
the borrower and the mvestor 
31 Note that the first best effort m the pure adverse selectwn problem w1ll only equal the first best effort m 
the pure moral hazard problem for the lowest value e borrower ( (!) To see th1s, observe that from (12), the 
opllmal pure adverse selectwn contract menu equates the (expected) margmal product and margmal costs 
of effort only for 9 =(! (smce F((!) = 0) 
32 Recall from chapters 4 and 5 that m general there may ex1st a range of target profits for the pure moral 
hazard case that mduce the agent/borrower to supply the soCially opt1mal effort 
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A second mterestmg feature is the last term m the denommator of the nght hand side of 
(18), which 1s an mforrnatwn rent that mcreases with borrower type. Clearly, mespect1ve 
of the incentive contract that the investor des1gns to overcome the problem of moral 
hazard due to the unobservab1hty of effort, the precontractual endowment of valuable 
pnvate mforrnatwn to the borrower mtroduces inefficiencieS, smce except for the lowest 
borrower type, the mvestor cannot keep borrowers at the1r reservation ulihty 
At first glance th1s consideration seems to suggest that since the investor IS res1gned With 
probability one to award the borrower an informatiOn rent, a consequent mcrease m the 
denominator of the right hand s1de of (18) renders th1s cond1t10n weaker than (19) 
However, the effort most preferred by the mvestor for the mixed problem exceeds that of 
the pure moral hazard problem for all but the lowest borrower type Consequently, the 
weakemng of(l8) m companson to (19) due to the allocatwn of a rent to the borrower is 
offset by a rcqmred effort m the m1xed case which exceeds 1ts correspondmg value for 
the pure moral hazard problem. As a result, the ordenng of the strengths of conditions 
(18) and (19) 1s m general arnb1guous 
Lastly, a feature of the model of adverse selectwn m Chapter 3 not specifically alluded to 
m the mixed model 1s the welfare improvmg effect of the liability constraint. In th1s 
respect, ex ante uncertainty as to whether the pay floor becomes bindmg m the m1xed 
problem denves from exogenous uncertainty & mstead of the opportunity cost of capital r 
Notwithstandmg that the optimal pure adverse selectwn outcome depends on the level of 
the pay floor of the borrower, the 1ssue for the m1xed problem IS whether the assocmted 
contmgent share rat10 contract can implement this solution. Varymg the pay floor w1ll 
therefore serve to 'move the goal posts' when we permit a greater range of borrower 
payoffs, such as m a model wh1ch allows for the shanng of both profits and losses 
However, observe that a trade-off ex1sts when we extend the range of payoffs over wh1ch 
the pay of the borrower vanes w1th profit Decreasmg the pay floor increases the wedge 
between the first-best pure moral hazard effort and the first-best pure adverse selectiOn 
effort, by mcreasmg the mforrnatwn rent that h1gher borrower types can command (see 
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3 5 2) A second effect of lowenng the m1mmum pay floor 1s however to better fac1litate 
the use of threat-based mcentive mechamsms a1med at Implementing the opt1mal pure 
adverse selection outcome, smce an associated w1dening of the pay differentml for the 
borrower 1s thereby rendered poss1ble, between outcomes m wh1ch the realised profit 1s 
less than, or greater than or equal to, the target profit 
We now collect concluding remarks. 
6.8 Concluding remarks 
In th1s chapter we exammed a combmed problem of moral hazard and adverse selectton, 
where a borrower endowed with precontractual mformation about the production functwn 
of a venture wholly financed by an investor, supphes hidden effort and IS awarded pay m 
duect proportiOn to reahsed profits. To hm1t the costs of h1s 1gnorance, the investor can 
do no better than to offer a contract menu which ehc1ts truthful (type) revelatwn by the 
borrower about the production functwn, and wh1ch motivates the borrower to supply the 
recommended level of effort for h1s type It was poss1ble to determine the optimal truth 
reveahng contract menu mdependently of the moral hazard problem arising from hidden 
effort, and a necessary cond1t1on (18) for a contmgent share ratio contract was derived for 
wh1ch the opt1mal pure adverse selectwn (observable effort) solution could be 
Implemented. 
As d1scussed m Chapter 4, contmgent share rat10 schemes may be less effective m 
inducmg an agent to supply effort than pure-lump sum schemes This meffic1ency anses 
from the offsettmg mcentive effects of the threat of a lower share ratio, wh1ch decreases 
mcentive pressure by allocatmg the agent a reduced share of all outcomes below the 
target level, wh1lst increasing mcentive pressure through a greater JUmp m agent pay for 
outcomes no less than the target At the expense of mvoking the use of (relatively less 
effic1ent) contingent share ratio schemes, we have therefore synthesised the key 
components of the Isolated informatwn problems exammed m the prevwus chapters, m 
order to denve a more hohstlc v1ew 
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Appendix I 
Global applicability of locally true incentive 
compatibility constraints 
We will now show m outline33 that H(K(9),e(9),e) non-decreasing m 9 is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for locally true incentive compatibility to obtam 
globally 
(I) Necessity. 
From (2), global mcentlve compatibility reqmres 
U"(O,e) 2 U"({},B) vee[~,e], \fBe[~,O](AI) 
ei 
Usmg (1), U" (O,B) = U" (B,B) + f1r(O- B)H(K(B),e(B),B)dG(li) (A2) 
Therefore, (AI) may be expressed as, 
& 
0 
&! 
U" (0,0) 2 U" (B, B)+ f1r(O- B)H(K(B),e(B),B)dG(li) (A3) 
Similarly, 
& 
0 
&! 
U" (B,B) = U" (0,8) + f1r(B- B)H(K(O),e(O),B)dG(li) 
& 
0 
and therefore, (AI) may also be expressed as 
&! 
(A4) 
U" (8, B) :>U" (B,B) + He- B)H(K(O),e(B),B)dG(B) (A5) 
Combmmg (A3) and (A4) yields 
& 
0 
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01 °1 J Jr((} -B)H(K(B),e(O),&)dG(s) $ J1r(B- O)H(K(()),e(B),&)dG(s) (A6) 
f: f: 
0 0 
If global incentive compat1b1hty obtains, then a necessary cond1t10n is that cond1tion (A6) 
1s satisfied, 1mplymg that H(K(8),e(8),s) 1s non-decreasmg m 8 
(2) Sufficiency 
From locally true mcenttve compattb1hty condition (6), 
e "1 
U" ((),()) = U" (fl_) + J J:r!i(K(s),e(s),s)dsdG(s) (A7) 
ec 
- 0 
'f: e 1 
and U" (B,B) = U" (fl_) + f f2rH(K(s),e(s),s)dsdG(s) 
Substttutmg (A 7) mto (A8) gives 
ec 
- 0 
8 "1 
(A8) 
U"(O,O) = U"((),()) + j)1rH(K(s),e(s),s)dsdG(s) (A9) 
0 
e 
Substttutmg (A2) into (A9), rewriting (8-0)H(K(O),e(O),&) as JH(K(O),e(O),s)ds 
8 
y1elds 
8 "1 
U" ((),())- U" ((),0) = J HH(K(O),e(O},s)- H(K(s),e(s),s)]dsdG(s) (AIO) 
ec 
0 
which together w1th (AI) 1mmed1ately y1elds the suffic1ency result 
33 See proof m Chapter 3, Appendix 11 for more details 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary of results and areas for future research 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the implications of 1mposmg a mmimum pay 
constramt for an agent who is endowed w1th pnvate mformatwn either before, during or 
both before and durmg the execution of a profit sharing contract w1th a pnncipal The 
mo!iva!ion for exarnmmg the affect of pay floors in the context of asymmetnc 
information derives from having iden!ified that this area is relatively under-researched 
For a problem of adverse selectwn, m which there exists a precontractual mformation 
asymmetry, limited agent (borrower) liability has been researched only m the context of 
debt contracts (see 2 3.4), With no analogous exarnmatwn of the affects of limited agent 
liability m profit sharing agreements In Chapter 3 we established an mnovatJve model m 
which knowledge of the production functwn was private to the agent before the pnnc1pal 
invested capital, and m which Importance was attnbuted to the proportiOn of capital costs 
allocated to the borrower as a contractual vanable used to sort agents by type We found 
that the Imposition of a pay floor for the agent created an overall welfare Improvement 
and reduced the extent to which the mvestor was reqmred to overinvest capital as part of 
a strategy mtended to mimm1se the cost to the mvestor of h1s precontractual Ignorance 
We also established when mformatwn 1s bi-laterally asymmetric, where the mvestor 1s 
pnvately endowed w1th mformation which IS valuable to the agent, that a welfare loss 
results with no associated meffic1ency m the optimal investment schedule 
The welfare enhancmg effect of a mmimUlll pay floor denved m Chapter 3 is extremely 
Important to the understandmg of the affects of precontractual mformatwn asymmetry m 
profit sharmg agreements. The analogous insight for problems of moral hazard, m wh1ch 
effort supplied dunng the executiOn of a contract is unobservable to the prmcipal, is that 
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varymg the pay of an agent wtth realised profit creates mcentives to provide effort and 
mttigates the problem of moral hazard, albeit that 1t ts a reductwn m the vanabthty of pay 
for some range of profits in whtch the pay floor binds, that creates a benefit for profit 
sharmg agreements wtth a pay floor 
Further research m to the affects of pay floors in profit sharmg agreements could constder 
alternative model specifications, such as an addttive (viz-a-vtz multiplicative) privately 
endowed mformatwn parameter determining the production functwn, or better still, 
extend the discussiOn by admtttmg a general production functwn and/or nsk aversion 1. 
However, we conJecture that the basic mtmtwn revealed usmg the model in Chapter 3 
wtll remam unaltered and will not be affected by relaxmg the assumptwns made therem 
at the expense of greater modellmg complexity. 
A second, and no less important contnbutwn made by the thests was the examinatiOn of 
mcentive contracts used to motivate agents to supply greater (unobservable) effort, when 
hmtted agent habtlity renders incredtble the threat of severe or potentmlly unlimited 
pumshment m the event of low profit outcomes A commonly discussed incentive 
contract m the literature (see 2 3.2) ts a bonus scheme m which an agent recetves a lump-
sum increase m pay tf realised profit exceeds a prespecified performance target. 
However, we tdentified that no published literature extsts to examine the case of a 
(p1ecewise linear) profit sharmg contract m which the profit shanng ratio ttself IS 
contmgent on some outcome 
In Chapter 4 we found that the effective use of these contracts is sensttive to the 
productiOn technology as well as to the ex ante beliefs whtch obtain concemmg 
exogenous uncertainty, m a manner not true of theu lump-sum bonus counterparts The 
reason for this stems from the contrary incentive effects of a widenmg share ratio 
dtfferential Increasing the dtfference between the share rattos by decreasmg the share 
rat10 which obtams for profits below the performance target increases mcentlves to 
provtde effort through a greater lump-sum pay element, but decreases incenttves due to a 
1 see Zou (I 992) for an ms1ght mto the effects of agent nsk aversiOn m problems of adverse selectiOn 
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reduced agent share of profit for all outcomes below the target. This general ambigutty 
for the case of a nsk neutral agent motivated an mvestlgatwn of the effects of assuming 
agents to mstead be risk averse, wherein we tdentified three tmportant ranges of (constant 
relative) nsk aversion. Most tmportantly we tdentified a mtddle range for whtch there 
exists a cnttcal reduction in share rat10 for outcomes below the target, such that the 
effective use of contmgent share ratio schemes rehes on the use of threats whteh are 
suffictently severe m relation to thts cntlcal value 
Pnncipal-agent models used to examine moral hazard usually assume that the agent 
supphes no capttal (see 2.2.1 and 2 3 2) However, real-world profit sharing schemes may 
require a (nommal) contnbution of capital by an agent as a way of showmg commthnent 
to the success of a venture through the supply of productive effort Therefore, the mam 
theme of Chapter 5 was to consider an extension of the contmgent share ratio incenttve 
contract explored m Chapter 4, m order to examme a capttal partnershtp agreement in 
whtch capttal contnbutors other than the agent are sleepmg partners who supply no effort. 
We were able to denve suffictent condttlons for which a Pareto Improvement would be 
avmlable by the relaxation of pumshment threats whtch reduce the ex post profit share of 
the agent for low profit outcomes, in favour of (margmal) capttal substltutwn by the 
agent 
In reahty, the isolated issues of moral hazard and adverse selection wtll coextst as an 
integrated problem of informatiOn asymmetry. For example an entrepreneur may be 
pnvately endowed with productivity information whtch determmes the nsk of return for 
would-be investors, but would also (characteristically) provtde effort whtch ts only 
pnvately observable. 
As such, Chapter 6 exammed the mteractwn of these problems, and how the solutions 
which obtain m the tsolated cases are affected by the existence of addttwnal and separate 
mformation problems We determmed a necessary conditwn for estabhshmg the best 
posstble outcome avmlable to an mvestor who faces a combmed problem of moral hazard 
due to unobservable effort, with adverse selection artsmg from (ex ante) pnvately 
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endowed productivtty mforrnatwn The most mterestmg feature of the combined 
problem, m whtch we were able to synthesise the essentml analysts from precedmg 
chapters, was that irrespective of the (type dependent) mcentive scheme used to 
tmplement the effort level most preferred by the investor for the parttcular productivtty of 
the project m whtch he mvests, the investor wlll almost surely2 bear a cost attnbuted to 
hts ex ante ignorance concemmg the productivlty of the venture In thts regard, the first-
best outcome ts manifestly dtfferent from the case of pure moral hazard. However, 1t ts 
also the case that moral hazard due to the unobservabthty of effort does not mtroduce 
addttional meffictencies mto the optimal mvestment schedule Further, lowering the 
mmtmum pay floor creates countervmhng effects As established m Chapter 3, a lower 
pay floor extends the range of profit outcomes over which the pay of the agent vanes 
wtth reahsed profit, and therefore m creases the (ex post) mefficiencies m m vestment 
through greater mforrnatwn rents However, m contrast, lower pay floors also mcrease 
the feastble pay differential between agent pay which obtams for realised profit above or 
below the performance target, thereby rendenng more effective the use of punishment 
schemes as a way to ehctt greater agent effort 
In the mtroductory chapter, we (partly) motivated the use of (ptecewise hnear) profit 
sharmg contracts by the notion that awarding effort through (only) a fixed wage may m 
some way be a result more of mertta than stnct economtc rationale, smce although both 
the mtcro and macro economtc vtrtues of profit shanng remam contentious, we have 
exposed valuable features m profit sharing agreements httherto not mentwned by the 
hterature. 
To be more specific, as we draw thts thests to a close, 1t is mforrnative to present a 
hohsllc vtew of the effects of awardmg an agent a (lmear) share of ex post profits with a 
pay floor, m companson to a pure fixed wage agreement On the one hand, fixed wage 
agreements create no adverse selection problem, if entrepreneurs rece!Ve a wage winch is 
mdependent of the productivtty of their ventures. However, fixed wage agreements 
engender the worst posstble problem of moral hazard, smce theoretlcally at least, an 
2 
with probability one 
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agent has no mcentive to provide effort. In contrast, p1ecew1se lmear hmited hab1lity 
profit sharmg agreements bnng about a problem of adverse selectwn through the 
variability m agent pay from an (ex ante) uncertain profit Th1s problem is mitigated by 
the pay floor. Also, smce profit sharing contracts are necessanly incentive schemes, 
motivatwn 1s provided for the agent to supply a non-zero effort Therefore, overall, these 
contracts represent a middle ground when cons1denng the implicatwns of both moral 
hazard and adverse selectwn In contrast, wage agreements highly favour the mitigation 
of the effects of e1ther one or the other of these informatiOn asymmetries, but cannot 
simultaneously reduce the extent of both problems 
An interestmg area for further work is therefore to formalise the above argument in order 
to benchmark the efficiency of p1ecewise linear lim1ted liab1lity profit sharmg contracts in 
relatiOn to fixed wage agreements, perhaps for a var1ety of assumptions includmg for 
example the probability d1stnbutwn of ex ante uncertamty and the risk averswn of all 
contractmg part1es 
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